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## The Old South



# THE OLD SOUTH

The geographic, economic, social, political,  
and cultural expansion, institutions,  
and nationalism of the  
ante-bellum South

by

R. S. COTTERILL

*Professor of Southern History, Florida State College for Women*



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# Contents

PREFACE . . . . .	9
THE SOUTHERN BACKGROUND . . . . .	15
The Face of the Earth . . . . .	17
The Oldest Inhabitants . . . . .	37
The Colonial Foundation . . . . .	59
EXPANSION OF THE SOUTH . . . . .	89
Expansion of the Tobacco Country . . . . .	91
The Rise of the Cotton Kingdom . . . . .	107
Crossing the Mississippi . . . . .	129
DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN NATIONALISM . . . . .	139
The Beginning of Southern Nationalism . . . . .	141
Sectionalism . . . . .	151
The Jacksonian Migration . . . . .	165
Trade and Transportation . . . . .	177
A Decade of Discontent . . . . .	187
The Southern Movement, 1848-1851 . . . . .	201
Building the Railroads . . . . .	215
Cotton Is King . . . . .	229
Secession . . . . .	241
THE CULTURE OF THE OLD SOUTH . . . . .	259
The Social System . . . . .	261
Education . . . . .	281
Literature . . . . .	293
THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE . . . . .	315
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	333
INDEX . . . . .	345



## Maps and Charts

PHYSIOGRAPHIC DIAGRAM OF THE OLD SOUTH . . .	21
THE SOUTHERN INDIAN COUNTRY . . . . .	55
EXPANSION OF THE SOUTH . . . . .	113
INDIAN LAND CESSIONS . . . . .	169
SOUTHERN RAILROADS, APRIL, 1861 . . . . .	221
SLAVEHOLDERS, 1860 . . . . .	274



## Preface



## Preface

Until the past ten or fifteen years the history of the South was a vast *terra incognita* concerning which the American people were apparently content to be misinformed or not informed at all. The West was discovered by Turner and exploited by his disciples, colonial history was re-written on the basis of facts rather than patriotism, but the South remained neglected as a sort of Bad Lands of "rebellion" whose history could have no significance except as a warning. These latter days, however, have witnessed a revival of interest in the history of the South. U. B. Phillips, wielding a prolific and able pen, led the way. A voice crying in the wilderness for many years, he was finally joined by an increasing number of writers such as Abernethy, Coulter, Crane, Craven, Henderson, Owsley, and others. The result of their efforts has been the revealing of a new South, in which slavery was merely a "peculiar institution" and not the central theme. Their writings have been accompanied by an awakening interest on the part of scholars and laity, by an increase of courses in Southern history in colleges and universities, by a rejuvenation of state historical societies in the South, and by a more just appreciation of the part the South has played in the building of the nation. The work is far from finished, but it is far enough advanced to be summarized.

There is at present no synthesis of Southern history, and there ought to be – hence this volume. As a pioneer

undertaking, the chief difficulty in its writing has been that of organization. There have been no previous books to chart the way, no prior guides to follow. The writer has had to determine for himself what things to include, what to omit. Arbitrarily, he has treated the colonial period merely as introductory, stressing only such features as seem to him essential to a proper understanding of the later period. In this later period, he has treated casually and incidentally those events so well known as to be discussed at large in general histories of the United States. He has had no desire to re-hash a story merely to make a book. The ambition throughout has been to relate as clearly as possible the story of the Old South; if there be a central theme at all, it is the development of Southern nationalism.

The bibliography contains only those titles which the writer has found in fifteen years of teaching Southern history to be most useful for an understanding of the subject. Annotation has been limited, for the most part, to things that are novel or in dispute. There seems little reason for bolstering accepted facts with references to authorities.

The writer has asked help only in the field of ethnology and geology. He gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Peter O. Brannon of the Alabama Anthropological Society for reading and criticizing the chapter on "The Oldest Inhabitants," and to Herman Gunter, State Geologist of Florida, for a like service on the chapter "The Face of the Earth." In these chapters, however, as in the others, the writer accepts responsibility for all sins both of commission and omission. He wishes also to acknowledge his indebtedness to F. L. Paxson for first directing him into a study of Southern



history, and to W. T. Root whose counsel and encouragement has given him confidence in preparing this book.

R. S. COTTERILL

Tallahassee, Florida  
June 24, 1935

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## The Southern Background



## The Face of the Earth

The oldest portion of the South is a narrow strip of land now occupied by the eastern Appalachian mountains and the Piedmont Plateau to the east and south-east of them.<sup>1</sup> When the ancient Proterozoic seas spread over all the other land of the South, this region kept its head above water and, as far as can be judged from the testimony of the rocks, has not since been submerged. In its initial stage it was merely a high plateau; its mountainous character was gained at a much later time as a result of violent uplifting of the land and of erosion.

In the second stage of its geological development, the land mass of the South widened to the east and south, establishing a new coast line far out to sea beyond the present line. The great interior area was covered by a shallow sea which, cut off from the gulf, had its connection with the Atlantic by way of the St. Lawrence Valley. Missouri appeared momentarily above the waters as did bits of Kentucky and Tennessee, but quickly sank again and remained under the waves for long ages. In the course of time the interior sea receded and geologists are not at all agreed on the cause of its coming or its going. It left the South in what may be called the third stage of its development. The great valley at the western foot of the old Appalachians remained under water, draining out to the Atlantic around the present Chesapeake Bay. West of this long sound

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<sup>1</sup> Hayes and Campbell, "Geomorphology of the Southern Appalachians," in *National Geographic Magazine*, vol. 6.

appeared a strip of high ground that in the course of time was to be uplifted into the newer Appalachians of Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. West of the Mississippi the Ozark region of Missouri made its appearance. The interior sea was cut off now from the gulf by practically the extent of the gulf states, and drained northward to the Arctic as the valley sound did to the Atlantic. For several geological ages the shore line of these two inland seas oscillated back and forth, sometimes receding to form new land areas and at other times rising to overflow the entire land west of the old Appalachians. The final stage came when violent convulsions of the earth lifted the present mountains into place and drained away the seas, leaving their residue in the shape of lakes scattered over the land. Then the contour of the South and its area were the same as at present except that the coast line was still far out in the Atlantic and gulf of today.

The geological creation of the South was spread out over three of the five great eras of the earth's history. Even since it took definite shape as a locality, it has been subject to many changes, some of them revolutionary in character. Mountains have been levelled and again uplifted. The surface of the land has been warped and distorted, with the effect of radically altering the course of rivers and the location of lakes. There has been at least one great inundation that submerged practically two-thirds of the South, and an unknown number of lesser overflows. As a matter of fact, the changes are still in progress, and the geological history of the South is still unfinished.

For the purpose of description, the South of today may be conveniently divided into three geographical provinces. The outermost and lowest part of the South is the Coastal Plain, a region bordering the Atlantic

and the gulf from the Delaware river to the Rio Grande. On the inner side of this is a region of high, hilly ground, called on the east the Piedmont Plateau, and assuming on the west a variety of names descriptive of its topographical features. Encircled by the plateaus, as are the plateaus by the Coastal Plains, lie the mountains. A bird's-eye view of the South would reveal it as a succession of terraces rising from the Atlantic, the gulf, and the Mississippi to the peak of the mountains. West of the Mississippi the configuration is repeated with the Ozark-Ouachita mountains taking the place of the Apalachians of the East.

Only a relatively small part of the Coastal Plain of the South is now above water; much the greater part of it is submarine.<sup>2</sup> The gentle slope of the plain continues under the water of the Atlantic and the gulf for a distance of fifty to two hundred miles beyond the present coast line to a place where it drops precipitously into the abysmal depths. This line of the precipitous drop may be regarded as the original coast line of the South. Toward this line the ocean retreats after each inundation; from this line the ocean advances to re-submerge the land. The present advancing sea has driven the old coast line far into the interior; one of the outstanding marks of its advance is the "drowning" of rivers' channels in their lower courses, transforming them into bays, sounds, and estuaries. This process is especially noticeable on the Atlantic coast north of the Neuse river, and on the gulf coast west of the Apalachicola. Chesapeake Bay and Mobile Bay, Pamlico and Albemarle sounds, the Potomac, James, and Rappahannock rivers are striking evidences of the effect of advancing seas. In many cases the ancient channels of these "drowned" rivers can be traced far out under the water


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<sup>2</sup> Isaiah Bowman, *Forest Physiography*, 500.

of the ocean bed. The coast line not only shows evidence of present advancing seas, but also bears the marks of the ancient receding ones. Along the present coast line there runs a succession of terraces, some half dozen in number, the lowest being nearest the water and practically at sea level, the others rising progressively higher into the interior. Each one of these was made by the sea as it stood for long ages at that particular level. When it withdrew to the next lower level, it left its old bed in the form of the terrace that we now have.

Just as the outer edge of the Coastal Plain is far out under the sea, so the inner edge is to be found far in the interior. The place where the plain meets the plateau is commonly called the "fall" line by reason of the fact that the Southern rivers pass from the plateau to the plain over rapids or falls. The fall line, of course, was the place where water power was most readily available, and consequently it became the location of prominent towns in the early days of white occupancy. Baltimore in Maryland; Washington on the Potomac; Fredericksburg, Richmond, and Petersburg in Virginia; Raleigh, Camden, and Columbia in the Carolinas; Augusta, Macon, and Columbus in Georgia; Wetumpka, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa in Alabama; mark the location of the fall line. From Baltimore to Montgomery the fall line roughly parallels the Atlantic and gulf coast, receding gradually from the coast as it goes south. West of Montgomery it leaves the coast altogether, swings sharply to the north until it reaches the Tennessee in Mississippi, and follows it to the Ohio. The reason for this northward swing is that it is here following the Mississippi river which, for many ages after the South took definite form, remained submerged under the Gulf of Mexico, then extending up the valley of the present river to Illinois. Crossing the Mississippi, the fall line







turns southward again, running through Carthage, Little Rock, Arkadelphia, Austin, and San Antonio to the Rio Grande. Geologists are not agreed on the origin of the fall line.<sup>3</sup> North of the Neuse river the tide of the ocean sweeps up the rivers to the fall line; south of the Neuse the fall line is above tidewater.

The peninsula of Florida lies wholly within the Coastal Plain, as do Delaware, Mississippi, and Louisiana. It is the part of the South that has most recently arisen from the sea, and its topography shows the effect of its submergence. At the present time only about one-tenth of the peninsula is above water, and its elevation is so slight that a land-sinking of fifty feet would again send the sea over a great part of the state. Lake Okechobee in the southern part of the peninsula and the Okefenokee swamp on the Georgia line occupy depressions made in the ocean bed when the land was under water. The overflow from the latter is responsible for the famous Suwannee river which drains into the gulf, and for the St. Mary's which empties into the Atlantic.

The soil of the Coastal Plain is immigrant soil. The sub-soils were brought in by the sea in successive inundations and spread over the underlying rock like blankets. Modern geologists are inclined to think that the two most recent blankets, at least, have come in not as the result of inundation but as a result of erosion in the high land of the plateaus. In either case they are sandy clays, with the sand element increasing as the plain approaches the ocean and gulf. For the most part, it cannot be considered as first-class soil. However, the well-known "black belt," a zone across central Alabama and up the Tombigbee river, is one of the most fertile sections of the United States. It is one of the paradoxes of

<sup>3</sup> G. T. Renner, "The Physiographic Interpretation of the Fall Line," in *Geographical Review*, vol. xvii, 278.

our history that the region which is the most exclusively agricultural is one of the regions that has the poorest soil. Its original fertility was quickly exhausted by the crude farming methods of the early white settlers, and at the present time the Coastal Plain remains agricultural only by the continued use of commercial fertilizers.

The Coastal Plain, when the white men reached it, was covered with a practically unbroken forest in which the dominant tree was the long-leaf pine. Unlike the deciduous trees characteristic of the plateau, the pine restores to the soil very little of the fertility it extracts in its growth. This is largely due to the fact that the pine needles fall infrequently and contribute very little to soil growth when they decay. There were certain regions of the plain where the pines grew so thickly from soil so infertile that the name "pine barrens" came to be applied to them. Among such regions were Mississippi east of the Pearl, southeastern Alabama, southeastern Georgia, and the zone of the fall line in the Carolinas. Near the coast a characteristic tree is the live oak, the chief utility of which in our history has been to enhance the scenery and to serve as a support for the air-nurtured Spanish moss. The cypress is essentially a water tree, flourishing chiefly in the swamps and marshes. The magnolia tree has rivalled the mocking-bird as a source of inspiration for Southern poets. But the pine alone has entered into the history of the plain and has influenced the course of events.

The Coastal Plain has many subdivisions. Running along the edge of the waters from Norfolk, Virginia, to Apalachicola, Florida, is a narrow strip of land called the "flatwoods." Its general width is some twenty-five or thirty miles, although in North Carolina and Georgia its width doubles. It is a land of sand and of thick-growing pine trees with a gradient of only about one foot a

mile back from the coast line. It continues between the Tombigbee and the Pearl while at the latter river it changes its name to the Coastal Prairie and runs on to the Rio Grande. In Texas it is treeless. Behind the flatwoods lies the Inner Coastal Plain, which east of the Mississippi is subdivided into the Upper and Middle Plain. The former is separated from the Piedmont in Georgia and the Carolinas by a low range of sand hills.

The Piedmont of the South includes all the region between the Coastal Plains and the mountains. It is of varying width as is the plain, increasing from fifty miles in Maryland to over a hundred in North Carolina and other places. As it circles south from North Carolina, it narrows until it reaches central Alabama, after which it widens rapidly to the Ohio. It is in two well-defined parts: that east of the mountains is called the Piedmont Plateau, while that west of the mountains is divided into a number of parts each with its own characteristic name. Most of the upland of the west Piedmont is included in what is generally known as the Highland Rim, which extends from the mountains on the east to the Ohio and Tennessee rivers on the west, enfolding within itself two great basins of lower ground, the Nashville region of middle Tennessee and the bluegrass region of Kentucky. In general, the topography of the Piedmont west is by no means so uniform as that east of the mountains.

The Piedmont is predominantly a hilly region, but the Upper Coastal Plain across the fall line is hilly, too, and the chief difference between the two is not in topography but in soil. The soil of the Piedmont is residual, formed in place by the decomposition of the underlying rocks throughout geological ages. In general, the soils of the eastern Piedmont are clay and are of red color, the particular shade of red in each case depending on the type of rock from which the soil was formed. West of the moun-

tains, the soil is darker and is more fertile. The best soil of the entire Piedmont area, and of the entire South, is to be found in the two basins inclosed in the Highland Rim of the west. It is formed by the decomposition of limestone rock and from it grew, and grows, the famous bluegrass. Originally these two basins were of the same elevation as the rim, but the steady decay of the rock through long ages has resulted in the sinking of the land until at the present time it approximates the level of the Coastal Plain. West of the Mississippi the Piedmont wraps itself around the Ozarks as it does around the Appalachians in the east.

The two Piedmonts east of the Mississippi have had quite different geological histories. The eastern region rose first from the seas and remained unsubmerged during the long ages while the remainder of the South was taking form. Since that time it has been under water at least once. The western region rose late from the sea and has been many times submerged since. Both east and west in the long eras during which they have been dry land have been subject to erosion which has at times worn them down to base level. Repeatedly uplifted, the effect of erosion on them is to be seen in their hilly character. Where the rocks were soft, the surface has been cut down to valleys; where the rocks were hard, hills resulted, the tops of which measure approximately the original elevation of the entire region. Erosion is today the worst enemy of the Piedmont. Due to its higher elevation, the currents of the rivers are swifter here than in the plain below, and the streams carry down with them every year, it has been estimated, some fifty million tons of soil.<sup>4</sup> Some of this is deposited over the surface of the plain; some of it is carried out to sea and deposited on the submarine plain; some of it is carried out over the edge of

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<sup>4</sup> Rupert Vance, *Human Geography of the South*, 103.

the continental shelf and is dropped into the abyss of the sea.

The forests of the Piedmont are made up, in the main, of deciduous trees, although there are many regions where the short-leaf pine is abundant. The hickory, oak, ash, elm, beech, and locust are the chief representatives of the Piedmont forests; in Kentucky the tulip poplar was at one time so abundant as almost to characterize the state. The leaves of these trees, annually falling, have been an important factor in the soil growth of the region. The western Piedmont in historic times has never been so well forested as the eastern section, and in western Kentucky and Tennessee the land was a treeless prairie when the Europeans reached it.

The mountains are the core of the South. They enter the South from Pennsylvania, and run in a general southwestern direction to central Alabama. They consist of two groups of parallel ranges separated from each other by a wide valley extending their entire length. The eastern range of mountains is called South mountain in Maryland, and the Blue Ridge in Virginia; in these two states the mountains are low and narrow and amount to little more than a single ridge. In North Carolina the mountains widen and become higher. The Blue Ridge continues here merely as a sort of sentry on the eastern front, while behind it pile up the ranges of the Great Smoky, the Unaka, the Iron, and others. Here is to be found the highest mountain peak in the eastern United States (Mt. Mitchell, 6711 feet). From North Carolina the mountains run across the tip of South Carolina, the northern part of Georgia, and die out just within the Alabama line. The western range reverses the configuration of the eastern, being wider in the north and narrowing as it goes south. It covers the western half of Maryland, practically all West Virginia, the eastern portion

of Kentucky and Tennessee, and extends into northern Alabama. It is generally called the Allegheny in West Virginia, and the Cumberland in Kentucky and Tennessee.

The two mountain ranges, like the two Piedmonts, have had different geological histories. The eastern range is much the older and is commonly referred to by geologists as the Older Appalachians, the name including the Piedmont to the east of it. Both the Older Appalachians and the Piedmont were originally merely a high plateau, a portion of which was at a much later time uplifted to form the mountains. As a matter of fact, a considerable part of this eastern mountain region has more than once been base-levelled and again elevated into mountains. The mountains to the west of the valley are much younger. Like those to the east, they existed at first merely as elevated plateaus, and geologists insist on referring to them today as the Allegheny and the Cumberland plateaus, reserving the word mountain for the narrow escarpment that walls in the valley to the east. Erosion levelled the plateau, inundation spread its sediment over it, and finally convulsions of the earth uplifted a portion of it into its present mountainous form. Continued erosion has had the effect of cutting up the plateau behind the mountains and transforming much of it into a mountain region. The mountains of the South have always been a barrier to Southern unity by hindering communication and by giving to the mountain people a separate set of interests from those of the lowland people.

The Appalachian Valley geologically is an integral part of the mountain system. Due, however, to the decay of the limestone rock, its surface was lowered and it did not appear above the water at the same time as the re-



mainder of the plateau to the west of it, but remained for a long time as a long shallow sound draining into the Atlantic near Chesapeake Bay. It has apparently not been submerged since its first appearance. The valley enters the South from Pennsylvania, as do the western mountains to which it geologically belongs, runs across Maryland, Virginia, eastern Tennessee, the northwestern tip of Georgia, and ends near the mouth of the Coosa in Alabama. It is twenty or thirty miles wide in Maryland and Virginia, widens to sixty miles in Tennessee, and narrows again through Georgia and Alabama. The valley is not by any means a level tract; in Virginia particularly it contains many mountains of its own, which are merely remnants of the ancient surface where the rocks have resisted dissolution and the land consequently has not sunk. It is in Tennessee that the valley character of the valley is most apparent. It has different names in different sections, such as Cumberland in Maryland, Shenandoah in northern Virginia, Holston and Tennessee in Tennessee, and the Coosa in Georgia and Alabama. The northern valley in Virginia is drained by the Shenandoah; the Tennessee and Coosa drain the southern section. It is crossed in Virginia by the James and Roanoke eastward-bound and by the New flowing northwest. The valley is, like the Nashville region and bluegrass Kentucky, a great limestone basin and it has the same soils and vegetation as the other two.

West of the Mississippi the mountain system is far less extensive than in the east. The Ozarks cover Arkansas and Missouri between the two rivers which give names to the states. That part of the mountains south of the Arkansas is called the Ouachita. They are neither as high nor as extensive as their eastern counterparts, and have had no such influence on the history of the South.

Historians have explained the name "Ozark" as being an American abbreviation of the French term *aux Arkansas*.

In its long geological history, the land mass of the South has been subjected to a number of influences which have from time to time altered its surface beyond all recognition. Erosion has swept off great parts of its exposed surface and redistributed them; the seas have overflowed great sections of it, pouring the blankets of sediment upon it, filling up its river channels, altering their courses, and changing the entire contour of the submerged regions. The enormous weight of the northern ice-sheets in the glacial period caused the land even at the South to warp and tilt and buckle in amazing fashion. Geologists today are able to detect a number of these warpings of the earth's surface, running in long lines in various directions. One line runs from Cincinnati to Cape Hatteras, and it is thought that this particular buckling of the surface is responsible for the pronounced eastward extension of North Carolina at the latter point. Another runs from Cincinnati through Chattanooga to the Chattahoochee near the Alabama line; a third follows the summits of the mountains west of the Appalachian Valley; a fourth runs transversely from Augusta to the neighborhood of Memphis, forming a tangent to the Tennessee in its westward course; a fifth leaves the Mississippi a little above Memphis, crosses into Mississippi about fifty miles from the river, curves down into Alabama, and dies out near Montgomery. The last named is called the Lignitic Ridge; south of it is the Grand Gulf Ridge starting from the extreme southwestern Mississippi and running eastwardly with steadily declining elevation until it dies out near Mobile. North of the Potomac the Coastal Plain slopes east and west

from a dividing ridge, and there are traces of ridges paralleling the coast in Georgia and eastern Alabama.

The results of the varied disturbances of the earth's surface are to be observed in the river system of the South. Some ancient rivers have disappeared altogether, others have been beheaded, still others have had their courses reversed. The oldest river now existing in the South is probably the New-Kanawha; the channel it occupied has not been materially shifted since the region appeared first as dry ground. It now rises in the mountains of North Carolina, flows across the Appalachian Valley, through the mountains of West Virginia, and into the Ohio. There is convincing evidence that prior to the glacial period in the north, the Kanawha continued across Ohio and emptied into Lake Erie. The ice sheets had the double effect of forming the present Ohio river across the ancient course of the Kanawha and thus cutting the latter stream off from its old mouth. The present Scioto, now with reversed current running to the Ohio, was the ancient northern extension of the Kanawha. The ice sheet had the same effect on the Allegheny and Monongahela, transforming them from a through stream running to the lake into northern and southern tributaries of the Ohio. The Kanawha is the only river running north through the southern Appalachians; the antiquity of the stream is shown by the depth of its gorge through the mountains.

In the drainage system of the South the Tennessee flows around three sides of a parallelogram. It comes down the valley through Tennessee as if headed for the gulf; near Chattanooga it abruptly changes its course to the west with the firm intention, apparently, of joining the Mississippi; on the northeast corner of Mississippi it has a change of heart and turns north to the Ohio.

There can be little doubt that its present tortuous course represents the changes of many ages. Its tributaries, the Clinch and the Holston, start far up in the valley of Virginia; doubtless the ancient Tennessee continued on down the valley across Georgia and Alabama, following the course of the present Coosa until it drained into the gulf. The elevation of the earth's surface on the Augusta-Memphis line was probably the force that threw it out of the valley and deflected it to the Mississippi. The elevation of the Lignitic Ridge may have turned it away from the Mississippi and caused it to take a northward course to the Ohio. That its valley course was the ancient one may be indicated by the fact that after leaving the valley it receives no single tributary of any importance. As it stands today it is the largest of the Southern rivers east of the Mississippi, and its tributaries reach into every eastern state of the South below the Potomac, except Florida.

Land warping and tilting has apparently greatly influenced the courses of the Alabama rivers. There are indications that in ancient times the Coosa, the Tallapoosa, the Cahaba, and the Tombigbee were "through" rivers, each emptying into the gulf in its separate channel. The tilting of the land cut the first three of these off from the gulf and united them with the present Alabama. The course of the Conecuh-Escambia may represent the ancient channel of one of these through rivers before it was deflected to its present course.

There are many instances in the South of river piracy, where the headwaters of a stream have been stolen by another.<sup>5</sup> Such a process is called "beheading." An example of this is the Shenandoah, which was anciently an insignificant creek draining a short part of the upper

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<sup>5</sup> J. O. La Gorce, "Pirate Rivers and their Prizes," in *National Geographic Magazine*, vol. I, 87.

valley, while the Rappahannock, Rapidan, and Rivanna crossed the valley at right angles above it. As the valley sank the Shenandoah pushed its headwaters further and further south until it finally ate its way into the channels of the transverse rivers and beheaded them, appropriating their upper courses to itself and leaving them with their sources in the Blue Ridge; it had, in effect, driven the three rivers entirely out of the valley. At the present time it is reaching out for the James with the same fell intent. Geographers consider the New and the French Broad as pirates of ancient lineage. There are traces in North Carolina of a once mighty river which, formed near Ashville by the junction of a confluent from southwest Virginia and another from southwest Carolina, ran southwardly through the mountain gaps and down the channel of the present Santee to the Atlantic. But the New beheaded its northern tributary and the French Broad its southern, and today there are no traces of the river left except the wind gaps through the mountains where it formerly flowed. At present a slow, silent war is being waged between the New and the Roanoke. Their headwaters already interlock and in the fullness of time it may be expected that one of them will suffer beheadal. The Ohio river succeeded in diverting the Mississippi from its course. The two rivers once joined somewhere south of Memphis after running parallel courses from Cairo, separated by only the narrow Crowley's Ridge. Tributaries of the Ohio ate their way through this ridge and tapped the current of the Mississippi with the result that the latter river left its ancient bed and transferred itself bodily to the Ohio channel.

A most unusual case of river diversion in very modern times has occurred in Louisiana. Here, on account of the fragile soil, the banks of the Red river on the outside

of the river bends caved in, choking the river for many miles with an accumulation of earth and trees. Thus were formed the "rafts" that effectually blocked the navigation of the Red for hundreds of years. These rafts caused the waters of the river above them to overflow and thus forced the river into a new channel below Alexandria; its old channel is indicated by a succession of bayous far inland.

"History, not geography, made the solid South," says a recent writer on Southern geography.<sup>6</sup> In geological development, in topography, in soil, in vegetation, and drainage, the South is composed of a variety of provinces. Neither is it a unit in the matter of climate. U. B. Phillips in his *Life and Labor of the Old South* recognizes four climatic zones in the South. In the border states the growing season lasts for six months; in North Carolina and Tennessee and Arkansas, seven months; in the upper part of the gulf states and in South Carolina, eight months; and along the gulf coast, nine months. It is the long growing season of the lower South that atones for the comparative infertility of the soil and makes it a great cotton-growing region; the upper South, with a climate less lenient, has in its limestone basins of Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee a superior soil that makes it the ideal tobacco-producing region of the United States.

On the gulf coast of the South the winter temperature rarely goes below freezing and the summer temperature rarely above 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Hot days are mitigated almost invariably by gulf breezes and by the high, pelting rains which are of almost daily occurrence. No part of the South ever experiences the terrific heat waves that are common occurrences in the summer at

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<sup>6</sup> Vance, *Human Geography of the South*, 26.

the north. Humidity is very low and sunstroke is practically unknown. The mountains fail to serve as a barrier against the northern blizzards in the winter, with the result that brief periods of uncomfortable cold are likely to visit the South every winter; in no part of the South is cold weather of more than a few days duration. Unreconstructed Southerners have been known to say that the South has no cold weather except what is imported from the North, and to ascribe all climatic inclemencies to the failure of secession. The upper South differs from the lower South more in its winters than in its summers. Passing from the Southern state of Kentucky in January to the Southern state of Florida is like going into another world.

A striking characteristic of the South, especially the far South, is the absence of gray days. It is a rare day indeed that the sun does not shine, and certain Southern newspapers have emphasized the fact by giving away an edition of the paper each day the sun fails to appear. The eternal sunshine makes for an outdoor life and has had a great influence in determining the culture of the South. It has contributed to the growth of men as well as vegetation. It has, perhaps, discouraged the development of art and literature. On the other hand, it has promoted toleration and given to Southern people a certain cheerfulness and hopefulness that only great catastrophes can take away.





## The Oldest Inhabitants

Most of the Indians living in the South at the coming of the white men were comparatively recent immigrants or even tourists. Four families were represented: Siouan, Algonquian, Iroquoian, and Muskhogean, and in addition a number of broken tribes, some of which ethnologists are unable to classify. They were all Indian, and as such had many things in common, including animosity. But they also presented many dissimilarities and differences of a family and tribal nature.

The Siouan Indians were the oldest inhabitants of the South, and are entitled to be called natives.<sup>7</sup> This family of Indians apparently had their "original" homes in the South whence most of them, in prehistoric times, migrated gradually to the northwest across the Mississippi, partly in pursuit of the receding buffalo, partly in flight from Algonquian, Iroquoian, and Muskhogean foes. Only scattered remnants were lingering in the South when the Europeans arrived. The most important of these were the Catawba, living on the river of that name in North Carolina. Their number was estimated in 1670 at 7,000; by 1775 they had shrunk to 500. They had no friend in the South, and every Indian hand was raised against them. Their Choctaw-given name, Catawba, might almost be translated "untouchable," and their Algonquian-given family name, Sioux, means "adder." Both names show the esteem in which they were

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<sup>7</sup> James Mooney, *The Siouan Tribes of the East*, Bulletin no. 22, United States Bureau of American Ethnology.

held by their neighbors. The Santee Indians in South Carolina belonged to the same family, and far away in Mississippi the Biloxi, in complete isolation from their kinsmen, clung obstinately to their ancestral home.

The Sioux seem to have reached their greatest development in the South as a coast people, and to have relied on fish as their principal food. A fish economy does not make for unity, and for this reason the Sioux were at a disadvantage in meeting the invasions of other Indian tribes who had developed a more centralized government and a more compact method of settlement based on a corn economy. When the Catawba first came under observation they had been pushed back from the coast and had become agricultural. They had several peculiarities such as head flattening, a custom of domesticating animals, and of building their houses with stone foundations. The antiquity of their culture was evidenced, perhaps, by the prevalence of female chiefs, easy divorce, and professional prostitution.

The Algonquin were apparently the most recent Indian immigrants into the South, as was shown by the fact that they had not penetrated far. They were essentially northern Indians, and the Mason and Dixon line between them and their Southern foes was the line of the Ohio, Kanawha-New, and Roanoke rivers. They were, in fact, practically limited to Virginia and Maryland, and their chief representative, the Powhatan confederacy, was the first Indian tribe the English encountered and the first they destroyed. The Algonquin were the most widely diffused family of Indians in North America, but in the South they never were able to make headway against the vicious, although uncombined, hostility of the earlier immigrants, the Iroquois and Muscogee, and the native sons, the Sioux. Some of their family characteristics were the custom of shaving one side of

the head, of tattooing tribal marks on the right shoulder, of using a vegetable substitute for salt, of prohibiting divorce, and of using poison as a method of promoting demises.

The Iroquoian family had two members in the South, the Tuscarora and the Cherokee. The Tuscarora formed the spear-head of Iroquoian advance into the South. There were three divisions of them, one of which bore the name Tuscarora, "hemp-gatherers," and gave the name to the entire tribe. The Tuscarora villages lay in eastern North Carolina, chiefly along the Neuse river, but they dominated the entire territory between the Cape Fear and the Roanoke. Although separated from their kinsmen in New York by several hundred miles of Algonquian territory, and constantly harassed by the other Southern Indians, they maintained their position until their power was broken in a war with the Carolinians in 1712, after which they rejoined the parent group of Iroquois in New York. Their most inveterate foe was their Southern relative, the Cherokee.

The Algonquin, Sioux, and Tuscarora in the South were comparatively weak people early destroyed or driven out by the advance of the white men. But with the Cherokee we come to one of the four major tribes of the South which by strength and position held their homes against white force and chicanery for a long period of time. Like the Tuscarora the Cherokee were Iroquoian, but unlike the Tuscarora their presence in the South was the result not of invasion but of flight. In a time indefinitely remote they had been driven south (if we can trust the Delaware legends) by a combination of Delaware and Iroquois as a penalty for attacking the Delaware with whom the Iroquois had an alliance.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Mooney, *Myths of the Cherokee*, Nineteenth Annual Report of the United States Bureau of American Ethnology, pt. 1, 18.

Traces of their northern residence remain in the name of the Allegheny river and mountains, reminiscent of the term "Alligewi," which was what the Delaware called the Cherokee. The Cherokee fought a long-drawn-out defensive war as they slowly retreated across Ohio, building, it is thought, the great defensive works on the Scioto and the Little Miami. South of the Ohio they continued their retreat down the Warriors' Trace through Kentucky, and down the banks of the Kanawha river into the valley of Virginia. Forced still further south, they finally came to a stand and maintained their position behind the Tennessee river, which was commonly known among the Indians as the Cherokee, or Hogohegee river – the latter term obviously a cockneyized corruption of Alligewi.

The Cherokee were the mountaineers of the South. They located their villages in the river valleys of the Carolinas, of northern Georgia, and southeastern Tennessee. In North Carolina they lived chiefly along the banks of the Tuckasegee; in South Carolina, the Keowee; in Georgia, the Tugaloo, Tallulah, and Chattooga; in Tennessee, the Hiwassee and Little Tennessee. Most of their villages were on the last-mentioned stream. The traders made two divisions of them, the Lower Cherokee who lived in Georgia and the Carolinas, and the Upper Cherokee who lived on the tributaries of the Tennessee. The latter were commonly called the Overhill Cherokee. This division was purely geographical; the ethnologists classify them as Upper, Middle, and Lower, according to the peculiarities of dialect. The chief town of the tribe was Echota on the Little Tennessee. Their original or "foundation" town in the South seems to have been Kituwha (in Swain county, North Carolina) on the Tuckasegee, for which reason the Cherokee were quite commonly called "Kituwhas" or "Cut-

tawas" by the northern Indians. Cuttawa was one name for the present Kentucky river along whose banks the Cherokee at one time lived on their long flight to the South. The term Cherokee is a corruption of their Choc-taw-given name, Tsalagi, which means "cave men" and which had reference to the numerous caves in the mountain country which the Cherokee inhabited. Alligewi has the same meaning, as does Monteran, the name by which they were known to their Catawba foes. The Cherokee called themselves Ani-Yunwiha which is very like the modern American slang term, "what a man." Practically every Indian tribe in the South had a name of the same subdued meaning.

The Cherokee numbered something like 15,000 people in colonial times, living in thirty or forty villages—the number both of people and villages changing from time to time. They claimed all the land north to the Ohio and the Kanawha, and since the northern Indians claimed everything down to the Tennessee there was sufficient overlapping of claims to form the basis of a permanent and fairly vigorous war. Eastward they claimed as far as the tributaries of the Tennessee extended, and westward they quite generally acknowledged the Chickasaw claim to the country beyond the Tennessee in its northward course. Their bitterest enemies were their own kinsmen, the Iroquois of New York and the Tuscarora of North Carolina. The latter were generally on the defensive, but the New York relatives of the Cherokee apparently never forgot the family quarrel and their raiding parties reached the Cherokee country year after year. When not engaged with their own family quarrel, the Cherokee seized the opportunity of evening old scores with the Algonquin of Ohio. The great Indian road across Kentucky was known as the Warriors' Trace, and old maps called it

"the common road to the Cuttawba country." With the Chickasaw, the Cherokee were commonly in a state of peace and sometimes of alliance. With the Creeks to the south of them they were always at war, the feud between the two tribes originating in the appropriating of Creek land by the Cherokee upon arriving in the South, and being handed down from generation to generation in both tribes as a precious heirloom.

The Creeks, with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, made up the Muskogean family of Indians whose territorial possessions almost exactly coincided with the later "cotton kingdom" of the South, east of the Mississippi. The Creeks, alone of the Southern tribes, bore a non-Indian name, and they secured it by reason of the fact that the first of the tribe with which the Carolinians came in contact were then living on Ocheese (Ocmulgee) Creek in Georgia.<sup>9</sup> Following the Yemassee war of 1715, these Ocheese Creek Indians moved west, rejoining their brethren on the Chattahoochee, and taking their name with them. The name thereafter was applied to the confederacy of Indians living in Georgia and Alabama. The English commonly made two divisions of them, the Lower Creeks living on the Chattahoochee and the Flint, and the Upper Creeks living on the Coosa, the Tallapoosa and the Alabama. The classification was geographical, and ethnologists recognize four major divisions of the tribe, Alabama, Hitchiti, Yuchi, and Muscogee. Of these the first two spoke Muskogean dialects quite different from the pure Muscogee, and the third an entirely different language which the Muscogee contemptuously termed "Stinkard." It is thought that the Alabama and Hitchiti represent very ancient migrations of the Muskogean people, and that the pure

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<sup>9</sup> V. W. Crane, "Origin of Name of the Creek Indians," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. v, 339-342.

Muscogee were more recent immigrants who overwhelmed their forerunners and incorporated them into their confederacy. One of the many migration legends of the Muscogee represents them as originating in the mountains of Mexico, of migrating from a region grown volcanic, of fighting their way across the Mississippi, and of entering Alabama and Georgia from the north. Place names in eastern Tennessee indicate that the Muscogee occupied that country prior to the arrival of the Cherokee. The nucleus of the Muscogee invasion was a group which on its arrival in the South separated into the two towns of Coweta and Cusseta, which were therefore looked upon as "foundation" towns. By force and, according to persistent Indian tradition in the South, fraud, they succeeded in bringing the Hitchiti and Alabama into a union with themselves, originating the Creek confederacy which by Indian tradition had its beginning on Ocmulgee river, and, as ethnologists think, was in process of formation when De Soto went through the South. The Yuchi were not incorporated until almost the time of the American Revolution. They were recent immigrants into the gulf region, their first homes in the South, as far as can be learned, being in Tennessee on the Cumberland.<sup>10</sup> They were always on suspiciously friendly terms with the Shawnee with whom, in fact, they were often identified.

The Creek confederacy had no name for itself until late in the colonial period. The term Muscogee is not a Muscogee name and is not even Muskogean. Its meaning is as unknown as its origin, but the most likely conjecture is that it is a name meaning "swamp" and that it was bestowed by the Shawnee as a labor-saving device to designate all their Creek friends whom they

<sup>10</sup> John R. Swanton, *Early History of the Creek Indians and their Neighbors*, Bulletin no. 73, United States Bureau of American Ethnology, 287.

could only refer to previously by the names of the several divisions. The Creeks were about equal in number to the Cherokee, but far superior to them, and all other Southern Indians, in the organization of their government. The confederacy came to have a common "capital" at Tukabahchee on the Tallapoosa river in Alabama. In time of peace each division and even each town had a habit of going its own way, but in war the confederacy was able generally to bring its whole strength to bear against its enemies. Both by position and by organization the Creeks were prepared to play the same part in the South that the Iroquois did in the North. They controlled the two most strategic rivers of the South, the Alabama and the Chattahoochee, and were in easy distance of the Tennessee. Had the coming of the white men been delayed a half-century, the Creeks would probably have subjugated the entire South.

Their territorial claims ran from the Atlantic to the Tombigbee. The Florida Indians east of the Apalachicola were not members of the confederacy, although the Apalachee were of Muskogean stock. Northern Alabama they contested fitfully with the Chickasaw, and northern Georgia unceasingly with the Cherokee. With the Chickasaw they were normally at peace, partly due to the traditional friendship between that tribe and the foundation towns, Cusseta and Coweta; with the Cherokee they were almost always at war; with the Choctaw they cherished a carefully nurtured family feud which probably had its origin in the appropriating of Choctaw lands by the Muscogee when they first came to the South. The Creeks were the least susceptible of Southern Indians to white influence, and were the last to bow to white rule. One characteristic distinguishing them from other Southern Indians was their custom of shaving all



the head, leaving only a narrow ridge on top as a sort of crest.

The Choctaw were a branch of the Muskhogean stock who seem to have entered the South from beyond the Mississippi at a considerable period before the other divisions. There are traces to indicate that anciently they occupied practically all the gulf coast and joined the Siouan littoral on the Atlantic. This is indicated by the fact that most of the tribal names given by the Spaniards were Choctaw names. The Creek invasion of the South drove a wedge to the coast, forcing the Choctaw west of the Tombigbee, and the main body of the Sioux north of the Santee. The Choctaw in historic times lived in Mississippi, locating their towns mostly on the Pascagoula and Chickasawhay rivers. They had some twenty thousand people and were the most numerous of the Southern tribes. They had about fifty towns divided into four, later three, sections. Their Southern towns were so completely differentiated as to form a distinct ethnic tribe. Kowehchito in the central group might be called the "capital" of the tribe.

The Choctaw differed in many respects from the other Southern Indians. They were the most sedentary of them all, depending on agriculture for a living. Although they were the most numerous of the Southern tribes they had the most circumscribed territory, being limited to the southern half of Mississippi and that small portion of Alabama west of the Tombigbee. They rarely went beyond their own borders to wage an offensive war, and grouped their towns with reference to defense against the Creeks on the east and the Chickasaw on the north. The tribe held together precariously with constant wrangling and sometimes civil war among the different groups of towns. Early observers noted that, unique

among the Southern Indians, the Choctaw people were unable to swim, and they offered the unsatisfactory explanation for this that there were no streams in the Choctaw country. The real reason probably was that the Choctaw were afraid of snakes, as they undoubtedly were. This same dread of snakes caused them to build their corn-cribs on high posts. The Choctaw were the darkest of Southern Indians as the Cherokee were the lightest. Alone among Southern Indians they wore their hair long, and for this reason gained the name by which they were commonly known among the Indians, "Pans-falaya" – long-haired people. The most evident physical characteristic of the Choctaw was the artificial deformation of the head, caused by placing weights on the head in infancy and thus flattening it. It has been conjectured that the name Choctaw may be from the Spanish word for "flat head." The practice of head flattening was probably derived from their ancient Siouan neighbors, since it was a practice of the Catawba and was unknown among other Muskogean people. It is indeed highly probable that most of the peculiarities of the Choctaw were of Siouan derivation.

The third member of the Muskogean family in the South was the Chickasaw. They were the least numerous of the four major tribes of the South, never in historic times numbering more than five or six thousand people. They had about a dozen villages, located in northern Mississippi on the headwaters of the Yazoo and Tombigbee. Their "literary" language was identical with that of the Choctaw, although the common speech differed considerably. The migration legend common to both tribes was that they came from beyond the Mississippi as one people, and that after reaching Mississippi the Chickasaw separated from the Choctaw as a result

of a quarrel. This seems to be the first recorded case of secession in the South. What the cause of the quarrel was can only be conjectured, but it possibly had to do with Choctaw susceptibility to Siouan influence, since the Chickasaw had none of the characteristics that have been noted among the Choctaw. But the animosity continued after the cause was forgotten and in historic times the Choctaw and Chickasaw were inveterate enemies. The latent hostility of these two closely related tribes was increased in colonial times by the fact that the Choctaw were allied with the French while the Chickasaw were firm friends of the English.

Their hunting grounds included all Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Tennessee river; east of the Tennessee their claims overlapped the Cherokee claim from the Duck to the Elk. In proportion to their number, their land claims were greater than those of any other Southern tribe. They were generally on good terms with both Cherokee and Creek, although continually harassed by the Choctaw. That in spite of their weakness in numbers they held their own so well was partly due to their bravery, which was proverbial throughout the Indian South, and partly due to the fact that an Indian war was rarely pushed to a decision. Even at that, it seems probable that the Chickasaw escaped extinction only by the timely arrival of the English.

In addition to these native sons and immigrants in the South, account must be taken of one tribe which can only be classed as tourists. The Shawnee weave in and out of Southern Indian history in a way that has given headaches to many an ethnologist. They were Algonquin from the North and were the only member of that family that was able to penetrate the South, west of the mountains. Their earliest recorded homes in the South were

in Kentucky and Tennessee on the Cumberland river, on which they lived so long that the river acquired the name Shawnee. A group of them settled on the Savannah river near Augusta sometime prior to 1680, where they smote the natives lustily, appropriated their lands, and gave their own name to the river. After some twenty-five years of possession, the Charleston people drove them out as common nuisances, whereupon many of them moved to Pennsylvania, travelling leisurely and giving their name to creeks and springs and villages all along the Southern frontier. Their Cumberland brethren in the meantime had coolly appropriated land on the Tennessee, and for their reward had been expelled from their homes by a rare alliance of the Cherokee and Chickasaw. Some of the Shawnee, both of the Savannah group and of the Cumberland group, remained in the South, taking refuge with the Creeks and living constantly on the move due to their propensity for stirring up trouble wherever they went. We find their villages near the Coosa, on the Chattahoochee, and so far down on the Apalachicola as to be in sight of the gulf. Some of the Cumberland group, when they were expelled, made a settlement on the Kentucky which they called Eskippakithiki, and remained there untroubled in the face of raids from the Cherokee on the south and Iroquois on the north until the time of the French and Indian war.<sup>11</sup> A group of these about 1745 attempted to occupy their old homes in Tennessee, but the unforgiving Chickasaw harried them until they took refuge with the Creeks.

The sudden appearances and disappearances of the Shawnee were a never ending source of wonder to the other Southern Indians, who as a result credited them

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<sup>11</sup> Lucien Beckner, "Eskippakithiki: The Last Indian Town in Kentucky," in *Filson Club Publication*, vol. 6, 355.

with powers of invisibility and other supernatural attributes. Except when engaged in some maladroit attempt to appropriate the hunting ground or the village site of someone else, they seemed to have lived on terms of amity with Cherokee, Chicksaw, and Creek. By the latter they were highly esteemed and there are many traces of the influence they exerted on Creek affairs. They gave them their name, Muscogee, and perhaps even the ceremonial name of their capital, Tukabahchee. Their southern wanderings gave them their own name, Shawnee, which means "southern."

The Indians of the South, whatever their tribe or family, had many common customs and characteristics. They were all village Indians living in towns usually located on some stream, sometimes giving the name to the stream, sometimes deriving the name from it. The towns were of all sizes and character, but in each tribe they were formally classified either as "white" towns or "red" towns, the former being the towns devoted to peace and the latter those devoted to war. In each tribe there were towns which served as cities of refuge to which mistreated Indians might flee for protection against their persecutors. These towns were considered sacrosanct and there was no greater sin known among the Indians than the violation of protection.

Within their villages the Indians lived in houses carefully constructed and designed to be durable. Each family as a rule had two houses, a summer house which was little more than a pavilion and only designed to ward off the rain and the sun, and a winter house more strongly built, with adobe walls and a thatched roof held on by logs. These latter houses were called by the white traders "hot houses" because they were kept heated to such a high temperature. They were occupied chiefly by the aged and infirm. In the winter houses it was the

practice to build the north wall stronger and thicker than the others. Quite generally the houses were painted. A man always built a new house when he married; after his marriage it became the property of his wife. Within the house the beds were "built in" around the walls and raised some distance from the floor so as to escape the visitation of fleas, which among the Indians were ever present and always carnivorous. During the day the beds were used as chairs in pretty much the same way as in college dormitories of today.

All the Southern Indians were agricultural, the Sioux and the Choctaw most of all. The principal crop everywhere was corn, of which they had several varieties including popcorn. They raised beans, pumpkins, squash, tomatoes, sweet potatoes, and melons, and what surplus they had at the end of the summer they stored away in cribs, of which each family had one. Around each village were the cleared fields where lay the garden strips of the individual families. It was the custom to make the planting a communal enterprise but after that each family worked and harvested its own strip. A certain amount of the crop went into the common storehouse, which was a central feature of the town and under the care of the chief. Tobacco was also raised but it was of inferior quality. The Southern Indians were pipe smokers, but their use of tobacco was chiefly for ceremonial purposes. When the cleared fields of the Indians became exhausted, their only recourse was to remove their village to some other site. Among the Creeks an abandoned town site was known as a "tallahassee," old town. There are innumerable tallahasseees in Georgia and Alabama, and one in Florida has become the state capital.

The Indians of the South prior to their contact with

the white people had no domestic animal except the dog. The Sioux made numerous experiments in domesticating animals, but apparently without utilitarian purpose. The dog of the Southern Indian was primarily a watchdog, useful in preventing surprise, but not used as a draft animal and hardly used at all in hunting. From the Spaniards the Indians secured hogs, cattle, and horses. They were slow to adopt cattle raising because of the difficulty of protecting the cattle, and because they were reluctant to eat the flesh of a sluggish animal for fear they would assimilate the spirit along with the flesh. Because of the wooded character of the South, the horse never played such an important part in Indian economy there as it did on the western plains. Horses were little used in war, not at all in hunting, and only at a very late period as a beast of burden. In the latter capacity he was chiefly appreciated by the women, for whom he substituted in many respects. The razor-back hog, however, aroused considerable enthusiasm among the Indians because of his valor as a scavenger, his ability to take care of himself, and the high edibilities concealed beneath his unamiable exterior.

The clan system of social organization was universal in the South. The term "clan" had much the same meaning among them as our word kinfolk, each clan roughly consisting of a man and his kinsmen. Relationship, however, was reckoned through the mother only. Each clan had a distinctive name, which served the same purpose of identification as do our own family names or surnames. The four chief tribes of the South had pretty much the same set of surnames, and the number was rarely more than six or eight in a tribe, although the Creeks had a much greater number. The clan names were commonly names of animals such as Bear and Deer, but the name

Wind was common. The different clans had different social positions much as our families have; the Winds of the Creeks were as aristocratic as the Randolphs of Virginia. Political privileges quite commonly went along with social standing among the Indians as with ourselves. It also formed the basis of their rivalry in their amusements and games.

Government among the Indians was pretty much the same throughout the South. Each town of a tribe had its peace chief and its war chief. The peace chief was selected generally on a basis of social standing, the office commonly being confined to certain clans. He was spokesman for his tribe in foreign affairs, supervised the communal labor and communal property, and presided over the town council which held daily meetings to adjust disputes and to make local ordinances. The war chief was chosen on merit for a particular war, but if he proved worthy it was the custom to continue him in office year after year. The peace chief commonly represented his town in the tribal council which met annually, generally the first of May, although there was sometimes a second meeting in September. The Indians kept track of time by seasons. The Cherokee were the best mathematicians of the South, having separate numbers up to one hundred, whereas the other tribes counted by tens.

Inter-tribal trade and commerce was considerably developed among the Southern Indians, and there is evidence of a merchant class among them, which went from tribe to tribe unmolested. Salt was an important item of commerce. It was made at the salt water springs, numerous throughout the South, by boiling off the water in huge clay kettles. The Shawnee had a knack of finding these springs for the location of their villages, and seem to have been the chief salt dispensers of the South. The Choctaw procured most of their supply from the



springs in Noxubee county, Mississippi. The Cherokee were the chief pipe makers of the South, fashioning them of steatite and clay and carving fantastic designs on bowl and stem. The Cherokee also supplied the other tribes with mica. From the gulf and Atlantic coast shells of many kinds were carried into the interior. Baskets, nets, mats, clay dishes, wooden spoons from the gum and tulip trees, skins of various animals, ochre for coloring, flints for arrows and garden tools, beads, and many other articles were carried over the Indian roads and traded from tribe to tribe. Much of it found its way north through the agency of the Shawnee who made their town at Eskippakithiki, Kentucky, into a fair town for the interchange of commodities.


The prevalence of inter-tribal trade led to the development of an inter-tribal language. Of course, the Muskogean tribes had very similar languages, and linguists have given the opinion that Hitchiti, Alabama, Choctaw, and Chickasaw could understand each other in their respective tongues. What little is known of the Caloosa language in the Florida peninsula indicates that it was a dialect of the Choctaw. Choctaw, in fact, seems to have been the most widely diffused of the Southern languages and so quite naturally become the basis of the trade language. This was a sort of "pigeon" Indian, made up of words from each family tongue with Choctaw predominating. It was commonly called "Mobilian," and the knowledge of it was practically universal throughout the South.

In passing from tribe to tribe and from town to town, the traders followed the network of roads which overspread the Indian South; in fact they probably originated a great many of them.<sup>12</sup> The Indian villages were

<sup>12</sup> W. E. Myer, *Indian Trails of the Southeast*, Forty-second Annual Report, United States Bureau of American Ethnology (1924-1925), 729.

located on these roads, although in many cases the roads were undoubtedly placed to connect the villages. Indian roads were commonly narrow in passing through the forests, rarely being more than two feet wide; those that were later converted into pioneer roads by the white settlers always had to be widened. It was the narrowness of the roads that led to the Indian custom of traveling single file. The main roads had innumerable detours and by-paths, so that it was often difficult to keep on the right path. Such crafty woodsmen as Thomas Walker and Daniel Boone lost their way in the Kentucky mountains when trying to follow the Warriors' Trace from Cumberland Gap to the bluegrass.

There were four main-travelled highways leading from the South to the North, three of which converged on Circleville, Ohio. The easternmost of the four might well be called the Siouan Highway since it ran through the heart of the ancient Siouan country. Starting from Savannah, it crossed the river at Augusta, then ran through Columbia and up the Wateree to the Catawba towns, skirted the headwaters of the North Carolina rivers, and came out at Bermuda Hundred on the James. North of the Catawba this road was called by the white traders the Occaneechi Path because it passed through an Indian town of that name on the Roanoke river. Farther west was the Valley Road running from the lower end of the valley on the Coosa river in Alabama, through the Cherokee villages, and on up the Holston and Shenandoah to the Potomac; one fork branched off at the New river and ran up the New-Kanawha, crossed the Ohio, and went on to Circleville. The Warriors' Trace was a transverse road starting at Charleston, running by way of Columbia, the French Broad and Cumberland Gap to the mouth of the Scioto river, and up that stream to Circleville. The earliest English maps





of the back country showed this road and labelled it "the common road to the Cuttawa country." A fourth highway ran from Circleville to Nashville where it forked, one branch going by way of Chattanooga to Augusta, and the other by way of Muscle Shoals to Natchez.

The chief east and west roads lay, as was to be expected, in the Coastal Plain. The greatest of these was the Creek Path which ran from Charleston through Augusta to Milledgeville where it divided, one fork going through the towns of the Creeks, and on to Pontotoc among the Chickasaw, the other going to Mobile and St. Stephens. Another great road was that which started at Savannah, ran to Pensacola, Mobile, Natchez, through Louisiana, and across Texas to the Rio Grande.



## The Colonial Foundation

The three major European nations which contested for possession of the present United States made their entrance into it through the Southeast. They came in by the back door. For the Southern Coastal Plain, whether its origin be erosive or marine, was geologically the youngest part of the South, and Indian civilization faced not the Atlantic but the Pacific. Neither nature nor native opposed to the incoming European on the gulf and Atlantic any such resistance as might have been expected on the Pacific. That the French and the Spaniards never spread beyond the coastal fringe of the South was due, in the last analysis, not to the obstacles they met, but to the fact that they viewed their possessions in the South merely as appendices to their other domains. To the English, on the other hand, the South appeared the most valuable portion of the continent, and they desired it not as an annex but as a home. It was the English, therefore, who inherited the South, and they did not inherit it through meekness.

That the South was the part of the United States first to be explored and to be settled was due to its proximity to the Spanish field of operations in the Caribbean and around the gulf. It is probable that Vespucci was the first white man to see the coast of the South, and that he sighted Florida on his voyage of 1497-1498. Florida appeared, unnamed, on the Spanish maps of 1500; thirteen years later De León gave it a name. For a half century it remained little more than a name while Narváez

and De Soto wandered through it in search of treasure not to be found, and Villafane followed Ayllon in vain attempts to make settlements. Thereupon the Spaniards washed their hands of the inhospitable land where death and not riches lay in wait for the explorer. From this time on Florida to the Spaniards was merely a mass of land bordering the gulf stream which bore their treasure ships homeward bound from the gulf. That they did in 1565 make a settlement at St. Augustine was not due to any appreciation of Florida, but to a desire to protect the gulf stream from the intruding French.

The La Florida of the Spaniards included practically the entire South east of the Mississippi, but Spanish occupation did not keep pace with Spanish claims. Interested chiefly in the coast line, they made little effort to penetrate into the interior, but from St. Augustine as a center pushed their stations northward along the Atlantic into Guale (Georgia) and Orista (southern South Carolina). In these efforts the missionary and the soldier worked together in such close harmony that it is a matter of doubt whether the state was using the church or supporting it. In 1633 the missionaries turned their zeal westward along the gulf coast into the Apalachee country, to be followed some twenty-five years later by the soldiers, who established Ft. San Luis at the present Tallahassee. Economics, as well as religion and politics, entered into this westward expansion, for Apalachee was the granary of Florida and Spanish ships had long traded with it through Apalachee Bay and the St. Marks river. Although mission stations were extended to the Apalachicola river and beyond, San Luis remained the fortification farthest west until the close of the century when Pensacola was established, like St. Augustine, to anticipate the French.

Spanish Florida, like Indian Florida and geological



Florida, was exotic. It was in the South but not of it. It was less a colony than an outpost of an empire, and it never received any considerable immigration from Spain. Imperialistically it faced outward to the sea and the gulf; only the missionaries made any effort of importance to penetrate inward, and they were received by the Creeks with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm. The consequence was that Spanish Florida exerted very little influence on Southern affairs, and may be said to have lived a life to itself.

The fisherman and the pirate pointed the way to English settlement in America. After the failure of Gilbert in Newfoundland, Raleigh planned a colony for the Southern coast, which had secured great publicity as a region where the English subjects, euphemistically referred to as "sea dogs," were wont to assemble with the object of securing a better economic distribution of the cargoes of Spanish treasure ships. Raleigh intended his colony for the Chesapeake: that it went to Roanoke Island was not due to his direction and that it perished there was not due to his neglect. It is well to remember that the southern Atlantic coast region after 1565 possessed an atmosphere decidedly lethal for enterprises of non-Spanish nature.

The lost colony left behind it a mystery and a name. The Virginia of Sir Walter Raleigh was all those "remote heathen and barbarous lands, countreys and territories not actually possessed by any Christian prince or people." In the charter of 1606 the English government restricted the name to the region between the thirty-fourth and the forty-fifth parallels, and in 1609 restricted it even more narrowly to a territory running up and down the coast two hundred miles north and south of Old Point Comfort and extending inland to the Pacific "west and northwest" — a provision which Virginia in-

terpreted as fixing her northern boundary by a northwest line. In this not uncomfortably restricted area the London Company planted a colony in 1607 which for twenty-five years remained the only promise, and a feeble one, of English colonization in the South. ~~But~~ surviving disease, famine, war, and maladministration, this colony had by 1633 become a thing of value which it was worth the while of the English government to protect. Accordingly Maryland was founded as a "mark" state on the northern frontier, with powers of government conveniently centralized for prompt use against an aggressive New Netherlands and, it is not impossible to think, against a surly New England. Maryland was to include that portion of Virginia north of the Potomac and as far west as the headwaters of that stream. The eastern boundary was the Atlantic and the northern the old northern boundary of Virginia which was now re-defined as a line "which lieth under the fortieth degree of north latitude from the Equinoctial, where New England is terminated" — a definition distinctly prejudicial to the claim of Virginia that her northern boundary ran northwest. Out of this restricted domain Maryland later lost that portion of the eastern shore which is Delaware, and was forced to exchange her northern boundary "under the fortieth degree" for the present Mason and Dixon line. This traditional line between North and South is practically the line between Virginia and New England as defined in the charter of 1609.

Maryland was never called upon to fulfill her original mission as a mark colony, but it soon developed an importance of its own. For thirty years Virginia and Maryland constituted the South. Both remained loyal to the

king during the Civil War and both experienced under Cromwell the first Southern reconstruction. With the restoration, Virginia had to undergo a second "rending" in the formation of Carolina. Maryland had diminished the Virginia domain only by a narrow section whose length was merely the length of the Potomac; Carolina cut off a region more than two degrees wide running from ocean to ocean.

The name Carolina had been fastened on the map in 1629 when a grant had been made of the region between thirty-six and thirty-one to Sir Robert Heath. But the grant lapsed for lack of settlement on the part of the proprietor, although people from Virginia had moved south to establish the colony of Albemarle, and in 1663 the same territory under the same name was re-granted by Charles II. Two years later the grant was enlarged to thirty-six thirty on the north and twenty-nine on the south. The northern extension was made apparently to include the Albemarle people and the southern boundary was placed below St. Augustine apparently for the purpose of forcing a compromise line from the Spaniards. It had this effect, for in 1670 England and Spain agreed each to recognize the possessions of the other as they then stood. At this time England had no settlement south of Albemarle and Spain none north of the Savannah. The Carolinians never admitted that their charter limits were affected by the treaty of 1670; they continued to claim to twenty-nine and to extend their settlements south as the Spaniards withdrew. Spanish recession was brought about chiefly by Indian hostility which Spain estimated was not altogether without inspiration from Charleston.

Carolina was a unit only from 1665 to 1670 while it

consisted entirely of Albemarle; after the founding of Charleston, Carolina became the Carolinas. Distance and difference of interests separated Albemarle and Charleston, and the proprietors recognized the element of disunity by maintaining separate governments for "our colony northeast of Cape Fear" and "our colony southwest of Cape Fear." The unnatural experiment of a common governor was made from 1691 to 1712, but was found impracticable and a return was made to the old arrangement. So little connection did the two colonies have with each other that they did not even unite in revolt. For ten years after the king took over the southern region the northern remained under the proprietors, and this fact finally forced the abandonment of the fiction of a Carolina. The names North Carolina and South Carolina, long in common use, now became legal designations. The boundary between the two was established by a joint commission, 1735-1746.

Into these colonies from Delaware Bay to the Savannah river for 125 years came the people who made the South. It may be noted first of all that they were almost exclusively English; of those "lesser breeds without the Law" mentioned by a later English poet there were practically none. Some French Huguenots came to the South, chiefly to South Carolina, but they were quickly assimilated by the English mass and, although they may have enlivened, they certainly did not leaven the lump. A great number of Germans came in and settled on the frontier, particularly in the Shenandoah Valley, but they, too, were absorbed and exerted no influence in changing the ideals of the English majority. The Scotch-Irish were, of course, neither Scotch nor Irish, but downright Englishmen whose migration to the South was

circuitous and delayed. They brought with them to America no characteristics appreciably different from those of the Englishmen already here. The colonial South was overwhelmingly English and it will be found that the later South never changed in this respect.

The incoming English were middle class people, poor, and of common stock; in this respect there was no essential difference between the English who went to the South and those who went to the North. The disparate legend that the South was settled by dissolute adventurers and by wealthy aristocrats has lived lustily in our history and it dies hard. The myth of the "adventurers" is due partly to the scoldings of John Smith in his books on Virginia. Partly it is due to a change in the meaning of the word; the present adventurer is a gambler, but the adventurer of colonial dictionaries was simply an investor. There was probably about the same number of bad characters in the Southern immigration as in the Northern. As for the aristocrats, there were no more of them in the colonial South than in the colonial North, and the number in either section was negligible. John Winthrop and George Washington were equally distant from the English nobility. Both North and South were settled by people who had made their living in England by hard toil and did not change their ways upon coming to America. The only difference between North and South in this respect was that in the latter the reward of toil was greater.

The most essential difference between the immigration into the South and that into the North lay in the motive. In the North the dominant note of the movement is that of escape; one might without essential injustice describe the Northern settlers as refugees fleeing

from a political, economic, or religious battlefield in Europe. There is practically none of this in the South. No Southern community was settled by people fleeing from religious persecution. The statement so often repeated that Maryland was founded as a refuge for Catholics has no foundation in fact, as is shown, among other things, by the refusal of any considerable number of Catholics to take refuge there. The Huguenots, it is true, were refugees, but they were few in number and made no definite impression on Southern ways. The colonial South was overwhelmingly Protestant but it was not the kind of Protestantism that had taken an active part in religious controversy in England, and consequently it was not a persecuting Protestantism in America. There was a certain dislike for Catholics in all parts of the South, and an even more certain disdain of Puritanism, but for the most part Southern people in colonial days and afterward were indifferent to religious controversies and theological disputations.

Neither were the immigrants to the South refugees from an economic battlefield. Every Southern colony began its existence as a proprietary, and in every case the proprietor exerted himself to further immigration since it was upon settlement that the value of his holdings depended. To a very great extent the immigration to the South was a promoted immigration. It was made up of people whose poverty had not sunk into pauperism and who were quite able to keep their heads above the economic waters in England. They had to be induced to come to America; it was a pull and not a push that started them. In this connection some reference must be made to one of the most widespread misapprehensions in the whole range of American history: the status of the indentured servants. History has insisted on giving

a modern meaning to the seventeenth century "servant," as it has to the seventeenth century "adventurer." But the servant of that time was merely one who contracted to learn a trade from a master workman.<sup>13</sup> If the servant worked as a craftsman or in the skilled trades he was called an apprentice and his indentures were called articles; if the articulated apprentice worked in the field of husbandry or the unskilled trades he was called a servant and his articles were called indentures. In neither case was there any question involved of social or economic status any more than there is today in the case of one becoming a bank clerk or a bond salesman. Apprenticeship was merely the conventional method of learning a trade preparatory to starting in business. As a matter of fact, apprenticeship was considered a privilege for which the apprentice customarily paid a good round sum. In the case of the indentured servant who came to America to work, the feature of payment was actually reversed, the master workman (the planter) paying the cost of passage for the apprentice as an inducement for him to enter the apprenticeship. Instead of the servant being driven to America by poverty, he was actually paid to come. That someone else paid his passage was not so much an evidence of his poverty as of his reluctance. Imaginative writers have drawn many fantastic conclusions from the supposititious lowly condition of the indentured servants. Some have seen in them the origin of the mountaineers of the South, some even of the "poor white trash." There is overwhelming evidence that after working out their apprenticeship in the conventional manner, they commonly took their place in the economic and social system of the South equal to

<sup>13</sup> P. A. Bruce, *Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*, vol. 1, 572-587.

that of their neighbors, often became members of the colonial legislatures, and not infrequently became plantation owners in their own right. In a very real sense every settler who came to America before 1619 was an indentured servant bound to the London Company. The Pilgrims were indentured servants of the London merchants who paid their expenses to America.

The consequence of all this was that no inferiority complex was included in the luggage of the English immigrant to the South. He was not a beaten man fleeing from an economic, political, or religious battlefield. Because he was unbeaten he was confident, tolerant, sane, individualistic. The aggressiveness of the Southern people was to display itself on every page of our history prior to the War between the States. They led the way in exploring and settling the West, they furnished the Declaration of Independence, and initiated the movement for a constitution; they directed the government of the United States for seventy years. They brought on the uncanny War of 1812, and the iniquitous War with Mexico. Their aggressiveness not uncommonly degenerated into arrogance which had its part in stirring up enemies for them.

The English immigrants to the South were a provincial people; most of them, it would be safe to say, had never been beyond their shire limits while they lived in England. Upon entering the South they came into an environment that was completely new to them; even the solid ground beneath their feet and the skies above their heads bore strange and bewildering aspects. Out of the impact of their hereditary ideas and practices against this new environment came the South – with an Englishman of a somewhat different kind to inhabit it.

To the Englishman the forest of the Coastal Plain



came as a shock and a surprise, for at home the forest had dwindled almost to the point of disappearance. The forests of the South were omnipresent.<sup>14</sup> The tang of the pine forests travelled far to sea and commonly met the immigrant long before the land itself came into view. This was particularly the case if there were forest fires burning and the wind blowing off-shore. When the settler landed he found before him practically all the trees he had known in England and many new ones. The oak, ash, elm, poplar, and beech he had had at home in some variety or other and in his first days in America they must have presented the appearance of old friends, little bits of England in a strange land. Cedar and pine were new, as were the cypress, locust, hickory, walnut, and the live oak of the far South. He found the dogwood and the mulberry which he had known at home, and the chinquapin and magnolia of which he was ignorant. He found peach trees and crabapple trees and plum trees growing wild and he hurried to domesticate them. The persimmon tree and the sassafras were new to him and it was long before he was able to put them to their proper uses.

But although the forests filled the immigrant with wonder, they did not fill him with awe. He speedily made himself as much at home in the forests of the South as he had been in treeless England, and as time went on came to look upon the forests as a part of the natural order of things to such an extent that he became suspicious of any area of country that was unforested. Yet the trees always remained an enemy to him. He had to make a living from the soil, if he lived at all, and before the crops could be raised the land had to be cleared. Although there was no undergrowth in the

<sup>14</sup> *Idem*, chapter 2.

forest of the Coastal Plain, the clearing of the land was a slow and laborious work to which the settler brought no English experience. Captain John Smith tells how the first settlers blistered their hands swinging their axes against the tough wood of the Virginia trees. In course of time the settlers learned the Indian method of girding the trees and of burning them down. But throughout the colonial period and for a long time afterward much of the demand for labor in the South was due to the necessity of clearing the land.

The forests of the South were apparently without end, but after all they were tangible things against which the settler could pit his brain and brawn; with the climate he had to make the best terms possible. In England the winter had been the longest time of the year and the summer had been merely a season in which he got ready for the next winter. In the South the summer was so much longer than the winter as practically to constitute the entire year. It was not only more prolonged than the English summer; it was much hotter. The result was that the settler had to reorganize his life on a summer basis. He had to adjust himself to it, and the process brought about many changes in his diet, his house, his crops, and his manner of living.

The Southern house is the result of an evolution. The first house of the immigrant upon arriving was commonly a primitive structure with earthen walls and a thatched roof.<sup>15</sup> As soon as possible he supplanted it with one of wood, built in traditional English fashion by setting up a palisade of slabs against a framework built around four posts, and surmounted by the English thatched roof. The log cabin which would seem to be the most natural house for a forest people made its ap-

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<sup>15</sup> Fiske Kimball, *Domestic Architecture of the American Colonies and of the Early Republic*, 3-53.

pearance as a result of contact with the Swedes on the Delaware. Once adopted, however, it soon came into universal use. Following this came the frame house, often a structure of hewn logs covered with weather-boards; this became the typical house of the well-to-do, as the log cabin was of the poorer class. In England the houses had been largely of rock, but rock was not to be had on the Coastal Plain, and wood was everywhere. Brick-making began early in the colonies, but brick houses were rare, although brick chimneys were as a rule on the frame house, supplanting the stick-and-mud affairs which characterized the log cabins even until the War between the States. The widespread idea that many colonial houses in the South were built of brick imported from England is entirely without foundation. "English" brick was a brick of a certain pattern whether made in America or England. After the house was built the settler was compelled to build a fence around it, and for this purpose it was impossible to use the English hedge either to inclose the lawn or to inclose the tilled fields. The Southerners early adopted the "worm" fence, finding good use for the hickory trees of the country in making rails. When they needed posts they soon found that the most durable of all wood for this purpose was the locust.

Not only did the Englishman in the South have to use material for his home quite different from that he used in England, but he was forced by the climate to radically alter its design. He built it high off the ground so that the air could get under it, quite commonly setting it on locust or beech posts. The central feature of it, whether cabin or mansion, was a hall running the full length of the house with doors or windows at each end so as to admit all the air possible. In the cabins these halls were commonly referred to as "dog-runs." The

heat was responsible for the elevation of the house and for the hall; the sunshine forced the building of porches. The Southerner looked upon doors and windows as the eyes of a house, and the porch as the eyebrows which shaded them. No Southerner, if he could avoid it, would suffer the rays of the Southern sun to beat against the unprotected walls of his house. He built porches not only in front, but on all sides of the house, and much of the indoor life of the Southerner was spent on his porches. Consequently, it was on the designing and ornamentation of the porch that the artistic talent of the Southern architects was displayed. Sometimes the result was happy and sometimes not, but in any case the house was a radically different thing from the houses of England. The climate was responsible for a new architecture. The furniture was different, too, for the colonial carpenters and cabinet makers liked to work in walnut, which was not to be had in England. The cedar tree which the Indians regarded with superstitious awe because of its aromatic tang, early became a favorite wood for the construction of cabinets, closets, and chests. Poplar in Virginia and Maryland, and pine in the Carolinas became the chief source of weatherboarding and of the shingles which at a very early date entirely supplanted the thatch as a roofing material.

In England the immigrant had been an eater of beef and mutton and flour bread, and a prodigious drinker of beer. His new environment changed his diet in a variety of ways. Mutton disappeared entirely from the bill of fare, for sheep were too shy and timid to thrive in a forest country where wolves, wildcats, and other beasts of prey abounded. Cattle were early imported from England, but owing to the absence of grasses on the Coastal Plain cattle raising was difficult and the under-

fed cattle rapidly deteriorated. The roast beef of old England did not accompany the immigrant to the South. Pork supplanted beef on the colonial bill of fare, for the hog could fend for himself in the Southern forest, finding his own food and holding his own against the wild beasts. The Southerner supplemented this meat diet with venison and wild turkey, and with sea foods such as oysters from salt water and mussels from fresh-water, and with fish of astonishing variety. But the hot climate forced him to lessen his meats. The new world introduced him to a great array of vegetables; as a matter of fact, it might almost be said that vegetables came into the world along with the settlement of America. He was acquainted with the "Irish" potato before he left England, but the Indian sweet potato now supplanted it in his affections—so much so, that the term potato in the South came to mean the sweet potato. He learned from the Indian the virtues of the tomato, the squash, and the pumpkin. The latter never became the favorite pie material of the South as it did of New England.

Flour bread was abandoned by the immigrant even more completely than mutton was. Wheat would not grow well anywhere in the Southern Coastal Plain, showing a tendency to become all stalk and no grain. The consequence was that one of the earliest diet changes in the South was from flour bread to corn bread, which the settler adopted from the Indians. Corn bread, it has been said, is one of the most highly concentrated forms of nourishment known to man, and there is reason to believe that some of the sickness to which newcomers were subject was due to the immoderate eating of this new food. The settler learned from the Indians all the different ways of eating corn; he learned to eat it as

grits, as hominy, as roasting ears, and many other forms. He even improved on his Indian instructors when he worked out a way of making it into whiskey.

At home the English laboring man had been a hard drinker, using beer as his favorite beverage. But beer was not to be had in America, and the settler suffered grave discomfort thereby. He tried hard to improvise a substitute. For a while he thought the sassafras tree could be utilized for beer, but the result from boiling the roots was only tea, after all. He had great hopes of the persimmons for a while, but they, too, disappointed him. He was finally forced to the use of water, and it may be that the change of beverage, as well as the change of diet, affected his stamina and outlook on life.

The immigrants to the South were, it may well be believed, a hardy people, but in their new home they encountered a number of new diseases with which they were long unable to cope. One of these, and the most persistent one, was malaria, so named because it was supposed to be caused by the bad night air. As a matter of fact it does originate in the night air, but it remained for modern science to ascertain that it was not the night air but the mosquito that flies by night that was its cause. The mosquito is by no means confined to the South, but the long summers in that section give it greater opportunity for action than elsewhere. Quinine, the prime remedy for malaria, had been discovered, but its use against the disease was unknown. The Coastal Plain of the South swarmed with mosquitoes, and they spread havoc among the inexperienced Englishmen. The disease of malaria was deadly to the newcomers. They later gained a certain amount of immunity by reason of the fact that they carried the latent disease always in their systems. One effect of the South on the Englishman was to make him a malarial person.

Typhus was much more deadly to the early settlers than malaria was. The settlers secured their drinking water whenever possible from springs, and these were often polluted. They often drank from the streams, and these were even more likely to be tainted. The immigrants knew how to dig wells because they were familiar with them in England, but they lacked stone for walling the wells, and springs were everywhere. Bad water and the night mosquito caused more deaths in the early South than all the other causes combined. In later times the Southerner fought typhus at its source and practically destroyed it; as for the mosquito, the most adequate attack the South has yet worked out is to retreat behind screens at nightfall.

One of the major novelties the new world had in store for the Englishman was the American Indian. The immigrant had never seen anything like him in England. But of all the forces in the new environment, the Indian had the least effect in bringing about changes in the English habits and customs; he was far less influential than the forest and the climate. The prevailing attitude of the immigrant to the Indian was one of contempt. He had no inclination to dignify him by picturing him as an imp of darkness or as a child of the devil inhabiting a land whose ruler was the prince of the powers of the air. On the contrary, he was inclined to classify him with skunks and weasels and other animals of a lower order than human, and the common term for an Indian in the colonial South was "varmint." In his self-confidence the settler underestimated the Indian and occasionally paid the penalty of his misjudgment in blood, as in the Virginia massacres and the Carolina wars against the Tuscarora and the Yemassee. Yet it must be admitted that opposition of the Indians of the Coastal Plains to the English was very feeble and it is a matter

of wonder that such a small body of men could settle down upon a continent and hold it with so little loss. Little effort was made in the colonial South to Christianize the Indian or to civilize him. Notwithstanding the politic union of Rolfe and Pocahontas, intermarriage with the Indian was practically unknown. The Englishman was not above learning from the Indian what the Indian had to teach – new foods and crops, forest lore, etc. He traded with him from the beginning, buying his hides and pelts in exchange for trinkets, strong drinks, and even firearms. He reasoned that with firearms the Indians would be better hunters, and in his confidence he was quite indifferent to the prospect that the arms might sometimes be turned against the whites. Every colonial legislature enacted laws against the selling of firearms to the Indians, and enacted them in vain. The first settlers in Virginia wore armor when fighting the Indians, but the coat of mail could not long survive in a Southern climate.

The most inveterate Indian traders in the South were the Virginians and the South Carolinians. As the tribes thinned around the first settlements, the traders of these two colonies went further and further afield in search of profits. The Virginia traders turned South rather than West at first, due to the fact that a great Indian path led south from Bermuda Hundred on the James. They followed this path south to the Roanoke where they found the Indian town of Occaneechi, and for some time this village marked the limit of Virginia trade. They called the road the Occaneechi Path. In time they followed the path still further south and came into contact with the Tuscarora and Catawba. The bolder spirits went even further across the mountains of the Carolinas



into the villages of the Cherokee.<sup>16</sup> The easier road to the Cherokee down the valley of the Holston was not found until 1673, and did not come into any considerable use until toward the latter part of the colonial period. As for the Charleston traders, they began to trade westward with the Indians almost as soon as the roofs were on their houses. Their chief trade was with the Creeks, whom they first found living on Ocmulgee river. In pursuance of this trade they penetrated into Alabama, and by 1700 had reached the Chickasaw on the banks of the Mississippi. The South Carolinians traded not only in peltry but in slaves, most of whom they sent on to the West Indies. This practice of buying Indian slaves had the effect of making Indian wars more frequent and of encouraging the taking of captives rather than of scalps. In the early years the Charleston traders neglected the Cherokee because their main villages were "overhill," across the mountains. After the coming of the French to the South served to check English penetration to the west, the Charleston people turned more and more to the Cherokee trade. Here they came into conflict with the Virginia traders, and the resulting rivalry between the two colonies led to many conflicting policies and many exhibitions of disharmony.

The natives of America would not produce the native products, and therefore the English sent out colonies. Gold was by no means absent from the thoughts of the promoters of colonization, but their chief purpose was fixed on more prosaic things such as the production of lumber, potash, wine, silk, and other things of the kind. The colonies were not originally designed as agricul-

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<sup>16</sup> W. Neil Franklin, "Virginia and the Cherokee Indian, 1673-1752," in *East Tennessee Historical Society Publications*, no. 4, 3-21.

tural colonies; agriculture, to reverse Jefferson's phrase, was to be a handmaiden to commerce. Under the London Company, Virginia made strenuous efforts to carry out this home-made program; after her failure no other Southern colony attempted any other form of industry than farming. Farming in Virginia first took the form of attempting to raise the crops with which the colonists had been familiar in England. It failed, and the lesson of the Virginia failure saved the other Southern colonies much useless labor. As a matter of fact, Virginia for its first twenty-five years might well be viewed as a great experimental station in colonization.

Every Southern colony had two chief crops, and neither of them was an English crop. Everywhere one of these crops was a food crop and that food crop was the one to which the Englishman, of scanty vocabulary, applied his old home term "corn." Corn had the place in the South that wheat had held in England; here the English farmer broke with English tradition, but only in the selection of his crop. He was still following the tradition that the main business of farming was to produce food. It was when he began to produce staple crops that he broke entirely with his English experience, for the English farmer produced for consumption, not for sale. The beginning of tobacco in Virginia and its spread to Maryland and North Carolina is one of the best-known parts of our history, and the story need not be repeated. The story of the rise of rice in South Carolina is almost equally familiar. It needs only to be pointed out that the raising of these two staple crops gave to farming in the South a zest it had never had in England, that it made the farmer a commercial factor, and raised agricultural problems that were previously unknown in the western world.

Farming in the South became an avenue to wealth

such as it had never been elsewhere. There was a market for the staples at all times and over a period of years inequalities in the market prices could be depended on to right themselves. The Southern colonists who had been poor men in England, whose relatives and ancestors had been poor, were not slow to take the novel opportunity, now presented them, of gaining wealth. First of all they demanded land, and, fortunately, land was to be had almost for the asking. First by the head-right system and, in the eighteenth century, chiefly by purchase for a nominal sum, they built up their small farms, piece by piece, to great plantations. There was much fraud and corruption in the land office, as was to be expected in an institution whose administration was largely in the hands of the easy-going county authorities. The English government admitted the right of the Indian to the soil, and the colonial charters were construed as asserting only the right of preëmption. But Indian land was easily alienated in time of peace and always forfeited in time of war, and the result was that the land came into the hands of the colonists quite as fast as they desired it. The fact that everywhere throughout the South the land was held subject to quit-rent, and that the validity of ownership depended on the payment of this rent, appeared to Southern people only in the light of a legal casuistry. They paid the quit-rent when they must, evaded it whenever possible, and in any case held the land as their own. In England the settlers had not been land owners, but land tenants. In England land ownership had been a badge of respectability possessed by few. In the South it was still a badge of respectability but it was in the reach of everyone. Few things added more to the self-esteem of the Southern colonist than his ownership of land.

But if large estates meant the possibility of great crops,

it also meant the certainty of great labor. The English farmer at home had never done such back-breaking work as was entailed in the production of rice and tobacco. And the cultivation of the crop was easy in comparison to the drudgery of clearing the land. The most insistent demand of the farmer and planter was for labor. It was useless for a farmer to ask help of his neighbor, for his neighbor was also a farmer and was also in search of assistance. The planter, in his need, had recourse to his English experience and made a trial of applying the apprentice system of the trades to the humbler field of husbandry. Apprentices the indentured servants were in reality, for no amount of farming experience in England would be of any use to them in the South. Old farmers had to learn a new art of farming. But the indentured servant was not the answer to the planter's prayer for the reason that his apprenticeship soon came to an end, and the custom or law that made him a landholder at the end of his service made him at the same time a competitor for labor. Permanency, not skill, was the quality that was most needed in a labor supply for the South, and the only possible solution was slavery. In Virginia and Maryland the settler adopted slavery slowly and reluctantly as a thing alien to all his English experience and repulsive to his English ideals; South Carolina adopted it more readily since it was already familiar to that large element of its population drawn from the West Indies.

The three things – staple crops, the large estates, and negro slavery – which later came to be considered as characteristic of the South as a section thus had their origin in colonial times. Of the two staples it may be noted that tobacco was a farm crop as well as a plantation crop, and that it was produced by rich and poor

alike, with and without slavery; rice, on the other hand, was exclusively a plantation crop only to be produced by men wealthy enough to own slaves for the actual work of cultivation. The small farms at all times outnumbered the large, and the greater per cent of the land acreage was in the hands of the poor people. Finally, the proportion of slaveholders was small, never amounting to more than one-fourth of the adult population.

Since the Southern settlers produced staple crops they had to sell them. Although the English government had not envisaged these crops as an aim of colonization, it recognized their value and encouraged their production. Tobacco was given a monopoly of the English market by the exclusion not only of Spanish tobacco but of English tobacco as well. Upon this action depended the prosperity of Virginia and Maryland, for their tobacco was inferior to the Spanish tobacco and could not compete with it in the open market. Colonial tobacco, however, never was restricted to the English market, although legally it could leave the empire only by way of England. From rice the English revenues could expect little since it found its chief market in the Scandinavian countries, and in Portugal and Spain, from which places it quickly expelled its Egyptian and Brazilian rivals. From 1704 to 1730 it was required to go through England on its way out to market, but after that date it was allowed to go directly from America to any point south of Cape Finisterre. To rice, as to tobacco, the English government gave a monopoly of the English market. The preferential treatment given to Southern products was due, of course, to the fact that they did not compete with English products (except mildly in the case of tobacco) and that they brought much revenue to the English customs.

English ships were attracted to the South because of the great profits to be made in the carriage of the Southern staples. Their presence discouraged the development of shipbuilding in the colonies while an even greater discouragement was the superior profits to be made in farming.<sup>17</sup> The vast forest resources of the South went untouched for shipbuilding, notwithstanding the persistent efforts of the English government to promote it. The English ships were able to make their way far inland on the estuaries and up the drowned river channels of the Southern Coastal Plain to the very doors of the colonial planter and to load tobacco and rice from the plantation wharves. For this reason no ports developed in Virginia. In Maryland the absence of deep rivers led to the growth of Baltimore as a port for concentration and distribution, and in South Carolina a similar cause developed the port of Charleston. The method of shipping made it inevitable that the middleman who handled the commerce should reside in England. The colonial planter sold his products in England and bought his products there through a merchant whom he never saw and from whom he was separated by the entire width of the Atlantic. Inevitably such a system resulted in the planter's running in debt. These debts were carried along from year to year and handed down from one generation to another as a family heirloom.

From the moment of their landing on the Southern coast, the immigrants began expanding into the interior. The spread of the Virginians was mainly to the north, moving from river to river until settlement finally reached the Potomac. The planters tried to locate their plantations, as far as possible, on the tidewater streams so that ships could come to their door, but as early as

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<sup>17</sup> Bruce, *Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*, vol. I, 435.

1700 settlements were reaching out into the Piedmont. Two eccentric bits of expansion in Virginia carried settlers eastward to the "Kingdom of Accomac" and southward to the Albemarle: the latter movement, the Virginians insisted, owing its chief inspiration to the peace officers. In Maryland the chief direction of expansion was northward along the bay, resulting in the founding of Annapolis and Baltimore, but, as in Virginia, there was a stream of immigration which crossed the bay and made homes on the eastern shore. In North Carolina the settlements hugged the shore until the driving out of the Tuscarora in 1712 made it safe to settle into the interior. From this time settlement moved up the valleys of the Roanoke, Neuse, and Cape Fear until stopped by the pine barrens near the fall line. In South Carolina settlement spread from the Charleston nucleus north and south along the coast. Only along the Santee and the Savannah was there any considerable movement into the interior.

Virginia was the only colony whose tidewater people expanded westward beyond the mountains. Early in the eighteenth century people found their way through the water gaps and wind gaps of the Blue Ridge and made homes for themselves in the valley beyond. For the most part this overflow from eastern Virginia into the valley went into the lower valley following the course of the Roanoke-Staunton, and settling on the upper courses of the New (which they called Wood's) river, the Holston (which they named Indian) river, and the Staunton. The lower valley was filling slowly but surely when the Germans and the Scotch-Irish came pouring into the Shenandoah region from Pennsylvania. These newcomers, as their host increased, followed the valley southward until they came to the Staunton. The valley

of this stream deflected them eastward through the Blue Ridge and down into the Piedmont of the Carolinas. It is possible that history has exaggerated the importance of the Germans and the Scotch-Irish and has laid too much stress on the differences between them and the people of the tidewater. The Scotch-Irish, the most numerous element, were of the same English stock as the tidewater people and were in no respect different from them in their point of view or their ideals. They were largely Presbyterian, while in the tidewater the Anglican church was the established form of worship; but in neither section did religion sit so heavily on the people as to direct their energies or determine their actions. Land was as easily obtained in the valley as in the tidewater, and the Scotch-Irish were as avid for its possession as were the eastern people; before coming to America the Scotch-Irish had been tenants just as the eastern people had been, and when they came to have the opportunity of land ownership, they reacted to it just as the eastern people did. Big estates were built up in the valley with the same readiness and by the same methods as in the tidewater. The valley people began the pursuit of wealth by the cultivation of tobacco, they adopted slavery and the system of indentured servants, and it is quite evident from the records that there was no appreciable difference between tidewater and valley in respect to the distribution of wealth. The one essential difference between east and west in colonial Virginia was that the west did not have an easy access to markets for its products and the east did. The idea that the string of German and Scotch-Irish settlements on the frontier promoted unity and nationalism can only be dismissed as a fantasy. In the Carolinas the Scotch-Irish were separated from the eastern people by a pine barren



region which in some places had a width of eighty miles. It was a much more effective barrier between east and west than was the Blue Ridge in Virginia. In the Carolinas, too, the soil of the Piedmont occupied by the newcomers was inferior to that of the tidewater, while in Virginia the valley had a soil that was much more fertile than the land of the east. The consequence was that in the Carolinas the two sections had a difference of interests based on a difference of crops and even of occupations, while in Virginia the difference was almost entirely one of access to markets. The penetration of the tidewater people into the lower valley of Virginia, the coming of the Germans and the Scotch-Irish into the valley of Maryland, the upper valley of Virginia, and the Piedmont of the Carolinas, established a new frontier for the South. But it was not a unified frontier; there were at least three frontiers, each with its own peculiar problems and interests, and none of them having more in common with the others than with the tidewater regions.

From the Mason and Dixon line to the Savannah river the English advanced into the interior of the South without hindrance except for brief, although bloody, conflicts with the Indians. Charleston had always been open to a flank attack from Florida, but as time went on and the attack was not delivered, Charleston became as contemptuous of Spanish power as of Spanish claims. From the beginning Florida was on the defensive, Charleston on the offensive. In Queen Anne's War a handful of Charleston men with a host of Creek allies invaded the Apalachee country, destroyed Indian towns and missions, carried off, killed, and scattered the Indians, forced the abandonment of Ft. San Luis, and reduced the Spanish power in Florida to practical impotence. Spain continued to hold the coast with her

garrison at Pensacola and at the newly established Ft. San Marcos but she was no longer a power to be feared.

The South was the stage for Anglo-French rivalry from the time the French made their settlement at Biloxi until they finally withdrew in 1763. The Charleston people were the aggressors in the early stages of this rivalry, and with their Creek allies they seemed for a time to have fair prospects of meting out to Mobile the same destruction they had inflicted on Apalachee. The Yemassee war saved the French. As a result of this war the disgruntled Creeks withdrew from the English frontier to the Chattahoochee country, and from this time forth held themselves neutral between English and French.<sup>18</sup> They even permitted the French to establish Ft. Toulouse at the junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa in the very heart of the Creek country. Because of this attitude of the intervening Creeks, the Anglo-French conflict in the South took on the aspects of a stalemate. Both nations tried to extend their influence over the Southern Indians; the French secured the Choctaw as allies while the English retained the friendship of the Chickasaw. Neither could make any headway with the Creeks, and the Cherokee were too far removed from the scene of conflict to display much interest. After the Yemassee war the English and the French directed their policies along different lines. England attempted to consolidate and extend her power east of the Chattahoochee; France endeavored to keep the corridor of the Mississippi Valley open so as not to lose contact between Louisiana and New France. In pursuance of her policy England established the military colony of Georgia, not as a buffer state against Florida but as a threat directed against Mobile. Georgia was taken out of South Caro-

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<sup>18</sup> V. W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 185.

lina; it lay between the Savannah and the Altamaha, with northern and southern boundaries extending from the heads of these rivers to the Pacific. The determination of the head of the Savannah entailed what was probably the weirdest boundary dispute in American history. Presumably after the founding of Georgia, South Carolina continued to claim the region south of the Altamaha to the twenty-ninth parallel, since that region was included in her original charter limits and had not been taken out by an English authority.

In her efforts to keep open the line of communication with New France, Louisiana enjoyed a fair measure of success. New Orleans was founded, and forts were built at Natchez and Memphis. A station was built at Nashville, then called French Lick, and another at Muscle Shoals. The chief impediment to the success of this program was the hostility of the English-loving Chickasaw. In an effort to subdue them, the French incited the Choctaw to war, led expeditions into the Chickasaw country from Mobile and even from New France, and established Ft. Tombecbe on the middle course of the Tombigbee river. The Chickasaw took terrible punishment, but they were not subdued, and they continued throughout the colonial period a potent threat to French communications.

English and French spent nearly a half-century strengthening themselves for a decisive struggle in the South, only to find that when the struggle finally came the decision was given, not in the South, but in the North. The fate of Louisiana was decided not by the conquest of Louisiana but by the conquest of New France; the annex fell with the house. The result of the French and Indian War was to relieve the English colonies in the South from future danger as far as the French and Span-

iards were concerned. This was a cause for rejoicing. Over another result of the war the Southern colonies were far from having a feeling of exultation, for the war had had the result of alienating some three-fourths of their territory by cutting down their western boundary from the Pacific to the Mississippi.

## **Expansion of the South**



## Expansion of the Tobacco Country

Notwithstanding their confidence and assurance, the Southern people were slow in occupying the vast regions so lavishly granted in the colonial charters. For a time it had seemed likely that the aggressive South Carolinians would quickly extend their frontier to the Mississippi, but Creek and French intervened to bar the westward way which geography had left so invitingly open. The race was not to be so swift. It was left to the Virginians and North Carolinians first to establish themselves on the "western waters," although in so doing they had to overcome the mountain barriers of the Allegheny and the Cumberlands.

As the eighteenth century turned to its decline, the westernmost frontier of the tobacco country was firmly fixed in the great valley. Westward from their homes down the length of it, from the Pennsylvania border to the forks of the Holston, the settlers could see the steep mountains which, like a veritable wall, hemmed them in. They knew something of the mountains and the passes through them – Cave (Cumberland) Gap, Pound Gap, the gorge of the New-Kanawha, and the narrow valley of the Potomac. These highways to the "western waters" had been found by hunters, and the restless farmers, although there was land a-plenty in the valley to be had almost for the asking, were beginning to turn their thoughts to follow them. It was inevitable that the marshalling and ordering of this prospective migration should be the work of the land speculator. The original

settling of the South, and the westward movement to the mountains had been promoted by land speculators. Lord Baltimore, the Carolina proprietors, and even the London Company could justly be so classed. The northern neck of Virginia was a huge speculation on the part of Lord Fairfax, and in the valley itself settlement was hastened by the granting of nearly a million acres of land to four individuals. The land speculator in Southern history was the *entrepreneur* of the westward movement. He fixed the time, chose the destination, and determined the routes.

It seemed in 1750 that the first transmontane expansion of Southern people was destined for the northwest. The Ohio Company chartered by England was given a conditional grant (1748) within vague limits on the Ohio. An extended preliminary survey by Christopher Gist having convinced the company that the Potomac river gave easiest access to the west, it fell vigorously to work building forts on the Potomac and Monongahela and connecting them with a road. But just as settlement was preparing to follow the hunter and explorer, the French and Indian War put an end to the activities of the company. But if it had not planted a colony beyond the mountains, it had, at least, popularized a road; the Potomac river route was destined to become the most used of the roads to the west. At practically the same time another group of speculators, united in the Loyal Land Company, had attempted another road, sending Dr. Thomas Walker through Cave Gap and over the Warriors' Trace through the mountains in search of good land. But Walker lost the trail in the mountains and the result of his exploration was to discourage any idea the valley people may have had of using the gap in their westward movement.



While the French war raged, the valley had all it could do to defend itself. Any westward movement that might have developed with the return of peace was effectively discouraged by the Proclamation of 1763 prohibiting settlement west of the headwaters of rivers running into the Atlantic. It is not to be supposed that the common people had any regard for the proclamation, but the speculators were estopped by it, and without the *entrepreneur* migration hesitated. The royal order, however, was designed to quiet the Indian, not to hinder expansion, and almost as soon as the new line was established, Sir William Johnson, the superintendent of Northern Indians, and John Stuart, superintendent of Southern, began seeking Indian consent for a dividing line farther west. Royal instructions were so powerfully reënforced by pressure from the speculators that in 1767 by the Treaty of Hard Labor with the Cherokee, a new boundary was agreed to from the head of the Savannah to the mouth of the Kanawha. From Chiswell mines on the New it sloped northwest and southwest, thus opening up a great amount of new land to the west of the proclamation line. In 1770 by the Treaty of Lochaber, Stuart moved the dividing line in Virginia still further west to the meridian through the mouth of the Kanawha, which line when it came to be surveyed, abandoned the meridian and ran most amazingly down the Kentucky to the Ohio which by the Treaty of Ft. Stanwix in 1768 had been agreed upon as the southern and eastern limit of the Indians of the northwest.

Thus the proclamation line was bent far westward in Virginia and millions of acres of transmontane land made available for settlement. Thereupon the hungry speculators girded up their loins and advanced in mass formation to the banquet. The Loyal Company, the vet-

erans eager for their promised bonus, and various members of the Virginia council petitioned Virginia for grants which in the aggregate amounted to some seven million acres. To the Crown went the petitions of the old Ohio Company, of a Mississippi Company (led by Thomas Walker and Patrick Henry), and of a Pennsylvania organization called the Grand Ohio Company, which modestly asked for all the area between the Monongahela and the Kentucky, where it proposed to establish a new colony to be called Vandalia. The promoters of this enterprise had sufficient influence in British politics to gain the favor of the Crown, and only the outbreak of the revolution prevented the consummation of the scheme.

The period, 1770-1775, might well be termed the war of the speculators. Royal orders reserved the region between the Kanawha and the Kentucky to the Vandalia promoters and to the Virginia veterans. There was precious little land elsewhere to be had, for east of the Kanawha Virginia settlers had already taken possession, and west of the Kentucky the Cherokee title legally still ran. The speculators applying to America an opinion of the British chancellor relative to India, began to seek from the Indians the land cessions refused them by Virginia and the Crown.<sup>19</sup> In 1774 a group of men from the Monongahela country drifted down the Ohio, ascended the Kentucky, and established Harrodstown on Cherokee land. This was the first southern settlement west of the mountains. Its origins are obscure: a plausible supposition is that it was sponsored by the old Ohio Company. It was abandoned the same year under attack from the Ohio Indians. Reestablished early in 1775, it was at once swallowed up in the new Transylvania colony.

<sup>19</sup> G. W. Ranck, "Boonesborough," in *Filson Club Publication*, no. 16, 228.

Transylvania colony was the great rival of Vandalia. Its promoter, Richard Henderson, was the most ambitious, the most energetic, and the most successful Southern *entrepreneur* of the westward movement. Maturing his project slowly, he had employed James Robertson to plant an outpost in 1768 on Watauga river in the valley of Tennessee, which should serve as a base for further penetration of the west.<sup>20</sup> The next year he had sent Daniel Boone across the mountains to explore the land beyond. Boone's report gave Henderson an accurate idea of the location of the best lands, and assured him of the utility of the westward route over the gap and the Warriors' Trace, both of which were now to be rescued from the disfavor in which they had lain since the Walker attempt. Organizing the Transylvania Company, he bought from the Cherokee in February, 1775, the land from the Kentucky to the Cumberland-Tennessee divide and by another purchase secured the gap and its approaches east and west. This purchase initiated a colony and rehabilitated a road.

Into his new Transylvania colony in the spring of 1775 Henderson led the vanguard of his colonists and established his capital at Boonesborough on the south bank of the Kentucky. Harrodstown submitted to the new order of things, and St. Asaph was settled by Virginians at the present Stanford. In the summer, representatives from these towns gathered at Boonesborough, formed themselves into a legislature, and made laws for the budding commonwealth. A land office was opened under the direction of a Virginia county surveyor, and Henderson, having definitely established his colony, prepared to take steps to have it recognized by the Crown. The coming of the revolution put an end to his hopes.

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<sup>20</sup> T. P. Abernethy, *From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee*, chapter 1.

In 1775 Virginia, which had remained largely indifferent to the anti-British agitation of the preceding twelve years, threw herself whole-heartedly into the revolutionary movement, and her influence gave it the necessary impetus to bring success. There can be little doubt that this action of Virginia was motivated by a desire to retain her western domain, and that she acted under pressure from her land speculators. The Quebec Act of 1774 had detached from her all the northwest; Vandalia was on the point of taking away the Southern back country as far as the Kentucky. Transylvania, with fair prospects of recognition by the Crown, would include the remainder to the Cumberland. It is small wonder that under these provocations Virginia became a convert to the cause of liberty and struck promptly for independence. Only in independence could she retain her western lands. One of the leading land speculators of Virginia became commander of the Continental army, another wrote the first constitution of Virginia, a third became her first state governor. Following her assumption of sovereignty, Virginia moved swiftly to regain her western territory. Both Vandalia and Transylvania were disregarded in the creation, October, 1776, of Kentucke county, including all Virginia territory south of the Ohio from the Big Sandy to the Tennessee. The next summer a little army under George Rogers Clark was sent down the Ohio to a bloodless conquest of the Northwest and the permanent undoing of the Quebec Act.

Kentucke county began life with a population of about four hundred, practically all of whom had come from the valley through the gap and over the "Wilderness" Road to establish new homes in the bluegrass basin of the Kentucky river. Thanks to the vigor of the Tran-

sylvania land office, most of the people were living west of the Kentucky and held their land from Transylvania. Until Transylvania should be formally outlawed, all land titles west of the Kentucky were uncertain and immigration consequently discouraged. In 1779, however, the Virginia assembly reached a decision in which, while denying the legality of Henderson's purchase, it recognized the validity of Cherokee sale. There immediately followed several things of importance: Virginia passed a definite land law for Kentucky, an increased migration got under way from the valley, and Richard Henderson, finally disappointed in Kentucky, now turned to Tennessee.

By the land act of 1779 old settlers were confirmed in their possessions and new settlers were offered land at two dollars (Virginia currency) an acre. The great migration following this act, and partly due to it, gave Kentucky a population of twelve thousand by the end of the revolution. Kentucky, which had been looked at askance in the early days of the revolution because of its exposed condition, now took on the attractions of relative security as Cornwallis's army moved through the South. The revolutionary migration included also many Loyalists seeking in the west an escape from the perfervid attentions of their patriotic eastern neighbors.

As long as there were any hopes of regaining his Kentucky lands, Henderson seems to have overlooked the possibility that his purchase extended into Tennessee. A survey of the Virginia-Carolina line in 1779 having revealed that such was the case, he proceeded at once to establish a new colony on his yet unconfiscated lands. He employed his old agent, James Robertson, to lead out the first colonists to the Cumberland where at the old French Licks there was begun on New Year's day, 1780,

a settlement which later grew into Nashville.<sup>21</sup> The trail which Robertson opened down the Cumberland long served as a road to western Tennessee just as the Wilderness Road did in Kentucky. Other settlers came in by the Tennessee and soon Henderson came in person after forwarding supplies from Boonesborough. Thus through the agency of Richard Henderson, the tobacco country expanded into western Tennessee, as it had done into eastern Tennessee and Kentucky.

Neither Kentucky nor the Cumberland settlements took any part in the revolution; both suffered considerably from Indian attacks, sometimes spontaneous and sometimes inspired. On three occasions Indian bands large enough to be called armies moved against Kentucky and each time the expedition was organized by Canadian officials and led by Canadian officers. But the palisaded forts of the settlers were all but impregnable, and after each invasion the Kentuckians retaliated by carrying fire and destruction to the Indian villages in Ohio whence the attacks came. The Cumberland settlements suffered chiefly from the Cherokee whose indiscriminating wrath had been aroused by encroachments on their lands in eastern Tennessee. The Cherokee had been encouraged by Superintendent Stuart to remain neutral in the revolution, but emissaries from the Northern Indians had aroused them in 1776 to a war in which they took terrible punishment and ended only at the price of a land cession. Following this Virginia and North Carolina appointed agents to live among them: their influence and the Cherokee remembrance of recent defeat were sufficient to insure nominal peace for several years while the settlers encroached southwards to the French Broad. In conjunc-

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<sup>21</sup> *Idem*, chapter 2.

tion with the British invasion of the South the Cherokee again prepared for war in 1780, only to have their villages burned by the militia returning from King's mountain. The more remote towns, however, kept up a desultory war for several years, their vengeance striking impartially both the valley and the Cumberland.

Against the Indians the Kentucky and Cumberland settlers protected themselves by palisaded forts through whose portholes they could use the long-range Virginia rifles with telling precision. The location of these forts was generally determined by the presence of springs, since a water supply was absolutely necessary both in war and peace. Only in the event of Indian attacks, actual or anticipated, did the settlers remain within the forts; at other times they were, perforce, busy in the field or hunting. The valley took along its crops, as it did its rifles, when it crossed the mountains, but during the revolution there was little opportunity to grow anything but corn. The soil of Kentucky and the Cumberland was the soil of the valley and the same bluegrass grew from it, but the raising of live stock had to await the coming of peace, as did the cultivation of tobacco. There was the same game as in the valley, the buffalo being quite common in the west although it was practically extinct in the valley. Like the valley, the new localities had their salt "licks." It might be said that the valley men in crossing the mountains had moved their homes without changing their environment.

With the close of the revolution the stream of immigration swelled to a torrent. The Ohio river, now safe for travel, began to supplement and then to supplant the Wilderness Road as a route of migration. Boats took the place of pack horses and wagon, and the source of immigration shifted from the lower valley and North

Carolina to the upper valley, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Inevitably, little towns began to appear along the Ohio at the places where boats landed passengers and cargo for the interior; Limestone (Maysville) was one of these places, Louisville another. Along the roads developed from these landings, other little towns came into existence as camping places for the wagon trains moving into the interior. Lexington, in the heart of the bluegrass, grew into importance as the converging point for all roads, and soon the Limestone-Lexington Road became the best settled region of Kentucky with Washington, Mayslick, Hopewell (Paris), and Millersburg attesting its prosperity. Another line of towns followed the Lexington-Louisville Road. Most of the old "stations" disappeared. Settlement moved out of the Kentucky river valley into the northeast along the Licking and to the southwest toward the Green. Land speculation, dormant during the war, again became rife. One of the most persistent of the speculators was John Filson, a Pennsylvania teacher, who in 1784 published his *Kentucke*, a topographical description, to which he added an autobiography of Daniel Boone. As a land sales propaganda the book had no great success, but it gave Boone an importance in history no subsequent research has been able to diminish.

In Tennessee, also, immigration after the war was encouraged by the speculators, chief of whom was William Blount.<sup>22</sup> He and his associates in 1783 induced the North Carolina legislature to open for sale all Tennessee lands, except a small Cherokee reservation in the angle of the French Broad and Tennessee, and a military reservation on Henderson's purchase which was at this time declared illegal. With advance knowledge

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<sup>22</sup> *Idem*, 44-115.



of the law, the speculators hurried their agents into Tennessee and secured the lion's share of the four million acres available. This done, they persuaded the legislature to cede Tennessee to the United States (1784) in order that they might secure protection against the outraged Cherokee.

Under similar circumstances, Virginia in 1784 made a cession of the northwest territory which it claimed under its charter, lost by the Quebec Act, regained by Clark's conquest, and had been holding for six years as Illinois county. Following these cessions, separatist movements developed in both Kentucky and Tennessee. In Kentucky the separatist movement originated apparently in nothing more fundamental than the inconveniences of government administration from beyond the mountains; and separation was requested as a preliminary to joining the Union. To this request Virginia assented with a heartiness not altogether flattering, but the non-action of a dilatory congress in admitting the new applicant prevented separation until 1792. At that time Kentucky became a state—the first of the new tobacco communities to reach its majority.

In Tennessee the separatist movement ran a different course. There after the act of cession the people of east Tennessee took the initiative, as congress had provided, in forming a state. The movement was dominated by speculators hostile to the Blount group, and these, fearful that their lands would be confiscated, influenced North Carolina to repeal its act of cession. Thereupon the new state of Franklin revolted against North Carolina, but had the ill-luck to choose as its leader one of the Blount group, John Sevier. The governor of North Carolina was another of Blount's associates, Richard Caswell, and between Sevier and Caswell, there ensued

a farcical war of three years duration in which Caswell struggled to preserve an outward appearance of animosity without coming to blows, and Sevier strove to extricate himself from rebellion without losing the favor of his constituents. The "war" came to an end when Samuel Johnson, succeeding Caswell as governor, had Sevier arrested and reasserted authority over the "state of Franklin."

In both Kentucky and Tennessee during this period the separatist leaders conducted with the Spanish authorities at New Orleans an arduous, but highly inconclusive, flirtation which historians have been wont to call the "Spanish conspiracy." In Kentucky the courtship was initiated by James Wilkinson for the ostensible object of securing for Kentucky the navigation of the Mississippi closed by Spain since 1784. To secure this Wilkinson (for a consideration) undertook to detach Kentucky from Virginia and join her to Spain. Under modern investigation the once-formidable "conspiracy" has dwindled to a successful effort on the part of Wilkinson to raid the Spanish treasury, and an ambition on the part of Spain to anticipate invasion from Kentucky. In Tennessee the flirtation was originated by Blount, Sevier, and allied speculators seeking an outlet down the Tombigbee for the products of a prospective colony at Muscle Shoals; it was continued as a device to secure Spain's influence in prevention of Indian raids against the western settlements, and put to its final use in scaring North Carolina into a second cession of Tennessee. Yet when the final cession was made there was scant comfort for the speculators, since the United States in the Hopewell Treaty of 1785 had restored to the Cherokee all their Tennessee lands except, approximately, the Henderson purchase.

Kentucky became a state in 1792; Tennessee was organized as the "Territory South of the River Ohio" in 1790. One had a population of 75,000; the other of 35,000. Under statehood the population of Kentucky was chiefly confined to its old limits of bluegrass and "Pennyrile" until 1797, when the Virginia military reservation west of Green river was thrown open, after which western Kentucky filled up rapidly to the Tennessee; beyond this was unceded Chickasaw territory. Henderson was laid out at the mouth of Green river in 1795 on land granted Richard Henderson in 1779 by Virginia when Transylvania was confiscated. Smithland came into existence at the mouth of the Cumberland, as a port of transshipment for the Nashville region. Little towns sprang up along the "Kentucky Road" from Danville to Nashville, and Russellville was established in 1795 as the westernmost town in Kentucky. In 1800 Kentucky made her first general land law, under which public land was placed on sale at twenty cents an acre. Kentucky was prosperous with an increasing commerce carried on almost entirely on the Ohio. Imports of all description came down the river from Pittsburgh while her exports, chiefly of tobacco and hemp, unable to go upstream to market, had to take the long downstream trip to New Orleans. The chief discontent in Kentucky was with the constitution of 1792, which had been a curious mingling of liberal and conservative features. It was the first of the Southern constitutions to provide for suffrage and office-holding without property qualifications, but it had made governor and senators elective, through an electoral college, and judges appointive through the governor. The electoral college was probably the result of Maryland influence, while the selection of judges through appointment was prac-

tically universal throughout the United States. The constitution provided for its own amendment in seven years, and consequently in 1799 public opinion forced the abandonment of the electoral college and the selection of governor and senators by popular vote.

Meanwhile the "Territory South of the River Ohio" was organized with William Blount as governor and John Sevier and James Robertson as brigadier-generals. Washington, in appointing these men, was in no doubt about their record in speculation and "conspiracy." Blount was also appointed superintendent of Southern Indians, an office which had been created in 1789 but had little significance up to this time. In 1792 the United States gave the superintendent assistants by appointing agents to reside among the Creeks, Cherokee, and Chickasaw, James Robertson being the agent to the last-named tribe. All the Southern Indians were under Blount's supervision, but as the Chickasaw were traditionally friendly, and Creeks and Choctaw under Spanish influence, his arrangement was limited practically to the Cherokee. Even thus his duties as superintendent were vastly more arduous than his duties as governor, for the Cherokee were sullen and discontented over white encroachment on their land and the towns around Chattanooga were openly hostile. There was sufficient military force in the territory to subdue them, but Blount was forbidden to take the offensive for fear of coming into conflict with the Spaniards and so endangering the negotiations then in progress between Spain and the United States. In 1791 he made a treaty with the Cherokee by which he secured a small cession of land, a road from the Clinch to Nashville, and the free navigation of the Tennessee. Forts were established at Tellico Block House and at Southwest Point, and in 1795 the

United States began its policy of securing Indian friendship through trade management by establishing a government trading post at Tellico Block House. Notwithstanding the constant Creek and Cherokee depredations, the population of the territory rapidly increased. What little land there was in the territory cleared of Indian title was practically all reserved by the act of cession for the revolutionary soldiers of North Carolina, and when this proved insufficient, the soldiers settled on Cherokee land in defiance of the Hopewell Treaty. By 1794 there was sufficient population in the territory to entitle it to a legislature and a delegate in congress. The next year the officials of the territory counted sufficient people to merit statehood, made a constitution, elected state officials, and demanded admission to the Union as the state of Tennessee. After some objection to the informality of this procedure, congress in 1796 admitted Tennessee, with John Sevier as governor, William Blount, senator, and a newcomer, Andrew Jackson, representative.

Kentucky and Tennessee were established communities. Both were tobacco states finding their market in New Orleans. Both depended on the East for their imports, Kentucky and west Tennessee receiving them down the Ohio by boat, and east Tennessee down the valley by wagon. The Wilderness Road remained the chief overland route for immigrants to Kentucky, a road down the valley reached Knoxville in 1792, and in 1795 a wagon road was opened along the French Broad through the mountains, superseding the old Morganton-Watauga Trail. The road from Southwest Point to Nashville (secured in the treaty of 1791) was opened in the same year, taking the place of the old way through the gap and down the Cumberland. A mail route from

Richmond reached Rogersville in 1792, was extended to Knoxville in 1794 and on to Nashville in 1797. Mail went to Kentucky down the Ohio and from Rogersville over the Wilderness Road to Danville. Kentucky had a half-dozen newspapers of which the first and most influential was *The Kentucky Gazette*, started at Lexington in 1787 by John Bradford. In 1798 *The Palladium* began publication at Frankfort. Washington and Paris also had their newspapers, *The Mirror* and *The Rights of Man*. In Tennessee, *The Knoxville Gazette* began its existence at Rogersville in 1791. These papers were all weeklies, although some of them had semi-weekly editions, and their circulation was limited. Illiteracy was widespread in the West and the numerous "academies" made little progress in furthering the cause of education. But in Transylvania Seminary at Lexington, Kentucky had the humble beginning of a school destined to become shortly one of the best institutions of learning in the United States.

## The Rise of the Cotton Kingdom

The settling of the transmontane region coincided with the American Revolution in which six Southern colonies transformed themselves into independent states, and two others, East and West Florida, were rewarded for their loyalty to England by passing into the hands of Spain. Delaware and Maryland went through the war unscathed, but Georgia and South Carolina were overwhelmed by British armies, and North Carolina and Virginia experienced invasion which brought them to the verge of ruin. The last four states emerged from the war with heavy debts, with a paper currency almost worthless, and with their staple crops in a condition of complete despondency.

The Southern states during the confederation period were, consequently, in no mood to meet congressional requisitions or to observe the treaty provisions respecting the restoration of Tory property and the payment of pre-revolution debts. They all, indeed, expressed a willingness to grant congress the tariff powers it requested, and Virginia and North Carolina made land cessions whose monetary value was far in excess of the requisitions they were unable to pay. But exhortations to observe the treaty were addressed in vain to the planter to whom the prospect of debt cancellation had been one of the chief appeals of revolution and to whom the restoration of Tory property meant a higher burden of taxation. With a property tax so high as to seem ruinous to a people hitherto virtually untaxed, and with export

and import duties, the Southern states materially reduced their public debt during the Confederation. They reduced their paper money to manageable proportions by redemption, by refunding at low rates of exchange, and by repudiation. In the intervals between struggles with their economic problems they found time for a certain amount of social legislation. Virginia, following the revolutionary example of the other states, disestablished the church, all the states abolished primogeniture, and all but South Carolina and Georgia abolished the slave trade. These were the two regions in which slave labor was essential in the production of rice, and which had lost most heavily in the slaves carried away by the British.

Except in the rice districts, Southern opinion by 1795 was turning very definitely against slavery and the antagonism was based, not on humanitarian, but on economic grounds. The overwhelming majority of the 2,000,000 Southern people was agricultural, and Charleston and Baltimore were the only towns of more than 10,000 population. But slave labor could be profitably employed only in the production of staples, and of the two staples of the South, rice was restricted to a very narrow area. Tobacco could be grown as far south as the Piedmont of Georgia and South Carolina, but by 1795 its cultivation was unprofitable in the tidewater on account of soil exhaustion and in the back country because of lack of transportation facilities. Unless the South could find a new staple slavery would be doomed, or else the South would be forced into an extensive program of soil fertilization and internal improvements to aid the tobacco grower.

What happened was that the South obtained a new staple through the invention of the cotton gin. The South-



ern farmer had long known the suitability of soil and climate in the far South for cotton growing, and he had so far worked out the principle of the gin that Whitney deserves the name of patenter, rather than inventor. Cotton quickly took its place as a staple complementary to tobacco, not competitive, for the two crops were radically different in their soil and climatic requirements. The first conquests of "King Cotton" were the upland regions of South Carolina and Georgia, the inhabitants of which had hitherto eked out an unsatisfactory existence by cattle raising, by a production of food crops, and by a desultory cultivation of tobacco. This was followed by a demand for new lands which resulted in cotton extending its area of cultivation to the Mississippi as tobacco had already done.

To the entire region west of the Savannah, from Tennessee to the thirty-first parallel, Georgia had a claim based on her charter, the Proclamation of 1763, and the treaty with South Carolina in 1787.<sup>23</sup> Spain claimed by conquest in the revolution the region south of the Tennessee and west of the Flint and Hiwassee.<sup>24</sup> The United States had a claim to an indefinite area in the west by reason of the peace treaty which named the thirty-first parallel as her southern boundary. In her claim was included the South Carolina cession of 1787, which was supposed to be an area about fifteen miles wide bordering on Tennessee; a geological survey later showed that this cession was so described that its southern boundary actually ran north of its northern boundary!<sup>25</sup> To an unbiased mind it would seem that Spain

<sup>23</sup> The basis of Georgia's claim to western land is elaborately set forth in *American State Papers, Public Lands*, vol. 1, 34-67.

<sup>24</sup> A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier: 1783-1795*, 68.

<sup>25</sup> R. S. Cotterill, "The South Carolina Land Cession of 1787," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. XII, 376-384.

had a valid title to the region west of the Chattahoochee and south of the Yazoo since this was a part of the West Florida which Great Britain ceded her (without naming its boundaries) in 1783, that Georgia had a valid title to the remainder, and that the United States had no title at all. From 1783 to 1795 Spain, actually in possession of all the old British West Florida, defended herself against the United States by diplomacy, intrigue, and Indian alliance, while Georgia occupied herself with actual settlement in the east and attempts at settlement in the disputed territory.

By the Treaty of New York in 1790 the Creek boundary was moved westward from the Ogeechee to the Oconee river. In the new lands thus opened, settlers began to take up farms under the Georgia headright system which gave each head of a family 200 acres of land with 50 acres additional for each member of his family, the total amount not to exceed 1000 acres. Under this system the immigration to Georgia was so great that her population doubled in ten years, the settlers coming chiefly from Virginia and North Carolina. Much more spectacular than the rush of settlers, however, was the rush of speculators.<sup>26</sup> Taking advantage of pliable or corrupt governors, they secured grants of 29,000,000 acres east of the Oconee, which was three times the amount of the total acreage. In the frontier county of Montgomery, with a total acreage of 400,000, their grants amounted to over 7,000,000 acres. A speculation of somewhat different form was that of Elijah Clarke who attempted to set up a "republic" on the Indian land beyond the Oconee.

Fraudulent as the "Pine Barren Speculation" was, it was at least accompanied by some actual settlement,

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<sup>26</sup> S. G. McLendon, *History of the Public Domain of Georgia*, 40-106.

which could not be said of the western speculation. Land speculation had first laid its hand on the southwest when in 1784 Georgia created Houstoun county in the bend of the Tennessee at the behest of a group whose leading members were William Blount, John Sevier, Richard Caswell, and John Donelson.<sup>27</sup> But the rise of Franklin prevented the speculators from securing settlers, and Houstoun county collapsed. The next year Georgia created Bourbon county,<sup>28</sup> embracing the Natchez region, but only 130 grants had been made therein when the county was abolished in 1788. It will be noted that Houston county was created on territory then claimed by South Carolina and Bourbon county on territory occupied by Spain. In 1789, coincident with the pine barren frauds in the east, speculation was resumed in the west when three companies – the South Carolina Yazoo, the Virginia Yazoo, and the Tennessee – bought some 20,000,000 acres comprising the Tennessee Valley in Alabama and all Mississippi north of Natchez. Patrick Henry was the leading spirit of the Tennessee Company. When the companies attempted to make payment in the now outlawed Georgia currency, Georgia cancelled the grants. The last speculation came in 1795 with the sale to four companies – Georgia, Georgia Mississippi, Upper Mississippi, and Tennessee – of practically the entire region west of the Coosa, amounting to 50,000,000 acres for \$500,000. This fraud was too glaring even for the Georgia people and the next legislature, with superior virtue, annulled it.

In 1795 Spain, fearing English resentment over the French-Spanish Treaty of 1795, made her peace with

<sup>27</sup> A. P. Whitaker, "The Muscle Shoals Speculation," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. XIII, 365-386.

<sup>28</sup> Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier: 1783-1795*, 55-56.

the United States, agreed to the treaty of San Lorenzo, and retired south of the thirty-first parallel.<sup>29</sup> The United States now had a free hand in the Southwest and adopted a more vigorous policy looking to the ultimate settlement of the region. To the superintendency of Southern Indians, now vacant since the Territory South of the River Ohio had lapsed, she appointed Benjamin Hawkins who chose to reside among the Creeks with subordinate agents among the other three tribes. The trading posts at Colerain (Georgia) and Tellico Block House, tentatively established in 1795, were made permanent the next year and private traders among the Indians were required to have licenses from the United States. In addition to the forts in Tennessee, she established Ft. Wilkinson on the Oconee, Ft. Pickering at Chickasaw Bluffs (Memphis), and Ft. Adams on the lower Mississippi near the Spanish line. Having thus made provision for handling the Indian problem, she, in 1798, took the step of erecting Mississippi Territory, limiting it to the region south of the Yazoo and west of the Chattahoochee; to this region the title of the United States was good since it had been taken away from Georgia and added to West Florida in 1764. Georgia had offered to cede this territory to the United States in 1788 on terms which the latter refused. But Mississippi Territory was isolated and practically inaccessible except through Georgia land so that the United States was now forced to secure a Georgia cession on Georgia's own terms. By the Georgia Compact of 1802, Georgia ceded to the United States all her land west of her present western boundary on condition that the United States pay her \$1,250,000 from the first net proceeds of the sale of land, that she validate the British,

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<sup>29</sup> *Idem*, 207.


# EXPANSION OF THE SOUTH

Confirmed to Georgia  
by South Carolina 1797

Georgia Charter

NOT-CONFIRMED BY PLACE  
NOT-CONFIRMED BY PLACE

Scale of Miles  
0 25 50 100 150 200





Spanish, and Georgia grants (under Bourbon county), that she make compensation to the Yazoo companies of 1795, that she establish a land office in the cession within a year, and that the region be made a state when it should have a population of 60,000.<sup>80</sup> The United States also ceded to Georgia that part of the hypothetical South Carolina cession of 1787 which theoretically lay within the new restricted limits of Georgia.

There being now no reason to the contrary, the national land system was extended to the territory (1803) and the territory extended northward to Tennessee (1804). There were already in 1800, 8,850 people in the territory (of whom 3,489 were slaves) some of whom had land titles from Great Britain, Spain, or Georgia, others merely squatters with no titles of any kind. The population was chiefly in two centers, around old St. Stephens on the Tombigbee and Natchez on the Mississippi, both regions having been cleared of Indian title by the Choctaw cession of 1765 to England. The two communities had little intercourse with each other since the only means of communication was the old McClary Path through the forest. Consequently, two land offices were set up, at St. Stephens for the district "east of the Pearl" and at Washington, near Natchez, for the district "west of the Pearl."

During the four years these two land offices spent in investigating claims preparatory to the selling of land, the United States busied itself with the Indian affairs of the territory. Hawkins was reduced to the rank of Creek agent, and Governor Claiborne was given the title of superintendent of Southern Indians. Government trading posts were established at Chickasaw Bluffs and St. Stephens, Ft. Dearborn was built at Washington

<sup>80</sup> McLendon, *op. cit.*, 109.

and Ft. Stoddart on the Mobile river, and treaties were made with the Indians securing land cessions and permission to open roads through the Indian country to the older-settled communities. The Choctaw went through the formality of confirming to the United States the two areas previously ceded to England, and in 1805 ceded the section of southern Mississippi connecting the two. In 1806 the Cherokee made a cession of the Muscle Shoals region. From the Choctaw and Chickasaw the United States obtained (1801) the Natchez Trace from Natchez to Nashville, and from the Creeks in 1805 permission to open from Ft. Stoddart to the Ocmulgee a way which came to be known as the Federal Road.

Land sales began in 1807 and continued slowly until by the opening of the War of 1812 about 500,000 acres had been disposed of. In 1809 the Tennessee Valley land, where Madison county had been created the preceding year, was placed on the market, but the land office for this turbulent region was located at Nashville until 1817. The census of 1810 gave the territory a population of 40,352 of whom 17,088 were slaves. The drift of immigration was decidedly to the Tennessee Valley, which contained the best land and which was accessible to the Georgia people by the Georgia Road and to the valley people of Tennessee and Virginia by a spur of the Cumberland Road. Twickenham (Huntsville) was laid out in 1809 as the seat of Madison county and quickly developed into a prosperous town. The Natchez region received most of its immigration down the Mississippi from Kentucky and Tennessee; the Natchez Trace did not have much significance as an immigrant road until after the War of 1812. The most backward region of the territory was east of the Pearl where practically all



the land cleared of Indian title was held under foreign grant or was pine barren. The Tombigbee section was practically inaccessible until the Federal Road became an immigrant route after the War of 1812.

It is evident from the number of slaves that Mississippi Territory was a planting community from the beginning. Cotton, in fact, had been cultivated by the Indians even before the revolution, and the United States in 1801 established a gin for them on the upper Tombigbee at a place which thereafter was called Cotton Gin Port.<sup>31</sup> Cotton found its way to market chiefly through New Orleans, and the industry was sufficiently developed by 1808 to protest against the embargo. The planter from the Piedmont of Georgia and Virginia built his pretentious home, laid out his estate, organized his slave labor, and as far as possible duplicated in the wilderness the life he had lived in the east. Partial contact, at least, was maintained with the older communities by a mail service opened in 1803 over the Natchez Trace. The Federal Road was intended to be a mail route but only letters were carried over it prior to the War of 1812.

An analysis of the census figures shows that the immigration to Mississippi Territory was slight before the war. Partly this was due to its inaccessibility, chiefly to the competition of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia. In Kentucky public land was selling for twenty cents an acre, while in Tennessee most of the land was being taken up on military warrants since by the act of cession these had to be satisfied before the United States could sell land, a condition which resulted in the United States selling no land at all. Available land was plentiful,

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<sup>31</sup> George J. Leftwich, "Cotton Gin Port and Gaines Trace," in *Mississippi Historical Society Publications*, vol. VII, 263-270.

however, for the Cherokee in four cessions (1804-1806) had given up the greater part of their hunting grounds in middle and western Tennessee.

The chief competition, however, came from Georgia. For twelve years after the treaty of 1790 no Indian cessions had been made in Georgia and the Georgia discontent with this inactivity was evidenced by the provision for Indian removal in the Compact of 1802. Apparently this provision had immediate effect, for by treaties in 1802 and 1804 the United States secured from the Creeks the area between the Oconee and Ocmulgee, and additional land from the Cherokee in the northeast. This land Georgia granted to actual settlers on a lottery system giving each man who drew a lucky number 202½ acres and a double amount if he was the head of a family. For these grants the state exacted no payment except an inconsiderable fee. The result of this liberal policy was the attraction of so many immigrants that in the decade 1800-1810 Georgia increased its population from 162,686 to 252,433. From its position Georgia intercepted much of the migration which otherwise might have gone to the territory. The capital was placed in 1804 on the frontier line at Milledgeville. Georgia was at this time the best cotton producing district in the South and the crops had ready access to market down the Savannah, Oconee, and Ocmulgee. The rice-growing coastal district lived a life of its own cut off from the interior by a vast pine barren.

The War of 1812 was of importance to the Southwest for two things, neither of which was directly connected with the war itself. One was the conquest of Spanish West Florida between the Pearl and the Perdido and its addition to Mississippi. The assertion of our claim to West Florida as a part of the Louisiana Purchase had been followed in 1810 by the occupation of the

region west of the Pearl, consequent to a "revolution" there, by the government of Orleans Territory. When Orleans Territory became the state of Louisiana in 1812 this part of West Florida was included in it; while about a week later the part east of the Pearl was annexed to Mississippi Territory, although it was left in the possession of the Spaniards. In 1813, ostensibly moved by the fear that England was preparing to use the Spanish forts on the gulf, the United States sent General James Wilkinson with a small force to take Mobile. The prudent, although strongly dissenting, Spanish garrison withdrew, deriving what comfort it was able from the assurance of the United States that the claims of Spain to the region would be the subject of future negotiations. The formerly land-locked Mississippi Territory now bordered on the gulf.

The other feature of the war period of importance to the Southwest was the Creek uprising. Indian affairs in the South had been competently, and even honorably, handled in the decade preceding the war. The agents, Hawkins among the Creeks, R. J. Meigs among the Cherokee, and Silas Dinsmore among the Choctaw, were able men who in representing the United States did not fail to protect the interests of their charges. The factor at St. Stephens, George S. Gaines, was a potent force for good among the Choctaw, and John McKee, agent at different times to Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw, and between times a roving commissioner for the United States for all Southern tribes, had great influence throughout the South. In each tribe the agents had been successful in attaching some of the chiefs to the cause of friendship between white men and red; Pushmataha, chief of the Choctaw, was perhaps the ablest of these.

In the Creek uprising the agents were able not only to

hold their tribes steady in friendship to the United States, but to secure their aid. Even the Lower Creeks, among whom Hawkins lived, joined the United States forces against the Upper Creeks. These Alabama towns had been led to revolt by their sympathy for the Shawnee to whom they were united by ancient ties of friendship, the origin of which is even today something of a puzzle to ethnologists. Under the direction of Pinckney, three armies closed in on the Creeks, by way of the Coosa, the Black Warrior, and the Creek Path, and Andrew Jackson leading the Tennessee militia gave the belligerents the finishing blow at the battle of Horseshoe Bend.

The War of 1812 was followed by a westward movement which historians are accustomed to call the "Great Migration." From the upper South the low price of tobacco, due to the loss of the British market through war, trade restrictions, and West Indian competition, brought about an exodus of farmers on the marginal lands to the Northwest for the raising of food crops, to Kentucky and Tennessee for hemp, and to the Southwest for cotton. An accompanying migration from South Carolina and eastern Georgia limited itself to the newer cotton lands of the Southwest. In the five years after the war the Great Migration in the South transferred several hundred thousand people to the West, caused the erection of two territories, the admission of three states, and, indirectly, the purchase of Florida.

The Great Migration was the cause, accompaniment, and result of the vast Indian land cessions of the period. Alabama fared the best with cessions which cleared the entire state except for a strip along the Georgia boundary; Mississippi fared the worst gaining only the Tombigbee Valley. Georgia secured all the vast tract south

of the Altamaha and advanced beyond the headwaters of the Ocmulgee to the Chattahoochee. Kentucky and Tennessee gained the land west of the Tennessee. The treaties in which these cessions were secured were monuments of iniquity without precedent in American history. The Creek revolt had so thoroughly revealed the weakness and dissensions of the Southern Indians that thereafter the United States felt it unnecessary to treat them with any degree of consideration. The abandonment of the Cherokee trading post prior to the War of 1812 was now followed by that of the Chickasaw and Creeks; the Choctaw post, moved up to the river from St. Stephens to old Ft. Confederation, remained open till 1821. Hawkins had died in 1816, James Robertson died, and Silas Dinsmore retired in 1813. Only Meigs and John McKee (now Choctaw agent) remained of the pre-war era, and they were helpless before such Indian despoilers as Andrew Jackson, Governor McMinn of Tennessee, and Governor Mitchell of Georgia. Considering the character of these men, it is a source of wonder the Indians retained as much land as they did.

Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee sold their land themselves; in the Mississippi Territory the land was sold, of course, at the government land offices. The three offices at Nashville (for north Alabama), St. Stephens, and Washington had continued open throughout the war, selling land in continually dwindling amounts until in 1815 it reached a low level of 27,000 acres. In 1816 the sales at these three offices jumped spectacularly to 490,000 acres. In 1817 the Nashville office was moved to Huntsville, and a new office was opened at Milledgeville, Georgia, for the Creek land of Alabama; the sales that year at the four offices reached 600,000, and in 1818 700,000. In 1819 the Milledgeville office was moved to

Cahaba, Alabama, and the sales reached a new high total of 2,278,045 acres. A slackening of immigration due to the panic of 1819 caused a great decrease of land sales the next year. In the five years following the war nearly 5,000,000 acres of land were sold in Alabama and Mississippi. Much of it was bought by companies of speculators or by individual speculators, of whom Andrew Jackson was an example. They forced up the price of land at the auction sales from a minimum of \$2.00 to six and eight times that amount. The wildest speculating and the highest prices prevailed at Huntsville. At the end of the decade the people of Alabama found themselves with a land debt of over \$10,000,000. The lands on which these installments were in arrears technically reverted to the United States, but the land law of 1820 extended the time of payments. For many years this land debt was a social and economic hardship to the Alabama people. Speculation had been made easy by the fact that money was plentiful in the shape of bank notes issued by the local banks of Huntsville, St. Stephens, and Mobile, of the bank notes of some seventy Kentucky and Tennessee banks, and of the Yazoo scrip issued by the United States in payment of claims by the Yazoo companies of 1795.

Southern Alabama was settled chiefly by Georgians who bought their lands at Milledgeville and came in over the Federal Road. They established a number of towns such as Selma, Montgomery, Cahaba, Claiborne, and Conecuh, and built up a cotton planting aristocracy as a basis of the "Georgia faction" in local politics. Georgians were numerous in the Tennessee Valley of Alabama, too, since the Georgia Road led them thither as easily as the Federal Road did to south Alabama. But the Tennesseans were even more numerous

and the whole Muscle Shoals region became virtually a part of Tennessee except for an unnatural boundary line. Huntsville, the leading town of the region, retained the flavor of its Georgia founders, but Decatur at one end of the shoals and Florence and Tusculumbia at the other were made up of Tennesseans. Middle Alabama was occupied chiefly by Virginians and South Carolinians, with their chief town, Tuscaloosa, retaining the Indian name of the Black Warrior, on which it was located. A picturesque venture in this region was the founding in 1817 of Demopolis on the Tombigbee by a group of Napoleonic exiles purposing to build their prosperity on the cultivation of vineyards. The black belt of Alabama, along the Alabama and Tombigbee, was passed over by the settlers of this period because they were distrustful of its unfamiliar black soil. The population of Alabama at the end of the Great Migration was still grouped in the two localities in the Tennessee Valley and south of the Alabama. An arduous intercommunication was kept up by way of the Black Warrior and Jones Valley, and by way of the Tombigbee and Gaines's Trace. Gaines's Trace had been opened in 1810 by the government factor at St. Stephens in an effort to secure supplies for his trading post without paying duties at Mobile.

Mississippi experienced no such growth as did Alabama, partly because the Indian cessions there were smaller, and partly because Alabama intercepted the immigrants. The valleys of the Pearl and Tombigbee received most of the settlers, resulting in the development of Jackson, Canton, Meridian, and Columbus. A number of little towns developed along the lower course of the Natchez Trace. The "Military Road" cut by Andrew Jackson, 1817-1819, from the place where the

trace crossed the shoals south through Columbus to Madisonville on Lake Pontchartrain, was useful both as a post route and an immigrant road as far south as Columbus, but was never of material service south of that point.<sup>32</sup>

The Chickasaw cession of 1818 in western Kentucky and Tennessee became a cotton growing region centering around Memphis (another real estate development of Andrew Jackson), Jackson, and Columbus. As a matter of fact cotton growing established itself in all the southern region of Tennessee and vied with tobacco as the staple crop. In Georgia the new cessions became cotton lands. Macon on the Ocmulgee was founded in 1821; a Creek cession of that year opened for white settlement the area between the Ocmulgee and the Flint.

The mails reached Georgia down the old fall line road from Washington to Macon, but not until 1827 was there a regular mail service over the Federal Road through Alabama to New Orleans. The territory continued to get its mail through the valley road to Knoxville, thence through Huntsville, Tusculumbia, and over the Natchez Trace. Mail came from the Ohio region over Zane's Trace to Maysville and thence through Lexington to Nashville and over the trace to its destination. All these roads were immigrant roads as well as mail routes. The numerous rivers of the south took on an added usefulness as the steamboats made their appearance in the wake of the migrations. Steamboats were running on the Tombigbee as far up as Demopolis by 1819, up the Tennessee to Florence by 1821, and up the Oconee to Milledgeville in 1819.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> W. A. Love, "General Jackson's Military Road," in *Mississippi Historical Society Publications*, vol. XI, 403-17.

<sup>33</sup> T. P. Abernethy, *Formative Period in Alabama, 1815-1828*, chapter viii.



The rush of immigration to Mississippi Territory increased the agitation, begun even before the War of 1812, for admission to the Union as a state. Congress, rather than the territory, desired a division into states, and Georgia's consent to this, a violation of the Compact of 1802, had been secured in 1812, but the coming of war had caused the matter to be deferred. The natural division would be by a north and south line separating the mutually antagonistic Tombigbee and Mississippi settlements in such a way that each would have a part of the gulf frontage between the Pearl and the Perdido. The division in 1817 made the west portion of the territory a state with the retention of the name Mississippi, while the eastern portion became the Alabama Territory.

Alabama began its territorial existence in the "second" stage with a former senator from Georgia as governor, and with a house and council meeting at St. Stephens, which was an assertive city of about fifty houses. Since it was not intended, however, that St. Stephens should remain the capital, the legislature at its first session appointed a committee to choose a permanent seat of government. To the second session the committee recommended Cahaba, but the Tennessee Valley members of the legislature forced a compromise to the effect that the capital should be at Huntsville until suitable buildings should be erected at Cahaba. As a matter of fact, St. Stephens remained the capital throughout the existence of the territory. The Great Migration was at its peak when Alabama became a territory, and so fast did the population increase that in one year the territory was asking admission as a state. The change of status in 1819 did not involve a change of name.

The two new states of the cotton kingdom adopted

constitutions differing in many respects from those of the Atlantic states from which their people were drawn. Neither Alabama nor Mississippi had a property qualification for voting, both elected their governors as well as their legislatures by popular vote, and both apportioned their legislatures on the basis of free white inhabitants. Both followed the practice, then universal in the South, of having judges and state administrative officials appointed by the legislatures. Mississippi imposed a property qualification for legislators and governor. Alabama provided for amendment by legislature, and Mississippi by a convention.

In 1820 Mississippi had a total population of 75,448 of which 32,814 were slaves, Alabama 144,317 with 47,439 slaves, Georgia 340,987 with 149,656 slaves, South Carolina 502,740 with 258,475 slaves. In all, the cotton kingdom had a population of more than 1,000,000 of which nearly one-half was slave. In 1820 the cotton crop amounted to 160,000,000 pounds and was selling at an average price of seventeen cents a pound. This was a decline of almost 50 per cent from the high prices of 1816, but it was still high enough to enable the cotton growers to make enormous profits.

As the Great Migration impaled itself on the panic of 1819 and came to an end, the area of the South was increased by the "purchase" of Florida. The seizure of West Florida west of the Perdido had been accompanied by the assurance to Spain that her rights therein would be the subject of future negotiations, but as a matter of fact it had been incorporated in the three states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and so was inalienable. Jackson's invasion of Florida in 1817 was in harmony with, if not inspired by, the pressure of Georgia and Alabama frontiersmen against the Florida

boundary. The resulting purchase perhaps reflected more the government's desire to remove a European neighbor than it did an appreciation of Florida resources.



## Crossing the Mississippi

When in 1803 the United States, somewhat to its own surprise, purchased Louisiana, it acquired a territory which already had a white population of 50,000. The people were for the most part French, relics of the years before 1763 when France had given Louisiana into the reluctant hands of Spain. Three-fourths of the French, perhaps, lived in and around New Orleans; there was a small settlement at Natchitoches on the Red; a few families at Arkansas Post on the Arkansas; a population of 1200 at St. Genevieve, the shipping port of the leading mining region of the present Missouri; and the nucleus of a city at St. Louis. During the last years of the Spanish regime the presence of free land and the nearness of the New Orleans market attracted an increasing number of Americans who settled at Cape Girardeau and New Madrid. Although Louisiana extended northward to Canada, practically the entire body of settlers, French and American, lived in the southern portion between the Missouri and the gulf. They were in two groups: along the Mississippi in the present Missouri, and south of the Red in the present Louisiana. The country from the Red to the St. Francis was practically devoid of white people.

The dominant Indian tribe in the southern portion of the purchase was the Osage, whose villages were located on the river of the same name. Their power was the result not of their number, which was less than 5000, but of their possession of arms and horses. With these

two advantages they destroyed the Quapaw, the original occupants of the region between the Arkansas and the Red, and the Caddo who lived in the northern part of the present state of Louisiana. In 1802, as a result of tribal dissensions, a portion of the Osage left their villages in Missouri and established a new town in the present Oklahoma near the junction of the Grand and the Verdigris with the Arkansas. The chief influence, perhaps, of the Osage on the history of the region was in forming a barrier against the fierce plains Indians to the west. In addition to the Osage there were several hundred Cherokee, Creeks, Choctaw, and Chickasaw living in the present Louisiana and Arkansas in 1803.

Louisiana came to the United States with its boundaries undefined and its character unknown. In March, 1804, the unwieldy mass was divided on the line of the thirty-third parallel, the southern portion being called the Territory of Orleans, and the northern the District of Louisiana. The territory included not only the area west of the Mississippi but also that part of the purchase "which lies south of the Mississippi Territory" — in other words, West Florida as far east as the Perdido; the western boundary of Orleans was specified as the "western boundary of the said cession." As a matter of fact, West Florida, being in actual possession of Spain, was only "constructively" a part of Orleans until the revolution of 1810 gave Governor Claiborne an opportunity to occupy the portion of it west of the Pearl. And wherever the "western boundary of the said cession" may have rightfully been, the watchful Spaniards kept their hold on Texas and forced the territory to observe, if not to acknowledge, the Sabine as the western limit of its jurisdiction. Orleans began its existence in the second stage with a legislature meeting at New Orleans. The

District of Louisiana was placed for the time being under the authority of the governor of Indiana Territory, and Governor Harrison and his judges had enacted sixteen laws for the inhabitants before the ungrateful beneficiaries of his care were able by their petitions to secure a separate government. In March, 1805, the District of Louisiana was made into the Territory of Louisiana, but the population of 10,000 (of whom 1,200 were slaves) had to be content with the first stage of territorial government. James Wilkinson, of Spanish conspiracy fame, was the governor until he was called to New Orleans to deal with the hypothetical conspiracy of Aaron Burr. The capital of the territory was St. Louis.

Having purchased Louisiana and made provision for its government, the United States took steps to ascertain what it was. The inevitable lines of penetration were the three rivers, the Missouri, the Arkansas, and the Red. Lewis and Clark made their well-known expedition up the Missouri, 1804-1806. At the same time, Governor Wilkinson sent out Lieutenant Zebulon M. Pike in search of the headwaters of the Arkansas and Red. Pike ascended the Missouri and Osage, crossed to the Arkansas which he followed to its source in Colorado, turned south to find the Red, and either by accident or design found the Rio Grande instead, where he was promptly taken captive by the Spaniards. However, prior to his capture, he had detached Lieutenant Wilkinson, son of the governor, to return to the Mississippi by way of the Arkansas so that that stream was explored notwithstanding the Pike fiasco. The Red river, also, was explored for 600 miles in 1806 by the Freeman expedition before it was turned back by the Spaniards near the southwest corner of Arkansas. Since Lewis and Clark as well as Pike had pushed their journeys into

territory claimed by Spain, it was perhaps not unnatural that the latter should consider the explorations of the United States to have other purposes than the promotion of scientific knowledge. The exploration of the Red, whatever the purpose, revealed the fact that its course at the south was blocked by the Great Raft in northern Louisiana, and at the west by Spanish hostility; consequently the Red river region was avoided by the early settlers. The exploration of the Arkansas made known the great length of the river and the wide extent of its tributaries, the Canadian and Cimarron on the south and the White, Grand, and Verdigris on the north. Since the Arkansas was navigable to the Verdigris, it became the common road for early traders and settlers.

Louisiana had been acquired primarily because it flanked the Mississippi river; congress was slow to recognize its possibilities for settlement. In 1804 Orleans Territory was divided into two land districts with commissioners at New Orleans and Opelousas to register and adjudge claims under Spanish and French grants. For the Territory of Louisiana one set of commissioners at St. Louis was deemed sufficient. The grantees were slow in registering their claims, and after twelve years of effort the commissioners in both localities were constrained to close their records with the task unfinished. Until these claims were settled no land could be sold, but as a matter of fact the interest of the United States in the Louisiana Territory at this time was chiefly concerned with its possibilities as a place to which the eastern Indians might be removed. In 1805 government trading posts were established at Natchitoches on the Red, Bayou Spadrie on the Arkansas, and Bellefontaine at the mouth of the Missouri, the first two less for the convenience of the native Indians than in anticipa-



tion of an immigration from east of the Mississippi. The governor of the Territory of Louisiana was ex-officio superintendent of western Indians, and local agents were appointed for the Osage, Quapaw, and Caddo. The inevitable land cessions followed in the form of a small but important Sac and Fox cession in northern Missouri, and four years later an enormous cession by the Osage of all their land north of the Arkansas and east of the present Kansas City. Near the site of the future city, Ft. Clark was established in 1809. The securing of the huge Osage cession was partly inspired by a desire to make room for the Cherokee who, under the encouragement of their agent, R. J. Meigs, had since 1807 been migrating individually and in small groups to the west. In 1809 some 300 Cherokee, led by their chief, Tahlontuskee, migrated to the west and at this time the United States established a reservation for them on the upper White river. But in disappointment over the small number of migrating Indians, the United States in 1807 discontinued the post on the Missouri and in 1810 that on the Arkansas.

Notwithstanding the policy of Indian removal and the lack of land sales, the census of 1810 showed an increase of population in the purchase of nearly 50,000 over that of 1803. Orleans now had 76,000 people; Louisiana more than 20,000. Some of this additional population was a natural increase of the native stock; a great part of it was due to the drift of settlers from the east. Since the public land was not yet on sale, this latter element necessarily became squatters, locating their homes as they pleased. One result of the increase of population was the admission in April, 1812, to the Union of a portion of Orleans under the name of the state of Louisiana. Theoretically, Orleans Territory had

extended on the east to the Perdido, but it carried into the Union with it only the area west of the Pearl, which it had seized in 1810. The western boundary of the state was fixed as at present.

In June, 1812, congress, apparently apprehensive of the confusion which might arise from having a territory and a state of the same name, changed the name of the former to Missouri. In somewhat belated response to repeated petitions, it also raised it to the second stage of government with a legislature and a delegate to the house of representatives. One of the first acts of the new legislature was the creation in 1813 of Arkansas county, to include practically all the present state of Arkansas. The formation of this county was in the nature of a surgical operation for the relief of the other communities, for the Arkansas region was becoming more and more a home for the eastern Indians. There were more than 2,000 Cherokee on White river by 1817, and the number had increased to 3,500 by 1819. Between the immigrant Cherokee and the native Osage there was waged an almost continuous warfare, making life too precarious for any white man but the criminal fugitive. In 1817 the United States established Ft. Smith, where the Arkansas crosses the line of the present Oklahoma, in the hope that the military might force the people, white and red, to keep peace.<sup>34</sup> The success of this altruistic measure was by no means startling.

North of Arkansas there was a more orderly development. The earthquakes in the Mississippi Valley were more effective in instilling piety than in discouraging immigration. The War of 1812 had its echoes in a certain amount of unrest among the Indians who were detected in such minatory acts as "infesting the country,

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<sup>34</sup> Grant Foreman, *Indians and Pioneers*, 55-59.

stealing pigs, crawling on all fours, and imitating the notes of the mud lark." In 1818 land offices were finally opened in St. Louis and Franklin, and by the end of September, 1819, had sold over a million acres of land. These were the only land offices west of the Mississippi until 1821, when offices were opened at Cape Girardeau in Missouri, and at certain places in Arkansas and Louisiana. The immigration to Missouri was chiefly from Kentucky and Tennessee. Both settled along the Mississippi and later penetrated into the interior. The Kentuckians principally followed the Missouri where the soil was very similar to that in their home state. Passing over the intermediate ground, they came to the attractive Booneslick country and made their settlements. Franklin was founded in 1816, Boonville in 1817. The Tennessee people settled chiefly in the Ozark highlands south of the Missouri river.<sup>35</sup> The White river region was occupied by 1818, and the Osage and Gasconade valleys received many settlers. Springfield was founded in 1822. Whether Kentuckians or Tennesseans, the settlers brought with them their home crops, and Missouri became a tobacco-growing region. The immigrants were chiefly from the poorer class, but slavery and the plantation secured a firm hold on the Missouri Valley. This was the most fertile section of Missouri and its prosperity was increased when the steamboats reached Franklin in 1819. The Santa Fé trade, begun a few years later, was in reality a land extension of this steamboat trade. From Santa Fé the first mules were imported into the Booneslick country and that region soon became the mule-raising center of the United States.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Carl O. Sauer, *The Geography of the Ozark Highland of Missouri*, Bulletin no. 7, Geographic Society of Chicago, 140, 159.

<sup>36</sup> *Idem*, 122.

The census of 1820 showed that Missouri had a population of 66,586 of whom 10,222 were slaves, and that Arkansas had a population of 14,273 with 1,617 slaves. The two regions had been separated in 1819 when congress created "Arkansaw" Territory so as to reduce the Territory of Missouri to a convenient size for statehood. The people of Missouri had been petitioning for admission to the Union for several years and a bill for admission had been introduced in 1818. The Tallmadge amendment to outlaw slavery in Missouri as a prerequisite for admission, precipitated the first slavery controversy in our history. The purposes of this amendment and the far-reaching effect of the resulting controversy must be examined in another connection. Missouri entered the Union as a slave state in 1821. It is said that the "panhandle" in the southeastern corner of the state was made to accommodate an influential planter who did not wish his plantation to be included in Arkansas. In 1836 the western boundary of Missouri north of the Missouri river was moved west from the meridian of the mouth of the Kansas to the Missouri.

The Territory of Arkansas in 1819 included all the area between Louisiana and Missouri as far west as the Spanish line, which in the same year was definitely fixed by treaty as the hundredth meridian. The capital was at Arkansas Post until 1821 when it was moved up the river to Little Rock. The development of Arkansas was slow and hesitant. In 1818 the Quapaw ceded the land between the Arkansas-Canadian and the Red, but two years later the United States assigned most of the ceded area to the immigrating Choctaw. In 1824 and 1828 the entire present state of Arkansas was cleared of Indians by the assignment of new homes to the Cherokee and Choctaw farther west. In 1824 the territory was given as

a new western boundary a north and south line beginning forty miles west of the southwestern corner of Missouri; in 1828 the territory was cut down to the present state limits. In 1821 the first land office in Arkansas was opened at Little Rock at the same time that the first offices were opened in Louisiana at New Orleans, Opelousas, and Ouachita. The next year gave Arkansas another land office at Batesville on the White river.

The location of the land offices show into what regions the Arkansas population was moving. The valleys of the Arkansas and the White received most of the settlers, although there was a considerable number of squatters in the Red River Valley in the southwestern corner of the territory. The establishment of land offices and the final decision to place the Indian reservation farther west encouraged settlement, but they both came too late for the Great Migration after the War of 1812. In 1830 Arkansas had a population of only 30,000, and its real settlement came only with the Jacksonian migration of the thirties.



## **Development of Southern Nationalism**





## The Beginning of Southern Nationalism

In colonial times that part of the Atlantic seaboard south of the Mason and Dixon line had been settled by a people essentially different in spirit from those north of the line. As time passed the people south of the line came to possess certain economic and social institutions, such as slavery, plantations, and staple crops, which served to emphasize their separateness from their northern brethren. But the essential mark of the Southerner was his spirit; his institutions were incidents of geography. Even his geography was incidental. For when the Southern people expanded westward they flanked the line and spread into the Northwest as avidly as into the Southwest.

In 1820, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were Southern states in all but location. Their population of 700,000 was overwhelmingly of Southern birth or of Southern descent. Southern sentiment was strongest in Illinois because it was farthest remote from the North but, like the other two, bordered by the Southern state, Kentucky, from which or through which most of the Southerners went into the Northwest. Into all three states the Southern people had carried their Southern sentiment, but not their Southern institutions. The Ordinance of 1787 had prevented, or at least prohibited, the taking of slaves; climate and soil prevented plantations and staple crops. The absence of these things did not make the people less Southern; as a matter of fact, the great mass of people south of the Ohio were equally without slaves and plantations. The movement of Southern people into the

Northwest was not a movement to avoid slavery but merely a movement into a new land precisely as the movement into the Southwest had been.

In 1820 the Southern people were spread over the land from the Atlantic to the Ozarks, and from the gulf almost to the Great Lakes. They were divided among themselves by a multitude of jarring and conflicting interests. They were all agriculturists but the tobacco planter had little in common with the cotton planter. South of the Ohio slavery was legal, north of it illegal. The Atlantic seaboard turned its commercial back on the Mississippi Valley. There were mountain people and lowland people, people of wealth and people of poverty, aristocrats and commoners. Southern people constituted a heterogeneous mass in which the only unifying element was a common descent from the colonial population south of the line.

There was, in truth, little indication in 1820 that common descent was a unifying force. There is little indication that Southern people in 1820 thought of themselves as one people or were conscious of themselves as Southerners or looked upon Northern people as in any essential way different from themselves. In 1820 there was, in a very real sense, no South and no Southerners. In 1790 there were 2,000,000 people south of the line; in 1820 their descendants scattered over Northwest and Southwest numbered about 5,000,000. If they constituted a Southern people they gave little evidence that they were conscious of the fact. Prior to 1820, South was an indefinite term which could only be defined, if defined at all, as the region inhabited by Southerners. Southerner could only be defined as meaning one descended from the colonial settlers below the line. But the controversy over the admission of Missouri gave new

meaning to these terms. It reduced the South to the limits of slavery and intensified within those limits the sentiment of unity among the people. As Professor Channing has said, it created a Southern nationalism. This new intensified feeling of unity deserves to be called nationalism rather than sectionalism inasmuch as it was based on sentiment rather than on interest. After 1820 there existed among the people of the South a "consciousness of kind" and a feeling of aloofness from the people of the North. They felt, and continue to feel, themselves a separate people: the other people of the United States they considered as aliens.

That the Missouri controversy resulted in the creation of a Southern nationalism is clear; why it should have had such a result is far from clear; why there should have been any controversy at all is difficult to understand. The action of Representative Tallmadge in offering to the bill admitting Missouri an amendment prohibiting slavery in the prospective state might be dismissed as the act of a crank and irresponsible fanatic. But the practically solid support he received from the free state congressmen and the even more solid opposition he met from the slave state congressmen has never been satisfactorily explained. If northern unanimity was due to a devotion to principle, it must be conceded that the devotion was of sudden growth for there is no indication of any deep-seated anti-slavery feeling in the North prior to this time. The Northern states, to be sure, had either outlawed slavery or "put it in the course of ultimate extinction," but their action had been the result of economic realism rather than of moral indignation. There was, of course, a persistent emancipation movement led by Lundy, Birney, and others, but it had never approached the dignity of a crusade. Moreover, the

sudden Northern enthusiasm for liberty was as barren of descendants as of ancestry, as was evidenced by the unpopularity of Garrison at the North in the following decade. Jefferson declared that the anti-slavery agitation of 1820 was like an alarm bell in the night: part, at least, of the terror of such a bell is due to its unexpectedness.

Southern opposition to the amendment on the ground of interest is as difficult to understand as Northern advocacy on the ground of principle. The Southern congressmen represented constituents the great mass of whom neither possessed slaves or had an interest in slavery. The only slave owners who could have had an active interest in seeing slavery perpetuated in Missouri were those who reared slaves for sale and those who intended to settle in Missouri. The latter class was small, the former entirely hypothetical. Southern opposition to the amendment was probably due to the fact that the congressmen were slave owners themselves and were actuated by class feeling in taking their stand.

Neither is it possible to view the Missouri controversy as a struggle for a balance of power. There is no evidence that there was any such balancing of power between North and South before 1820. Such a balance would be important only if there were controversies to be determined, and there were none. The bank war, the tariff war, and other sectional clashes were in the future. If before 1820 North and South had conflicting interests, their actions would indicate that they were singularly unaware of them. To interpret the Missouri controversy as an outburst of anti-slavery feeling or as a struggle for control of the senate is to read into the history of the time things which were essentially absent.

The moral uprising against human bondage in Missouri seems to have some relationship to the ratification

of the Spanish Treaty then before the senate.<sup>37</sup> This treaty gave the United States a Florida whose valuable portions had long been in her possession, and confirmed to Spain Texas where our claim remained unbuttressed by occupation. Since by this treaty the South gained only the small area of barren Florida and lost the huge domain of Texas, she viewed it with hostility and opposed its ratification. The attack on slavery was perhaps designed for the purpose of forcing Southern congressmen to give up Texas. The northeast wished to surrender Texas, not because Texas was Southern, but because it was Western; the jealousy of the East toward the West was the result of conflicting interests and had often been displayed in our early history.

In the end the Spanish Treaty was ratified and Missouri was admitted as a slave state. The Missouri Compromise effected a most inequitable division of the Louisiana Purchase in outlawing slavery therein above 36° 30', except Missouri. The South accepted it because in doing so it won the area then at issue, and was content to trust to the future for the remainder if it desired it. The Missouri Compromise was merely a law of congress and might be repealed by a future congress as, in fact, it was in 1854. But in 1820 it seemed apparent both to North and South that the prohibition of slavery in the purchase above 36° 30' was merely a gesture. For the Lewis and Clark expedition and other western explorations had popularized the idea that the Great Plains were a desert which could never support a population. In Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, slavery had secured the only portion of the purchase that was thought inhabitable. The South accepted the compromise with

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<sup>37</sup> F. H. Hodder, "Sidelights on the Missouri Compromise," in American Historical Association *Annual Report*, 1909, 153-161.

reservations as to its constitutionality since it lay beyond the power of congress to enact. Nor did it judge it ethically binding since, after all, Missouri was not admitted under the compromise, but had to submit to further restrictions as a price of entering the Union.

The South created by the Missouri conflict was a South from which many Southerners were excluded. The Southern people of the Northwest had been divided in their attitude toward the Tallmadge amendment. Illinois had voted solidly against the amendment; Indiana solidly in support of it. All the Ohio votes were cast for the amendment save the lone vote of William Henry Harrison. After the matter was settled, the people of the Northwest remained as Southern as they had been before, but of course they failed to share in that intensification of feeling which characterized the people of the slave states. Throughout the ante-bellum period the Northwest quite generally worked in political harmony with the South, assisting it in its battles against the North. Whether this was due to a concord of interest or a harmony of sentiment, it would be difficult to say.

Southern people after 1820, then, were of two kinds: the slave state people actuated by a feeling of Southern nationalism steadily increasing, and Northwest people, sympathizing with the South without sharing the new spirit. Within the next fifteen years in the slave states themselves the cotton states came to be characterized by a nationalism much more intense than that of the tobacco states. The event which brought this about was the tariff conflict between the cotton planter and the Northern manufacturer.

In the vote on the tariff of 1816 there had been no consistent sectional alignment; the leading advocate of

the tariff of this year was John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. The first Southern alignment against the tariff came in 1820, and the date suggests a connection between Southern opposition to the tariff and the controversy over Missouri. There can be little doubt that much of the Southern opposition was due to its ill-will toward the North rather than to actual damage received from the operation of the tariff. The South attacked the tariff because it benefited a North apparently inimical to Southern slavery. The South, to be sure, could, and did, give reasons for the faith that was in it. It argued that a tariff made higher the price of the manufactured goods it had to buy, whether of domestic or foreign origin. It also maintained that a tariff depressed the price of raw cotton by discouraging the demand for it. In this connection it did not fail to point out that the price of cotton fell steadily after the tariff act of 1816. These arguments in all probability were the results of rationalizing rather than of reasoning. In moments of extreme candor even Southern leaders were willing to admit that the low price of cotton might have a connection with overproduction.

The South defeated an attempt to increase the tariff in 1820, but in 1824, owing to the defection of the Northwest, had to submit to higher rates. Having failed in the frontal attack of that year, the South in 1828 attempted a flank movement which proved a boomerang and brought on the famous "tariff of abominations." It was at this juncture that South Carolina, under the guidance of Calhoun, worked out her theory of nullification which she forebore putting in practice pending the election of Jackson to whom she looked for relief. For various reasons, prominent among them his quarrel with Calhoun, Jackson failed to show enthusiasm for tariff

reform, and following his reëlection in 1832 South Carolina resorted to nullification. The ensuing display of bluster, braggadocio, and swashbuckling is of less importance than the attitude of the Southern states to the action of South Carolina.

The event showed that while the Southern states were quite generally willing to unite in denouncing the tariff, the spirit of nationalism was still too weak to bring about any approval of nullification. Kentucky and Louisiana, indeed, gave official approval to the tariff, and the condemnation of Maryland was so weak as almost to equal assent. The other Southern states condemned the tariff and all rejected nullification. Virginia sent an agent to South Carolina to urge moderation. Georgia and Alabama asked for a federal convention to settle the controversy, and the former made the interesting suggestion of a Southern convention to be composed of delegates from the cotton states.

Except for this suggestion from Georgia, there was nothing in the attitude of the Southern states that would indicate a disposition to make common cause with a sister state of the South. Yet it is probable that in regard to the nullification controversy the Southern states were actuated less by principle than by regard for their immediate, individual interests. Kentucky wanted a protective tariff for her hemp, and Louisiana for her sugar. Neither, therefore, could approve a nullification aimed at a tariff, although Kentucky had herself advocated nullification of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee could not join in defiance of a president whose aid they were then invoking for the removal of their Indians. Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi were themselves engaged in defying the supreme court—which they could do in



safety as long as they were supported by the president. In Maryland and Virginia official disapproval of nullification was perhaps not unconnected with a desire for federal aid for railroads and canals. In disapproving nullification in 1833, Virginia was visibly embarrassed by her remembrance of the Virginia resolutions of 1798. In Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, the legislatures in discountenancing nullification perhaps had a thought of their own sectional minorities just at this time displaying pronounced tendencies toward nullifying state legislation.

It is evident that the failure of the slave states to support South Carolina in nullification is not to be taken too seriously. What is more significant is the relatively solid alignment against the tariff. After all, the tariff was the issue; nullification but a method of opposition. Southern opposition to the tariff was certainly largely a matter of sentiment rather than of interest. The tariff war was a cotton war and the support given it by the upper South was not given it because of identity of economic interests, because there was no such identity. It was, as a matter of fact, to the interest of the tobacco South to support rather than to oppose a tariff, and Kentucky very truculently did so. The tariff war originated, in part at least, in the spirit of nationalism; it had the effect of increasing the nationalism in which it originated. But since it was a cotton war, it was inevitable that it should be more effective in intensifying the feeling of the far South than that of the upper South.

Southern nationalism made the South conscious of itself. It expressed itself in the four decades following the compromise in an unceasing effort to promote Southern interest and to oppose those of the North. It fed on the wars it waged, gradually increased in intensity,

largely determined the issues of our history before 1861, and in that year launched the South into a desperate struggle for independence.

## Sectionalism

The spirit of nationalism, born of the Missouri controversy, had an increasing tendency to unify the South in its attitude toward other people. But within the South itself there were many clashing and discordant interests. There was, for example, a clearly discernible cleavage between the upper South and the lower South, and one only less patent between the Atlantic states and those of the Mississippi Valley. There were state enmities such as the Kentucky-Tennessee boundary dispute. But the most virulent discords were intra-state and because they were discords of interests they may properly be called sectional.

Delaware was too small for sectionalism, but in Maryland, Virginia, and the two Carolinas, the people were divided into hostile camps by passions so bitter as to endanger the very existence of the states. In each of these there was an east and a west, the one chiefly lowland, the other upland or mountainous. The east had easy access to markets by its navigable rivers, the west was almost entirely cut off from markets. From this it resulted that the west was a region of small farms, of diversified industry, and of few slaves, while the east was marked by a plantation economy of staple crops and slave labor. It resulted also that the west was poor and the east wealthy. There was no essential difference of people, although there were great numbers of Germans and Scotch-Irish in the west. In colonial times the line between east and west had been the tidewater line, but

in each South Atlantic state the east gradually encroached on the west as its people shifted inland in search of fresh lands. In 1820 the line of division had advanced westward in the Carolinas to the fall line and in Virginia and Maryland to the Blue Ridge.

From the differences in character, the two sections inevitably developed discordant interests and conflicting demands. In its poverty the west demanded free schools supported by the state; the wealthy east opposed because taxes for their support would fall chiefly on the east. The west, having few slaves, demanded that slaves be taxed; the east, having many, opposed. The west, with no navigable rivers, wanted internal improvements at state expense; the east felt neither the need of them for itself nor the desire to support them for the west. The east favored sound banking, a sound currency, and a low tariff; the west desired local banks with a plethora of bank notes, and from its budding industries was inclined to view the protective tariff with an affectionate eye.

In all four states the east and the west struggled for the control of the state governments from which these conflicting blessings might flow. Here the east occupied the strong ground of actual possession. Because it was the oldest settled region it had controlled the legislature in colonial days and thereby had determined the provisions of the state constitutions which everywhere marked the coming of independence. These eastern-written constitutions were in no respects self-denying ordinances, but carefully written documents designed to give the east control of the government in all perpetuity. The design, splendid in its simplicity, was to subordinate the entire state government to a legislature which should be controlled by the east. This control was secured by a method of apportionment which assigned

representatives not to population but to area. The unit of representation was the county and all counties in the state had equal representation in the lower house of the legislature and commonly in the upper. The western counties were few in number not so much from fell design as because they were created when the section was young and population scanty. Their population increased, but not their representation. They were overbalanced in the legislature by the small, numerous counties of the east with a smaller population and a larger representation.

To the legislature thus ingeniously constructed was given the power in every South Atlantic state to select the governor. The legislature also chose the executive council which in Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina assisted and limited the governor. The legislature selected the judges also in every state except Maryland, where they were appointed by the governor – himself selected by the legislature. There was a property qualification for office-holding and a property qualification for voting. The resulting disfranchisement of great numbers of the western people was robbed of its importance by the fact that there were so few elective officials. These were the provisions of the constitutions, and to secure their perpetuity the constitutions further provided, expressly in Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia, by implication in Virginia and North Carolina, that constitutional amendments be made only on the initiative of the legislature.

The east did not refrain from using the power it possessed. United States senators, governors, state judges, and other state officials were chosen from the east in scandalous disproportion. The only internal improvements were made in the east, such as the Santee Canal

and the Dismal Swamp Canal. Slaves were practically exempt from taxation. No schools were provided by the state. In Maryland the two branches of the university – Washington College at Chestertown and St. John's at Annapolis – were so far east as to be inaccessible to western people. The capitals remained in the east. On one occasion in Virginia an impassioned orator declared that the only state institution located in western Virginia was an insane asylum.

Even in colonial times western discontent with eastern rule had been attested by uprisings, such as Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia and the Regulators' War in North Carolina. Both were put down, but the discontent remained and became more and more intense. As the western counties grew in population, their under-representation became more glaring every year and western indignation grew by leaps and bounds. The crux of the situation was control of the legislature, and under an equitable apportionment the west would secure this control. But apportionment could only be changed by constitutional revision, so that in all four states the fundamental demand of the west was for a constitutional convention. Every session of the legislature, the western men renewed their demands, western newspapers gave publicity to western woes, western orators laid down a heavy barrage of reasoning and denunciation at every opportunity. In 1816 the aged Jefferson was induced to come out for revision in Virginia. Mass meetings passed resolutions of protest and a deluge of pamphlets poured down on the people.

The east remained complacent and unmoved. In Maryland the property qualifications for voting and office-holding were abolished in 1810, but there was scant comfort in a widening of the suffrage when legis-

lative apportionment was left unchanged and executive and judicial officials remained appointive. In Virginia the legislature shifted apportionment slightly, but the net result was to leave the east fully in control. The breach between east and west widened year by year in Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. In South Carolina, on the other hand, sectionalism ran a brief course and disappeared.

In South Carolina sectionalism in early days was aggravated by the fact that the east was a rice growing district dependent on slavery and a plantation economy, while the upland had found no industry at all suitable for it. The two sections were so different in interests and ideals that the constitution of 1790 established almost a dual government. The legislature was to meet at Columbia but there were to be two treasurers, one to reside at Columbia and one at Charleston. The secretary of state, the attorney-general, and the judges of the superior court were to transact business at both places. The governor was required to be in Columbia only when the legislature was in session. From the trend of disunion evidenced by such an arrangement, South Carolina was rescued by the invention of the cotton gin. The upland found its staple crop in cotton and soon the entire section became a region of plantations and slavery.<sup>38</sup> The identity of interests between the cotton planter of the west and the rice planter of the east drew the two sections together, and the process was hastened by the building of roads and the improvement of river navigation. There was no longer need for the east to hold itself entrenched against the west. In 1808 apportionment was changed to a basis of white population and taxes; in 1810 the

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<sup>38</sup> W. A. Schaper, "Sectionalism and Representation in South Carolina," in *American Historical Association Annual Report*, 1900, vol. 1, 237-463.

property qualification for voting was abolished; in 1811 a public school system was established. Both sections united in the support of South Carolina College, established (1801) at Columbia for the promotion of planter culture and ideals. The unification of South Carolina gave it the leadership of the South. The like-mindedness of the people enabled them to act promptly and boldly in a crisis, as in the case of nullification and secession. The spread of cotton culture, it may also be noted, resulted not only in unification of the people, but in early exhaustion of the soil, and rendered the state discontented and dissatisfied.

In the newer states of the South sectionalism was far less pronounced than in the Atlantic states. Chiefly, perhaps, this was because, by an accident of geography, all but the most remote regions had access to markets over navigable rivers flowing directly or ultimately to the gulf. Partly it was due to the fact that, by the accident of immigration, in each state different sections developed simultaneously and so no one section had the opportunity of seizing control of the government. There may be added to this the fact that when the state governments were established all sections were frontier, socially and economically alike, and therefore without incentive to discriminate. All the newer states apportioned the legislature in some way on the basis of population, and none had property qualifications for voting. Everywhere the executive, like the legislative, officials were elective.

Nevertheless, each of the newer states had its modicum of sectionalism. Kentucky and Mississippi had the least, for in both of them the planter was so completely in control as to make opposition useless. The mountaineers of Kentucky and the "piney woods men" of eastern Mississippi were too feeble to merit discrimination, too



lethargic to resent it, and too inarticulate to denounce it. In like manner the Ozark region, without protest and without approval, acquiesced in the domination of the Missouri Valley. Tennessee had, probably, the most bitter sectionalism in the Southwest. Here the plantation regions of middle and west Tennessee allied themselves with the eastern valley against the farmers of the hills and mountains. But since there were no discriminating clauses in the constitution, sectional ill-will quite generally worked itself off in political rivalry and never reached the feud proportions of sectionalism in the Atlantic states. In Alabama, the Tennessee Valley and southern Alabama were both rich planting communities differing only in that one traded to New Orleans, and the other to Mobile. Between the two lay the relatively inaccessible hill country with small farms, poor farmers, and little slavery. Each of these three sections was settled by a different stream of migration and the rivalry in early days was a social rivalry transferred to politics. It can be seen in the migration of the state capital from St. Stephens to Huntsville (1819), to Cahaba (1820), to Tuscaloosa (1825), and to Montgomery (1846).

In Georgia the people were divided along sectional lines, but the division, nevertheless, was not sectional but factional. The cleavage was social rather than economic in the beginning and originated in the union of the aristocratic coast planters and the Virginians on the upper Savannah against the Carolinians of the interior. But the plantation system spread west as settlement spread and soon the alignment of east against west lost all meaning. Habit and tradition continued it, however, throughout the ante-bellum period, and rival leaders exploited it for their own ends. The eastern faction

followed the Crawford-Troup leaders, the west the Clarks. The factional contests were at times extremely bitter, but there was rarely anything at stake more fundamental than the spoils of office, and government policies remained the same whichever faction was in office. Without great controversy the capital was moved gradually inland to Milledgeville (1804), the state university located at Athens, and academies established in every county. Constitutional amendments made elective all inferior judges (1812) and the governor (1824).

Each Southern state, except South Carolina, was a house divided against itself, but the division was not serious in the newer states. Sectional feuds and rivalries greatly influenced the course of Southern history. Outstanding among these was the movement for constitutional reform and the formation of political parties.

There was no "solid South" in politics in ante-bellum times any more than there was in geography. On the issue of adopting the constitution the people of Virginia and the Carolinas aligned themselves according to their sectional interests, the east favoring the constitution because it promised protection to property and the west opposing because it feared the loss of liberty. In North Carolina alone did the west prevail, and its victory was only temporary. Georgia and Maryland were all but unanimous for the "more perfect union" from which the former hoped to secure aid against the Creeks and the latter, perhaps, against its neighbors.

The parties thus formed survived the issue on which they had been organized; the anti-Federalists survived even their name. On the new issue of centralization the eastern aristocrats were Federalists, the poorer people of the west, Republicans.<sup>39</sup> But the stigma of the Chris-

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<sup>39</sup> U. B. Phillips, "The South Carolina Federalists," in *American Historical Review*, vol. XIV, 529 ff.

holm *vs.* Georgia decision and of the sedition acts combined with the leadership of Jefferson, a western aristocrat, sufficed to overthrow the Federalists and to unite all sections in a common Republicanism. After the revolution of 1800 the Federalist party practically ceased to exist in the South, showing infrequent symptoms of local animation only when the blunders of its opponents gave it opportunity.

For more than thirty years there was but one party in the South and that was the Republican party. But in each Southern state the Republicans were divided into factions struggling for the spoils of office, state, and national. In most Southern states these factions were sectional. These sectional divisions were perpetuated as bases of new parties when the old Republican party divided into Whig and Democrat. In Maryland and Virginia the east allied itself with the Whigs, chiefly because the Whigs advocated a national banking system which the planters needed in financing the growing and marketing of their staple crops. In both states the west became Democratic, partly because Jackson was identified with the cause of the common man, and partly because of its traditional antagonism to an east now become Whig. In North Carolina the party alignment followed sectional lines, but the choice of party labels is a challenge to the human understanding. Eastern North Carolina, with the same interests as the east of Virginia and Maryland, became Democratic, while the west became Whig. Apparently it was the influence of the aged Nathaniel Macon which determined the choice of the east, while the Whig fervor of the west had no other reason for existence than an opposition to things eastern.

There were many other paradoxes in the Southern political alignments. South Carolina, where was the

heart and soul of opposition to Jackson, became not Whig, but overwhelmingly Democratic. This highly illogical state of affairs resulted from the influence of Calhoun over his unified state. Calhoun was one of the organizers of the Whig party and gave it its name, but a short experience taught him that he could not, without a surrender of principles, compete with Clay for Whig leadership. Unable to surrender his principles or his ambition even for the sake of crushing Jacksonianism, Calhoun, using the sub-treasury measure as an occasion and excuse, rejoined his old associates now chiefly in the Democratic fold. South Carolina followed him and remained Democratic with frequent displays of independence.

Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee presented elements of surprise in their political complexions. The alignment in Georgia well illustrates the saying that only a Georgian can understand Georgia politics. The Troup faction of the east, although it had had Jackson's support in Indian removal, became the Whig party. Apparently this was due to the Force Bill.<sup>40</sup> That Kentucky became almost as solidly Whig as South Carolina did Democratic, may safely be ascribed to its tariff leanings, the need for the national bank, the Maysville Road veto, and the influence of Henry Clay. What is surprising is that the greatest Whig majorities were from the mountain section. In Tennessee the influence of John Bell, Hugh Lawson White, and other personal enemies of Jackson, made the state consistently Whig with only the mountain and hill country normally clinging to Democracy.

In the remaining states of the South political align-

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<sup>40</sup> U. B. Phillips, "Georgia and State Rights," in American Historical Association *Annual Report*, 1901, vol. II, 138.

ment coincided with sectional division. In Alabama the plantation regions of the black belt and the Tennessee Valley were Whig; the northern hill country, Democratic. In Mississippi, the river counties were Whig while the hill country north and the pine barrens east of the Pearl were Democratic. The southern, sugar-producing section of Louisiana was Whig, the northern farming counties, Democratic. In the first states the determining issue was the national bank; in the last, the tariff.

In general the Whig party in the South was the party of wealth and aristocracy; the Democratic strength except in the Carolinas was among the poor classes. The fight for constitutional reform was in every case a fight of the common man who had remained common because of his poverty against the man who had taken on aristocracy because of his wealth. In the Atlantic states, where the struggle was most bitter, the east was a region of planters whose aristocracy quite often outlived the income on which it was based; the west was a region of farmers whose poverty prevented them neither from hoping nor complaining. In every case, except North Carolina, it was a struggle between a resisting Whig east and an attacking Democratic west.

In Virginia, reform preceded party formation. Here by 1829 the western people had reached such a condition of vocal indignation that the east was compelled to choose between concession and revolution. The legislature, accordingly, called a convention which should meet in October. Any rapture the west may have felt over this attainment was considerably modified by the legislative stipulation that the convention be composed of equal delegations from the senatorial districts, which would place the east in control and make all hope of

reform depend on an eastern magnanimity to which Virginia politics had hitherto been a stranger. The constitutional convention was a distinguished body, including in its membership two ex-presidents and the chief justice of the United States, four ex-governors, seven United States senators, and fifteen representatives, past, present, and prospective. James Monroe was president of the convention; James Madison, chairman of the executive committee; and John Marshall, of the judicial committee. The sessions continued until January 15 and resulted in a new constitution which bitterly disappointed the hopes of the reformers. Both houses of the legislature were arbitrarily apportioned in such a way as to leave the east in control. The property qualification for voting was lessened but not removed, and the legislature retained the power of appointing executive and judicial officials. The western people of Virginia, exasperated over the mouse of reform born of the laboring mountain of agitation, strenuously opposed the adoption of the constitution and after their failure renewed their protest.

In North Carolina the western people finally made an impress on the obdurate legislature by taking (1833) a plebiscite of the west which resulted in a practically unanimous vote for revision of the constitution. The legislature obligingly called a convention but specified that the delegates thereto should be chosen on the county unit plan and that any new constitution must apportion senators on the basis of taxes and representatives according to federal numbers. Thus carefully circumscribed, the convention met in 1835 and with Nathaniel Macon as its chairman made a constitution which limited the power of the legislature, made the governor elective, and apportioned the legislature according to specifica-

tion. Slight as these changes were, they were distasteful to the east and were adopted by a vote strictly sectional.

In Maryland the western people, unsatisfied by meager concessions previously made, held a convention in Baltimore (1836) which urged a reform of representation, abolition of the electoral college for senators, and the popular election of governor. To forestall this movement the legislature in 1837 made certain amendments. The electoral college was abolished and senators were to be chosen one from each county by popular vote. The lower house was to be reapportioned every ten years on the basis of federal numbers, and the governors were to be chosen by popular vote in rotation from an eastern, middle, and western district. In conservative Maryland these reforms were denominated the "revolution of 1837."

In four of the newer states of the South the thirties saw reforms in government. In 1832 a new constitution in Mississippi abolished all property qualifications for office-holding and made practically all state executive and judicial officials elective. The Tennessee constitution of 1835 abolished property qualifications for the legislature and in Georgia in the same year a legislative amendment accomplished the same object. Missouri in 1829 made judges elective.

In the Atlantic states, except for the action of Delaware (1831) in abolishing property qualifications for voting and for membership in the lower house, the reforms, such as they were, were all in the nature of concessions which interest, not conviction, forced the east to make. In the newer states the reforms represented an increase of democracy. The Democratic party in the southwest identified itself with reform. In the two Whig states of Kentucky and Louisiana reform had to wait

another decade. Arkansas, making its first constitution in 1836, showed the result of the democratic movement by omitting all property qualifications for voting and office-holding and by making all state officials elective except the superior judges.



## The Jacksonian Migration

The stream of westward migration, which had run so violent a course in the years preceding the panic of 1819, continued to flow with steady, although diminished, volume throughout the twenties. The stationary population of Maryland and Virginia during the decade shows the source of the movement; the growth of the newer states of the South reveals its destination. The two Carolinas lost little by emigration and the rate of population growth was above normal in both states.

In the newer states of the South there were few Indian cessions in the twenties, in contrast to the rape of land in the decade before. West of the Mississippi the land had already been cleared of Indian title in both states and territory; east of the Mississippi there were only minor cessions made. Nowhere in the South did the decade witness such plundering as that of Ft. Jackson, such grand larceny as the Jackson Purchase. Consequently, the immigration of the twenties went for the most part into communities already in the making. For the Southwest it was a ten year period of consolidating the frontier rather than of advancing it. In Kentucky and Tennessee, the steady inflow of people filled the Jackson Purchase and advanced settlement to the banks of the Mississippi. In Georgia the westward-moving frontier reached the Flint and looked hungrily across to the lands beyond where the Creeks, with the support of President Adams, were making their last stand on Georgia soil.

Nearly half the land sold in the South by the United States during the twenties was sold in Alabama. The Natchez Trace and the southern spur of the Cumberland Road delivered the settlers to the Tennessee Valley; the Federal Road took them to the valleys of the Alabama and the Warrior. Crossing into Mississippi the migration was reduced to a mere trickle, for the Natchez district was now filled up, the piney woods east of the Pearl was a region to avoid, and there was but one new tract of land cleared of the Indians. The migration to Louisiana was negligible through the twenties, and the only new settlers Arkansas received were those who drifted down through the Ozarks into the White River Valley. Such migration as Missouri received went into the valleys of the Missouri and the Mississippi.

In the next decade, 1830-40, the stream of migration after ten years of gentle meandering swelled suddenly into flood. Sectionalism, the general feeling of unrest accompanying the rise of democracy, and the decreasing fertility of the soil pushed thousands out of the Atlantic states toward the west. The recovery of cotton prices helped lure the movement into the Southwest where great tracts of new land made available by removal of the Indians were placed on sale by the United States. The beginning of the migration, however, preceded Indian removal and aided in bringing it about.


After forty years of land cessions, the Indians of the South still retained in 1830 some twenty-five million acres of land. It lay in two tracts, roughly equal. The eastern tract lay chiefly in northern Georgia and eastern Alabama; the western, in eastern and northern Mississippi. The two tracts were separated and surrounded by avid, encroaching whites. Contact with the white man had brought to the Indians both weal and woe.

They had welcomed the vices of the white man with insistent hospitality. Although both federal and state laws forbade the sale of liquor, prohibition was impossible to enforce and drunkenness among the Indians had become almost a major industry. They were scourged by the white man's diseases such as smallpox and cholera, and by syphilis whose origin is in dispute. But the worst result of federal management was to break their spirits, to rob them of independence and initiative, and to render them lazy and shiftless in the terrible lethargy of those who have no ambition and no hope. Each tribe contained chiefs who were in the pay of the United States and whose influence over their red brethren was always for sale. Each tribe was split into factions whose persistent quarrellings and bickerings made it all but impossible for the tribe to plan with wisdom or act with resolution. But the Indian ledger was not wholly in red. They had learned from the white man the utility of many a creature comfort. They were better housed than ever before, living in log cabins and frame houses and occasionally even in brick dwellings. They were better fed, for the federal government had striven successfully, and not altogether unselfishly, to change them from hunters to farmers. They raised the same crops as the white men and had a considerable number of horses and cattle. They were better clothed, supplied with materials by the traders or producing homespun among themselves. There were missionary schools among them subsidized by the United States, and although the students were few, they were often the children of chiefs. Their intertribal wars were over and they lived in peace, subject only to political dissensions within and altercations with the constantly encroaching white men without. Finally, each tribe received from the United States — in return

for value received – an annuity of very respectable proportions. This, unfortunately, had a habit of stopping in the pockets of chiefs friendly to the United States.

The Southern Indian tribe which had made the most appreciable progress toward civilization was the Cherokee. One of their number, Sequoya, had invented a phonetic alphabet for them, and the Cherokee language became a written language. Their rising culture found expression in the establishment of a newspaper, *The Cherokee Phoenix*. Realizing the inadequacy of tribal organization, they had (1827) adopted a written constitution and established a republican form of government, with John Ross as president. It was this action that led directly to the ruin of the Cherokee and, indirectly, of the other Southern tribes. For Georgia was outraged by the erection of a state within her limits and in 1829 extended her own laws over the Cherokee, organized new counties to include their land, and forbade the Indians to hold further elections or to make new laws. It may be that the natural indignation felt by the patriotic Georgians over the Cherokee violation of the United States constitution was not altogether unconnected with the discovery of gold in the Cherokee hills. At any rate, her action was contagious and the next year Alabama and Mississippi took similar action.

What these states wanted the Indians to do was to move west of the Mississippi. Removal had been a declared policy of the executive department of the United States since the purchase of Louisiana, and was, in fact, implied in the Georgia Compact of the year before. Since that time the government had pursued the contradictory policy of attaching the Indian to his home and of persuading him to leave it. As the Indian became more localized through agriculture he became progressively more opposed to removal and, except for a disgruntled





faction among the Cherokee, the tribes had refused to go. Calhoun, as Monroe's secretary of war, had given prominence to the removal project, but the New England conscience of President Adams had balked at the idea of removal either through force or chicanery. Since removal was possible in no other way, the project awaited the administration of Jackson. Then in 1830 congress officially adopted the removal policy and empowered the president to carry it out by treaty. Jackson promptly sent commissioners south who at various times and places and by various methods made treaties with the four reluctant and helpless tribes, exchanging their land in the east for new homes in the west.

The Choctaw were the first to go. They were, in general, opposed to removal, but some of the chiefs were bribed or intimidated into a cession of their remaining lands in 1830, and in the two years following the tribe moved to its new home. The Creeks were the next. They were as opposed to removal as were the Choctaw, but they had to choose between removal and spoliation since the United States refused to protect them against state laws. After a brief resistance, federal troops forcibly removed them in 1836. The Chickasaw sold their land to the United States and after a five year delay bought new lands from the Choctaw in the west. In 1835 a "treaty" of cession was made by a few hundred Cherokee — out of a population of seventeen thousand, ratified by a senate well aware of the fraud involved, and under it, after exhausting every resource of delay and evasion, the Cherokee were finally removed by force. Remnants of each of these tribes remained in their old homes, and the Florida Seminole took refuge in swamps and forests whence neither the power nor deceit of the United States was able to evict them.

The removal of the Indians from the South was a

lurid episode, full of cruelty, hypocrisy, and broken faith on one side, and of suffering and misery on the other. Its chief historical significance, however, lies not in its dramatic features but in the prosaic fact that it made available some twenty-five million acres of land for white settlement. The hungering and thirsting of the white man for Indian land was perhaps the chief force in driving the government to action; as a matter of fact, a considerable portion of the land had been occupied, informally but effectively, by squatters years before the Indians left.

The rush of settlers was first directed to Mississippi where the most fertile lands yet unsettled in the South were now offered for sale in the valleys of the Yazoo and Tombigbee. The population of the state tripled in the decade. Numerous towns sprang up in the hill country of the north such as Corinth in the Tennessee Valley, Holly Springs which had its beginnings as a camping ground for travellers down the Chickasaw Road from Memphis, and Columbus which served as the export center of the upper Tombigbee Valley. In Alabama the immigration first turned to the black belt in tardy, but thorough, appreciation of this unique soil. The country east of the Coosa, where most of the Creek cession lay, was hilly and, except for the river valleys, infertile. Population spread over it thinly, giving evidence of its presence by the founding of Guntersville, Talladega, Opelika, Tuskegee, and dozens of other towns most of which merely continued the existence of Indian villages on whose abandoned sites they were located.

The migration once under way did not confine itself to the lands recently ceded but jumped the Mississippi and penetrated the long over-looked portions of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. Missouri and Arkansas



tripled in population during the decade; Louisiana experienced the comparatively normal increase of seventy-five per cent. In Missouri the lands most in demand were those around Palmyra in the northeast and Springfield in the southwest. The land sales at the latter place indicate that settlement was finally going into the Ozarks. In Arkansas new regions were settled on the Red river in the southwest and on the headwaters of the White in the northwest. The increased population of Arkansas raised the territory to statehood in 1836 in time to cast its first electoral vote for the Democratic ticket, thereby establishing a precedent from which it has steadfastly refused to depart. Making its constitution in the high tide of the democratic movement, Arkansas discarded practically all the restrictive clauses which had characterized earlier state constitutions in the South. All county and state officials were made elective except the judges. There were no property qualifications for voting or office-holding, and the legislature was apportioned on the basis of free white males.

In Tennessee, North Carolina, and Georgia, the land ceded by the Indians became the property of the states and was sold by them. In northern Georgia the coming of the farmer was accompanied by a gold rush to the newly discovered mines. Rossville (Chattanooga), Rome, Cartersville, and Marthasville (Atlanta) were founded during the decade. In western Georgia, Columbus on the Chattahoochee developed from a hamlet to a town on the lands ceded by the Creeks in 1826.

The Jacksonian migration was stopped by the panic of 1837, but the effects of the migration continued for many years. The most visible effect was the tremendous shifting of people, both white and black, from the older states to the new. During the decade of the thirties the

population of the South increased by two and one-half millions; all but seventy-five thousand of this increase was in the new states, including Georgia. Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas increased but two per cent; the newer states, over one hundred per cent. At the same time, while the slave population of the newer states increased over half a million, that of the older group actually decreased. It is evident that the settlers for the southwest during the Jacksonian migration were supplied by the southeast, and that there was no appreciable migration from the north. It is evident, too, or at least apparent, that the migration was not limited to the poor but contained an appreciable percentage of plantation owners who brought their slaves with them to their new homes.

The migration in the South, as in the North, meant a demand for currency and credit and led to the birth of mushroom banks by the score. There was a great increase in the production of cotton, a rapid multiplying of wealth, an increase in state revenues, and a consequent squandering of public money on enterprises of dubious economic merit. For all this sowing to the wind there was to be an abundant reaping of whirlwind in the next decade.

The migration steadied the older South and unbalanced the new. Sobered by the loss of their people to the west, the Atlantic states put their house in order by reforming their agriculture, bettering their transportation, mending their outworn constitutions. The west became a ferment wherein the people were impatient of restraints and prohibitions, both religious and legal. It was flush times in the southwest. Money was plentiful, morality and law rested but lightly on the people, the spirit of democracy was stirring mightily in the land,

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and men and women busied themselves with walking in the ways of their hearts and in the sight of their eyes. The panic of 1837 quickly brought them into judgment.



## Trade and Transportation

The great shifting of *lares et penates* which made up the Jacksonian migration brought many changes in the South, none of which was more marked than the improvement of transportation facilities. The combination of newly settled communities seeking access to markets, of old markets seeking new trade, and of state governments with a plethora of revenues, brought about in the thirties an energetic effort for the improvement of rivers, the cutting of canals, the building of roads, and even a beginning of railroads.

Road building was largely confined to the upper South where an abundance of surface stone made it easy to construct the macadamized roads demanded by a diversified agriculture. Ordinarily these macadamized roads were built by private companies incorporated by special acts of the legislature and compensating themselves for the expense of construction and repair by tolls collected at toll gates on the road. Kentucky began the investment of state funds in the stock of road companies in 1832 when, for reasons political as well as economic, she came to the aid of the Maysville and Lexington Turnpike. By the time the constitution of 1850 called a halt to state aid, Kentucky had over 600 miles of macadamized roads constituting probably the best road system in the South. Tennessee, Virginia, and South Carolina, like Kentucky, took stock in road companies, and South Carolina built at state expense a highway from Charleston to Columbia. The best roads outside

Kentucky were those of the Nashville region of Tennessee and the valley of Virginia, both of which were regions of abundant limestone.

Prior to 1825 canal building in the South had been limited to the Dismal Swamp, and the Santee. Both were chartered in 1790, the former for the purpose of securing swamp timber and the latter of bringing food supplies to Charleston from the interior. The Santee Canal was finished in 1800, the Dismal Swamp in 1822. Neither had been successful enough to arouse enthusiasm; the Santee was abandoned in 1858.

Inspiration for further canal building in the South was the result of the construction of the Erie Canal in New York. During its construction, or shortly after its completion, boards of internal improvements were organized, or reorganized, in every Southern state. The two most ambitious canal projects were the Chesapeake and Ohio and James river and Kanawha. Both were old projects chartered in 1785 and both were sponsored by George Washington. Both had languished until envy of the Erie Canal stirred Baltimore and Richmond to rivalry for the rapidly increasing trade of the west. The reorganized Chesapeake and Ohio was chartered by Virginia in 1824 and by Maryland a year later. It was designed to follow the courses of the Potomac and Youghiogeny from Washington to Pittsburgh with a lateral canal from the lower Potomac to Baltimore. The United States, Maryland, Alexandria, Washington, and private individuals invested in its stock and construction was initiated by President Adams July 4, 1828. But the canal failed both in its destination and its purpose. Due to difficulties of financing even more than of construction, it had only reached Cumberland by 1850. There it stopped, for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad paral-

leling its course had already passed and superseded it. The canal was 185 miles long and cost \$11,000,000 to construct. The reorganized James river and Kanawha was chartered by Virginia in 1835 and began construction the next year. It reached Lynchburg in 1840 when the hard times following the panic practically forced it to stop. Like the Chesapeake and Ohio it was robbed of its potential utility by a parallel railroad.

Such other canals as were built during the "boom" times of the thirties are to be viewed as accessories to rivers rather than as substitutes for them. The Ogeechee Canal from Savannah to the Ogeechee was finished in 1831 in a condition of insolvency from which it never recovered. The opening in 1831 of the Louisville and Portland around the "falls" of the Ohio reflected the increased traffic conditions on that river, while the building of the Muscle Shoals Canal in northern Alabama was an attempt to aid that long-suffering and now rapidly developing region in gaining easier access to New Orleans. The latter canal was built by Alabama with the proceeds of 400,000 acres of relinquished land granted her by the United States for the purpose. Unfortunately it was so constructed that boats could enter it only at a high level of water and it was abandoned in 1837, one year after completion. As a matter of fact it was only completed for fourteen miles around one of the three shoals of the series. South Carolina built at state expense an elaborate system of canals near Columbia in an effort, more or less successful, to utilize the Santee system, while North Carolina subsidized private companies to open the Cape Fear for navigation to Fayetteville and the Roanoke to the Virginia line. Georgia began making appropriations for river improvement in 1817 and eventually made all her rivers

navigable to the fall line. Alabama dissipated \$135,000 in languid attempts to improve the Coosa, Tombigbee, Black Warrior, and Conecuh before the panic of 1837 halted her prodigality. In Kentucky, river improvement was more a matter of political calisthenics than anything else until the filling up of western Kentucky forced appropriations for the Green and Barren.

During the boom times no such huge sums were spent for internal improvements in the South as in the North. Partly this was due to the number of navigable rivers in the South, partly it was due to lack of federal aid. The abortive Muscle Shoals Canal was the only canal to receive such assistance. Mobile harbor was improved, the "rafts" were removed from the Red river, and a military road was marked from Memphis to Little Rock. The strict construction theories which Southern leaders professed to entertain made them chary of accepting government aids. Perhaps the chief reason Southern promoters and politicians were able to restrain their enthusiasm for waterways was that they were developing a mania for railroads.

The first two railroads in the South originated in the desire of Baltimore and Charleston to revive their failing trade by tapping the western trade. As long as trade between east and west was carried on wagons, the Cumberland Road had given Baltimore practically a monopoly of it. But the Erie Canal and the Pennsylvania system were raising rivals in New York and Philadelphia to the north while the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal seemed likely to build up Washington to the south, since the projected lateral canal to Baltimore proved impracticable. As a measure of self-defense citizens of Baltimore organized the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company to build to some point on the Ohio, and so



retain for Baltimore the trade now in danger of being detracted by the canals. On July 4, 1828, the venerable Charles Carroll of Carrollton, the only surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence, laid the corner stone of the road at Baltimore. Maryland and Baltimore subscribed to most of the stock, and in May, 1830, the first twelve miles were open to traffic. In 1834 it reached Harper's Ferry where it was overtaken by the panic of 1837.

The Charleston and Hamburg Railroad had in the beginning no more vaulting ambition than to secure for Charleston the Savannah river trade and to make her the center of wholesale trade for the interior. The retail trade of the interior, once possessed by Charleston, had passed to the fall line towns, Cheraw, Camden, Columbia and Hamburg, with the result that business was at a standstill, property values rapidly falling, and the population gradually dwindling. The railroad was chartered in January, 1828, under the name of the South Carolina Canal and Railway Company, and construction begun early in 1831. The railroad was completed to Hamburg on the Savannah in September, 1833, at the cost of \$900,000, most of which was subscribed by the people of Charleston. An attempt to secure a subscription from the United States called forth such a storm of criticism that it was hastily abandoned. The 136 miles of the Charleston and Hamburg was at that time the longest railroad in the world. A branch line from the main road was completed to Columbia in 1840 while an extension to Camden had to await the passing of the panic years. The panic also put an end to the project of tapping the Ohio river trade by a road from Columbia through Saluda Gap, along the French Broad, through Cumberland Gap and Kentucky to Cin-

cinnati and Louisville. This Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston had secured its charters in the four states it proposed to traverse, had made its survey, and had pledged its subscriptions when a combination of hard times and the death of its president, R. Y. Hayne, destroyed the fairest prospect that ante-bellum Charleston ever had to gain metropolitan glories.

Aroused by the energetic action of Baltimore and Charleston, other South Atlantic cities bestirred themselves to revive their flagging trade by means of railroads to the interior. In Virginia, Richmond sought to gain connection with the Potomac to the north and the Roanoke to the south; the latter connection was secured by 1838 but the northern line had only reached Fredericksburg when it was overwhelmed by the panic. Even Norfolk was infected with the railroad fever and secured a line to the Roanoke by 1837. The two Virginia roads met at Weldon, North Carolina, from which point a railroad was built, 1836-1840, to Wilmington, thus providing a "through" line from that city on the lower coast of North Carolina to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock. These, it may be noted, were tidewater railroads, and the two states subscribed liberally to their stock. Virginia also took stock in a line from Winchester to Harper's Ferry, which gave the upper valley a long-deferred outlet over the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. In North Carolina a line from Weldon running west to Raleigh was left suspended in the air at that place by the panic, with faint hopes of sometimes going on to Columbia.

In December, 1833, the Georgia legislature chartered three railroads: the Georgia to run westward from Augusta through Athens to the Tennessee river, the Central of Georgia from Savannah to Macon, and the Monroe

from Macon to Forsyth. The Central of Georgia was Savannah's reply to the Charleston and Hamburg. Savannah, seeing her river trade transferred to Charleston and realizing the failure of the Ogeechee Canal, sponsored the railroad as a method of getting into the interior. The Monroe road and the Georgia road, on the other hand, were attempts of the interior to find a market, the one with Savannah and the other with her rival. Hampered, but not stopped by the panic, the Savannah road reached its destination in Macon in 1843. Both the Monroe and the Georgia, however, changed their aim while in full flight and both built into Atlanta, reaching that infant city in 1845 and 1846 respectively. The reason for the change of goal on the part of these two roads was that in 1836 the Georgia legislature had chartered the Western and Atlantic, a state-owned road, to run from some point on the Chattahoochee to Ross's Landing on the Tennessee. The "point on the Chattahoochee" was fixed at a place first called Terminus, later Marthasville, and finally Atlanta; Ross's Landing was later renamed Chattanooga. The panic of 1837 and the difficulty of transporting road material until the Augusta and Macon roads were completed limited construction to grading until the late forties.

In the newer states of the South, as in the Atlantic states, railroads represented the efforts of ambitious cities to increase their trade. The chief sponsors were Natchez, Vicksburg, Memphis, and Mobile, each of which had been compelled to witness the phenomenal growth of New Orleans while her own development remained purely prospective. Now in the railroad they saw a means of doing for themselves what the Mississippi had done for New Orleans.

As a matter of fact, however, the first railroad built

in the Southwest was built to aid New Orleans rather than her rival. The Tuscumbia and Decatur built around Muscle Shoals, 1831-1834, paralleled the canal and continued useful after the canal was abandoned. Both Mobile and Memphis proceeded to make plans for railroads to connect with the Tuscumbia and Decatur and convert to themselves the trade of the Tennessee Valley. In 1834 the Tennessee legislature chartered the Mississippi and Atlantic Railroad to run from Memphis to Tuscumbia, utilize the Tuscumbia road to Decatur, and from Decatur proceed east till it met the Georgia road. After the Georgia legislature chartered the Western and Atlantic to Chattanooga, that city became the goal of the Memphis road. But its only construction was grading the forty miles between Memphis and La Grange when the panic stopped it. Mobile interests secured from the Alabama legislature a charter for a road from Selma to Gunter's Landing on the Tennessee but the panic preceded and prevented construction. To offset these attempts to confiscate her valley trade, New Orleans planned a road to Nashville but it too fell a victim to the panic. Neither Memphis nor Mobile made any headway, during the boom times, in railroad building, but the two pigmy rivals of New Orleans - Natchez and Vicksburg - made at least a beginning. Before the paralysis of the panic crept over the South, twenty-five miles of road were built from Vicksburg toward Jackson where a connection was planned with a road to Mobile. Natchez built valorously twenty-five miles up the old Natchez Trace toward Canton in the interior.

In Kentucky the only road built was the Lexington and Ohio which was ambitious to reach Louisville, but in 1835 came to a halt in Frankfort. Florida by 1840 had

three railroads of which the most important was the Tallahassee opened to St. Marks in 1837. In Louisiana there were a number of roads built around New Orleans, of which the one to Lake Pontchartrain was probably the most useful. The panic of 1837 not only arrested the construction of roads in the South, but also suspended many a project which was to materialize when prosperity returned. The Memphis-Charleston connection was one of these. The Vicksburg-Savannah was another. One of the most ambitious was a project for a valley road connecting Richmond with Chattanooga and Atlanta. All these projects originated in the thirties, succumbed to the panic, and were later brought to fruition.



## A Decade of Discontent

The period 1830-1837 had been a time of prosperity for the South, particularly for the cotton kingdom. Notwithstanding the enormous increase in cotton production, its price remained high enough for profit in the new lands, and whatever distress manifested itself in the less fertile eastern states could generally be appeased with the panacea of migration to the west. It had been a period, also, of relative peace and quiet in which nullification, Indian removal, and sectional conflicts took their places as mere eddies in the huge current of content. These halcyon days came to an abrupt end with the panic of 1837.

As far as the South was concerned the panic was a species of foreign manufactured goods imported into the United States. Hard times in England made it necessary for English banks to withdraw from their correspondent banks in New Orleans the funds ordinarily used for marketing the cotton crop. The failure of the New Orleans banks dragged down the feebly constructed banking systems of Louisiana and Mississippi, and the epidemic of failures ran through the South. The scores of new banks in the South created during the migration failed when the declining price of farm products made it impossible for the farmers to repay their loans. After the fall of the National Bank had removed all effective restraint on note issues, the Southwest, like the Northwest, had indulged in an orgy of wildcat banking in which the quantity of bank notes

issued had quite generally no discoverable relation to the reserves. Jackson's specie circular had the same effect on bank credit in the South as in other sections, while the withdrawal of public funds from the fifteen "pet banks" to meet the installments of surplus distribution to the states facilitated the descent into ruin. Thanks to better banking regulations and to a banking practice based on reality rather than hope, the Atlantic states fared much better than did the newer states. The Virginia and South Carolina banks, particularly, weathered the panic without losses.

As hard times made their appearance in the wake of the panic, taxes ceased to be paid, public revenues dwindled and disappeared, and the credit of the states themselves was shaken. Delaware, Georgia, and North Carolina had no public debt, but the other Southern states were staggering under a burden of obligations which aggregated \$75,000,000. These debts had been accumulated by the lending of state credit to banks, and by works of internal improvement such as roads, canals, and railroads. The following table shows the debts of the Southern states in 1838, and the way they were incurred:<sup>41</sup>

STATES	BANKS	CANALS	RAILROADS	ROADS	MISC.	TOTAL
Alabama	7,800,000		3,000,000			10,800,000
Arkansas	3,000,000					3,000,000
Kentucky	2,000,000	2,619,000	350,000	2,400,000		7,369,000
Louisiana	22,950,000	50,000	50,000		235,000	23,285,000
Maryland		5,700,000	5,500,000		292,980	11,492,980
Mississippi	7,000,000					7,000,000
Missouri	2,500,000					2,500,000
So. Carolina		1,550,000	2,000,000		2,203,770	5,753,770
Tennessee	3,000,000	300,000	3,730,000	118,166		7,148,166
Virginia		3,835,350	2,128,900	354,800	343,139	6,662,189

Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and South Carolina each had a state bank owned, financed, and managed

<sup>41</sup> E. L. Bogart, *Economic History of the United States*, 214.



by the state; the other states of the South had taken stock in private banks, raising the money by the sale of state bonds. The failure of many of these banks in the panic period deprived the state treasuries of the dividends on which they relied to meet the bond interest. Louisiana and Maryland defaulted on their payments and Mississippi avoided a default by the novel device of repudiation. When Florida became a state in 1845 it repudiated bonds, to the amount of \$3,000,000, which it had issued to its Union Bank.<sup>42</sup>

Bank failures in the South increased from 1837 to 1841, the greatest number coming in the latter year. The South yielded to the panic slowly, due to the fact that cotton prices kept up for several years. There was a sudden drop in 1837 from fifteen cents to ten, followed by a quick recovery, and then a gradual decline to six cents in 1843, the lowest price in ante-bellum history. At that price its production was unprofitable even on the most fertile land, and the cotton growers faced ruin. During the decade 1837-1847 they were the most discontented class in the United States.

The farmers of the upper South suffered less than those of the lower South in the panic for the double reason that they had not been so prosperous in the boom times and that they had a more diversified agriculture. Tobacco had been struggling for existence for a generation.<sup>43</sup> Its exportation had been hurt by the trade restriction of the Napoleonic period and had practically ceased during the War of 1812. At this time tidewater Virginia and Maryland ceased to be tobacco-growing communities. After the war the industry enjoyed a few

<sup>42</sup> R. C. McGrane, "Some Aspects of American State Debts in the Forties," in *American Historical Review*, vol. XXXVIII, 673-687.

<sup>43</sup> Gray and Thompson, *History of Agriculture in the Southern States to 1860*, vol. II, chapter xxxii.

years of prosperity until the panic of 1819 started it on a decline from which it began to recover only in 1834. The panic of 1837 again plunged it into the abyss which tobacco growers had come to think was its normal condition. High duties in England, a tobacco monopoly in France, and the competition of tobacco grown in Germany, Austria, France, and Russia discouraged importation and the development of domestic manufactures in Lynchburg, Petersburg, and Richmond was not rapid enough to consume the excess crop. From 1819 to 1834 the farmer sold his tobacco for less than four cents a pound.

By 1837 tobacco production in the east had become concentrated in a tier of Piedmont counties extending southwest from Chesapeake Bay in Maryland to the vicinity of Raleigh in North Carolina. It had disappeared from Georgia and South Carolina, from the tidewater of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, and from the valley. Its abandonment in the tidewater had been the result of low prices, soil exhaustion, and the increased cost of labor due to the demand of the cotton kingdom for slaves. The domestic slave trade grew not only because of the demand for slaves in the cotton fields but also because the tidewater planter could find no adequate substitute for tobacco on which to employ his labor supply. In 1837 the discontent of the old tobacco region of the tidewater was less poignant than that of the cotton kingdom only because it had become a routine.

In the newer tobacco states the area of production had expanded as it had contracted in the old. From the old production districts of middle Tennessee and central Kentucky tobacco had expanded in western Kentucky, into the Missouri Valley of Missouri and into southeastern Ohio. The Ohio tobacco was marketed through

Baltimore, but that of the other sections was shipped to New Orleans after being collected at Louisville, Hopkinsville, and Henderson in Kentucky, Clarksville in Tennessee, and St. Louis in Missouri. In 1837 Virginia was the leading tobacco growing state, followed in order by Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, North Carolina, Missouri, and Ohio.

In the newer states tobacco had its place as one element of general farming, and as its price fell, the farmer tended more and more to stress other farm features. Hemp largely displaced tobacco as a staple in central Kentucky and middle Tennessee from 1819 to 1834. It was protected from foreign competition by the tariff, and from domestic competition by the superior fertility of these regions. Practically the entire production was sold to the cotton states in the form of cordage and cloth for baling. The bluegrass regions also offset the decline in tobacco prices by the raising of live stock which they drove overland or shipped down the Mississippi to the lower South. Missouri had almost a monopoly of the mule trade, Kentucky of the trade in "saddle" horses. From Kentucky every year great droves of cattle and hogs were driven South, either by the old Wilderness Road through Cumberland Gap or over the Louisville-Nashville Pike. The trade flourished because the lower South had so concentrated on growing cotton that it produced neither its work animals nor its food.

But the cotton grower had no substitute to which he could turn when the price of cotton fell. As a matter of fact, his discontent was due not merely to low prices but also to the cost of marketing. The planter, as a rule, sent his cotton directly to a factor in the port city of his neighborhood or to his local agent; the farmer almost invariably sold to the local merchant in payment for

merchandise, quite commonly already consumed. In either case the proceeds came back from the factors in the form of drafts on New York or London. The exporting factors were generally agents for Northern or English firms. Their drafts drawn for sixty or ninety days could be turned into ready money by the cotton grower only by discounting them at his local bank, which in turn forwarded them to New York for collection or sale. The rate of discount would depend not only on the time element but also on the rate of exchange in New York. The planter lost the amount of the discount, and the sum he received for his crop was always considerably less than the amount for which he sold it.<sup>44</sup> He was to an extent dependent on New York for his income and in a period of economic distress he found the dependence irksome.

There were other methods by which the profits from the cotton crop found their way into Northern pockets. Since two-thirds of the cotton crop went to England, the freight charges on its transportation across the sea amounted to a large sum. Although the river boats of the South were generally Southern owned and Southern built, the South had never engaged in the building or operating of ocean-going ships, principally because capital could be more profitably employed in agriculture. Most of the cotton sold was carried on coastwise ships to New York, and the great part of it transshipped from that place to England. All the coastwise ships and most of the ocean-going shipping was Northern owned and consequently the freight charges went into Northern pockets. In 1843 this amounted to nearly a million dollars. In addition the insurance costs while the cotton was in transit were generally paid to Northern firms.

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<sup>44</sup> A. H. Stone, "The Cotton Factorage System of the Southern States," in *American Historical Review*, vol. XX, 557.

Not only did the cotton growers pay "tribute" to the North through their exports, but through their imports as well. The imports into the South came through Northern ports; the exports of the South amounted to two-thirds the total of the United States but her *direct* imports were less than one-tenth. The freight charges to New York and Boston, the tariff duties, and the cost of transportation on coastwise vessels to the South all added to the cost of merchandise. There is no method of determining what proportion of the goods imported into the North was for Southern consumption; the Southern estimate of the whole was probably too high. Nor is it possible to estimate what proportion of the manufactured articles used in the South was made in the North.

In the hard times of the forties, Southern economists were prone to find the explanation for their distress in the "tribute" paid to the North. They came to believe that the economic progress of the North depended on this "tribute," and epitomized their opinion in the phrase "Southern wealth and Northern profits." They pictured the South as a downtrodden region whose huge profits had a habit of slipping through its fingers and flowing North through consumption of Northern goods, tariffs, costs of cotton marketing, and the unequal operation of the federal government. An orator at Tuscaloosa in 1851 delivered his soul as follows:

At present the North fattens and grows rich upon the South. We purchase all our luxuries and necessities from the North. . . With us, every branch and pursuit in life, every trade, profession, and occupation is dependent upon the North; for instance, the Northerners abuse and denounce slavery and slaveholders, yet our slaves are clothed with Northern manufactured goods, have Northern hats and shoes, work with Northern hoes, ploughs, and other implements, are chastised with a Northern made instrument, are working for Northern more than Southern profit. The slaveholder dresses in Northern goods,

rides in a Northern saddle, . . . sports his Northern carriage, patronizes Northern newspapers, drinks Northern liquors, reads Northern books, spends his money at Northern watering-places. . . The aggressive acts upon his rights and his property arouse his resentment and on Northern paper, with a Northern pen, with Northern ink he resolves and re-resolves in regard to his rights! In Northern vessels his products are carried to market, his cotton is ginned with Northern gins, his sugar is crushed and preserved by Northern machinery; his rivers are navigated by Northern steamboats, his mails are carried in Northern stages, his negroes are fed with Northern bacon, beef, flour, and corn; his land is cleared with a Northern axe, and a Yankee clock sits upon his mantelpiece; his floor is swept with a Northern broom, and is covered with a Northern carpet; and his wife dresses herself in a Northern looking-glass; . . . his son is educated at a Northern college, his daughter receives the finishing polish at a Northern seminary; his doctor graduates at a Northern medical college, his schools are supplied with Northern teachers, and he is furnished with Northern inventions and notions.<sup>45</sup>

By the phrase "operation of the federal government" the South meant bounties to New England fisheries, internal improvements in the North such as harbors, roads, canals, and public buildings, tariff duties, and deposits of government funds. The total amount thus spent the Southern people estimated at \$232,000,000 a year.<sup>46</sup>

Bounties to fisheries .....	\$ 1,500,000
Customs disbursed at North.....	40,000,000
Profits of manufacturers .....	30,000,000
Profits of importers .....	16,000,000
Profits of shipping .....	40,000,000
Profits of teachers and others .....	5,000,000
Profits on travellers .....	60,000,000
Profits of commissions .....	10,000,000
Capital from South .....	30,000,000

<sup>45</sup> R. R. Russell, *Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism*, pt. 1, 48.

<sup>46</sup> T. P. Kettell, *Southern Wealth and Northern Profits*, 127.

The irritation felt by the Southern leaders over the "tribute" paid to the North was intensified by the growth of the abolition movement there. Prior to 1831 the South had shown tolerance and even sympathy for the conservative emancipation program put forth by such men as Benjamin Lundy and J. G. Birney and to the project for colonizing Liberia. But with the founding of the *Liberator* by William Lloyd Garrison the abolitionists seemed less concerned with helping the slaves than with harming their masters. The Garrison editorial which declared "We do not acknowledge them to be within the pale of Christianity, of Republicanism or humanity" certainly did little to promote intersectional good-will and coöperation. The Southern leaders attempted vainly to debar incendiary literature from the mails and succeeded in 1836 in obtaining a rule by congress against the further reception by that body of petitions against slavery. Ordinarily Southern men treated the abolition movement with contempt, realizing that the great mass of Northern people were either hostile or indifferent toward it. But in the irritable years following the panic, the movement appeared more portentous. The ministrations of the "Underground Railway" over which slaves were encouraged to make one-way trips to the North were also exasperating, although the total number of fugitives was small, and practically all from the tobacco states. The South was disposed to believe that the Turner rebellion in Virginia in 1831 was a result of the abolition crusade. The consequence was that the Southern states generally restricted the privileges of free negroes and made more stringent regulations for the slaves.

Abolition affected church unity. In 1845 as a result of the action of the general conference in suspending

Bishop Andrew because he held slaves, the Methodist Episcopal Church divided and the M.E. Church, South, was formed. In the same year the Baptist Church split into a Northern and Southern wing. That the division was popular in the South is shown by the fact that each of these two new denominations doubled its membership in the next fifteen years.

It was to be expected, of course, that out of this welter of discontent there should emerge a host of remedies and panaceas for Southern ills. Among the proposed panaceas of an economic nature, the most prominent were those of direct trade with Europe, of manufacturing, and of agricultural reform. Direct trade with Europe meant the building of ships in the South to ply between Southern and European ports. The arguments in its favor were that it would not only take exports directly to Europe from the South but it would also bring in imports directly and thus leave in Southern hands the freight rates, the money the merchant usually spent on going to New York for his supplies, commissions, exchange rates, coastwise transportation, and various other items. To develop a movement for direct trade commercial conventions were held in Augusta (1837 and 1838), in Charleston (1839), in Richmond (1838), and in Norfolk (1839). In the nature of things it was the Atlantic states that were most interested in direct trade, and the delegates to the conventions came chiefly from them. They included in their number the most prominent men of the South. The conventions recommended better banking laws so that capital could be procured for shipbuilding, that the states should promote by subsidies the building and operation of ships, and that laws should be made legalizing the formation of corporations. The commercial conventions were held before



the full force of the panic struck the South; in the increased economic distress after 1840 the agitation for direct trade met little encouragement.

It was inevitable that a fall in the price of cotton should inspire in the South a movement for manufacturing. The leading advocate of this idea was William Gregg who in 1844 summed up the arguments for manufacturing in the South in his *Essays on Domestic Industry* which was widely read throughout the South. Gregg spoke from experience gained as a manufacturer at Graniteville, South Carolina.<sup>47</sup> Manufacturing, he claimed, would make it cheaper for the planter to market his cotton and to buy his manufactured goods. It would keep at home for Southern development the money that had been flowing North for manufactured goods. It would give employment to the poor whites of the South, and to the slaves who could not be used profitably on the plantation. It would promote immigration and thus, increasing Southern population, would restore the numerical equilibrium between the two sections. The agitation for manufacturing had better results than did that for direct trade. Southern manufactured products amounted to \$2,000,000 in 1840—ten years later their value was three times this figure.

Agricultural reform, like direct trade and manufacturing, was intensified rather than caused by hard times. Also like the other two it concerned chiefly the Atlantic states. By 1837 a very great portion of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina east of the Blue Ridge was abandoned land where the soil had been filched of all fertility by successive crops of tobacco and now was given over to sedge grass and cedars.<sup>48</sup> Some attempt

<sup>47</sup> Broadus Mitchell, *William Gregg, Factory Master of the Old South*, 49-75.

<sup>48</sup> Avery Craven, *Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland*, 122-161.

had been made to change to wheat culture, but the soil was too exhausted even for wheat. The tidewater was thoroughly spent, and the Piedmont was failing fast. John Taylor of Caroline in 1812 had, in his *Arator*, urged the use of vegetable manures. Plaster and clover had been introduced from Pennsylvania, but little improvement was discernible until in 1832 Edmund Ruffin published *An Essay on Calcareous Manures* embodying the results of many years experimentation on his James river plantation. Ruffin recommended the use of marl as manure. The hard times following the panic gave point to his urging and the farmers of the east slowly took up the new agriculture and gradually brought their dead land to life. By 1860 the tidewater and Piedmont were almost wholly restored and ranked as the most fertile part of the South. Ruffin spread the gospel of mineral fertilization throughout the South by his *Farmer's Register* which he began editing in 1833. Early in the forties the first cargo of guano came to Baltimore and commercial fertilizers were popular with Southern farmers for the next decade. The panic of 1837 was followed by a great increase in the number of agricultural societies and fairs, all of which deserve great credit for their intentions and social practices.

In time the South turned to politics for redress of its wrongs, and here it had a better measure of success. It renewed its war on the tariff which had been increased in 1842 in the hope of reviving a treasury undernourished since the panic, and in 1846 with a Southern president and a Southern secretary of treasury, it forced through congress the Walker tariff which was so low as to be practically for revenue only. Southern votes in congress upheld the Tyler vetoes which prevented the reestablishment of a national bank. In 1846 congress

adopted the warehousing plan of the Southern leaders by which imported merchandise need not pay duties until sold, and not at all if reexported.

But there was arising in the South a class of people who thought that economic and political measures were not sufficient to put the South on a par with the North. It was their belief that the only way the South could rid itself of subservience to the North was by leaving the Union. These were the secessionists *per se*. They were the counterpart of the abolitionists at the North whom they resembled in fewness of numbers, virulence of declamation, and lack of influence. They were most numerous in South Carolina where James Henry Hammond and Robert Barnwell Rhett were the leaders. William L. Yancey in Alabama and John A. Quitman in Mississippi were rising to fame. In 1842 Rhett initiated the "Bluffton movement" for secession in South Carolina as an answer to the tariff and Texas policy of the North.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> C. S. Boucher, "The Annexation of Texas and the Bluffton Movement in South Carolina," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. VII, 3.



## The Southern Movement, 1848-1851

The beginning of Southern migration to Texas came so closely on the heels of the Missouri Compromise that careless or prejudiced observers have been inclined to see between the two events the relation of cause and effect. The slaveocracy had the fell design of compensating itself for the loss of the northern purchase by promoting an emigration to Texas which should colonize, revolt, and join the Union as a slave state. This particular myth has died hard, but it has died. The movement of Southern people into Texas was, indeed, a promoted movement, but the promoters were not Southern politicians; they were land speculators. Stephen F. Austin and his fellow *empresarios* were in direct line of succession to Richard Henderson, William Blount, and the Yazoo companies. Both North and South, the land speculator was the *entrepreneur* of the westward movement.

That Southern people, rather than Northern, were attracted to Texas by the liberal land and immigration policies of the Mexican government may be ascribed less to foresight or depravity than to proximity. The plantation owners of the South were discouraged from migration by the hostile attitude of the Mexican government toward slavery, and Texas in consequence exerted its attractions chiefly for the poor farmer whose lack of possessions made him impervious to damage through attacks on his property.<sup>50</sup> Although hard times after 1819 and the abolition of credit in land sales by the

<sup>50</sup> E. C. Barker, "Influence of Slavery on the Colonization of Texas," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. XI, 3.

United States gave a certain impetus to the movement to Texas, the "Texas fever" never attained any such high temperatures as did the Great Migration and the Jacksonian migration. In 1836 the twenty thousand Americans in Texas were settled in the eastern part of the state where the forests screened them from the attentions, invariably unwelcome, of the Indians of the plains.

The high indignation which brought about the American revolt of 1836 was not the result of any attacks, present or prospective, on the institution of slavery, for the Mexican policy in that respect had been long foreseen and discounted. Slave owners neither originated the revolt nor guided it. Neither his residence among the Cherokee nor his intimacy with Jackson qualified Sam Houston for heading a cause of the planter aristocracy. But the revolution once accomplished, it was not unnatural that Southern leaders in the United States should let their thoughts dwell fondly on the added strength an annexed Texas would furnish in their warfare against the twin Northern abominations of tariff and abolition. Southern sentiment, however, was by no means unanimous; every Southern Whig senator except one voted against the treaty of annexation in 1844 and only three Whig senators and eight Whig representatives supported the joint resolution of 1845 which finally brought Texas into the Union. That the opposition of the Whig congressmen reflected public opinion in the South and not merely their personal hostility to Tyler is indicated by the vote for president in 1844 when five of the thirteen Southern states cast their electoral vote for Clay who opposed annexation. The entire group of cotton states with the addition of Virginia and Missouri voted for Polk and "reannexation."

Southern orators were accustomed to call the Mexican

War which followed the annexation of Texas a Southern war; the South, they said, furnished two-thirds of the money, three-fourths of the men, and four-fifths of the graves. But as a matter of fact the Whig leaders of the South quite generally opposed both the war itself and the acquisition of territory which resulted from it.<sup>51</sup> Part of this attitude was due to Whig inability to detect virtue in a Democratic war, but chiefly it was because an acquisition of territory would mean an increase in the price of slaves and a decrease in the price of cotton. It is quite evident that the expansion of slave territory was not the work of the Whigs who owned the slaves but of the Democrats who did not. Both parties at the South made common cause against the Wilmot Proviso deeming it not only a blow against slavery but an attack on the South.

The introduction of the Wilmot Proviso represented nothing more significant than the attempt of a Pennsylvania representative to regain from his constituents the approval he had forfeited by his unthinking support of the Walker tariff.<sup>52</sup> The enthusiasm it aroused among Northern congressmen was due partly to resentment against a Southern president for his veto of the Rivers and Harbors Act, and for his failure to "reoccupy" Oregon; partly it was due to the demand of the manufacturers that no more Southern states be prepared for later fight on the tariff. Both North and South took it for granted in 1846 that Southern territory would necessarily be slave territory unless preventative measures were taken, and that no territory would be Southern in sympathy if slavery were forbidden in it.

With the admission of Texas and Florida in 1845 the

<sup>51</sup> A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party of the South*, 118-123.

<sup>52</sup> R. R. Stenberg, "Motivation of the Wilmot Proviso," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. xviii, 535.

South had attained its full strength of fifteen states; eight of the fifteen voted for Taylor in 1848 in the expectation that he would, as a Southern man, use his veto if necessary to prevent any form of a Wilmot Proviso in the Mexican cession. By the time Taylor met his first congress in the fall of 1849 a gold rush had supplied California with a population whose origin so far offset its impermanency as to result in the making of a free state. Texas was involved in a dispute with the United States over its western boundary which the Texans with some show of logic insisted was the same Rio Grande the United States had accepted in admitting them and had maintained against Mexico in war. When Taylor recommended the admission of California as a free state, Democratic leaders were prevented by their own state rights principles from effective opposition, but the idea of a Wilmot Proviso spread over a territory of New Mexico enlarged by the confiscation of western Texas moved them to thoughts of resistance.

The legislatures of the Democratic states gave formal warning of their intentions. Virginia in March, 1847, had adopted resolutions to the effect that she would resist the proviso at all hazards and to the last extremity, and in January, 1849, provided for a special meeting of the legislature if the Wilmot Proviso were adopted. Georgia in February, 1850, provided for the calling of a state convention in case congress adopted the proviso, abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, admitted California as a free state, or if the Northern states persisted in violating the fugitive slave law. South Carolina (December, 1848) and Missouri (March, 1849) declared themselves ready to coöperate with other Southern states. Florida (January, 1849) suggested coöperation of the Southern states through a Southern conven-



tion. North Carolina (January, 1849) recommended extending the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific.

The idea of a Southern convention to provide for a concerted resistance to the perils threatening the South had been sponsored, if not originated, by Southern congressmen in Washington. At the instance of Senators Foote of Mississippi, Hunter of Virginia, and Calhoun of South Carolina a caucus of 69 Southern congressmen was held in the senate chamber, December, 1848, for the purpose of considering plans to avert danger to the South. A committee of fifteen was appointed to prepare an address, and this delegated the task to a sub-committee of five. Calhoun wrote the "Address to the People of the Southern States" which the caucus adopted January 22, 1849, and sent to the newspapers of the South for publication. Only 48 Southern congressmen signed the address and only two of these were Whigs (Mississippi). The address, after setting forth the attitude of the North, urged that Southern people forget their political animosities and unite in one party for defense of the South. The purpose of the address was primarily to promote a Southern party to include all Southern people; it was for this reason that the Whigs opposed it, for the program of the proposed party would be a Democratic program, and the Whigs had no intention of losing their identity in any such way. Four Democrats refused to sign the address and issued one of their own. Senator Berrien of Georgia also issued an address.

Although the address issued no call for a Southern convention, it had its part in promoting it. Apparently influenced by the address, a meeting in Jackson, Mississippi, May 7, 1849, issued a call for a state convention to meet in October to consider the relations of the North and South. The proceedings of this May meeting were

sent to Calhoun, who suggested that the October meeting issue a call for a general Southern convention. Calhoun was reluctant that the call for a Southern convention should come from South Carolina because he fully realized the distrust of South Carolina felt by the other Southern states because of her radical and intemperate policies. The Mississippi state convention was composed of both Democrats and Whigs and its chairman was the Whig chief justice, William L. Sharkey. The Whigs of Mississippi were more inclined to resistance than were the Whigs in the other Southern states; the two Whig congressmen from Mississippi were the only Whigs to sign the address. The convention summed up its work in a series of resolutions one of which was a call for a general Southern convention to meet at Nashville, Tennessee, the first Monday in June, 1850, "to devise and adopt some mode of resistance to these aggressions." The convention declared that this call constituted Mississippi's response to the Southern address. In another resolution the convention recommended that if congress passed the proviso, or prohibited inter-state slave trade, or abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, the legislature should authorize the governor to call a state convention "to consider the mode and measure of redress."

When the call went out it met with general opposition from the Whig leaders in all the Southern states. It was, of course, not to be expected that they would join the Democrats in opposition to a Whig president they had just elected. When Taylor recommended the admission of California as a free state they professed to see in it nothing more than an endorsement of the state rights theory for which the South had battled in the Missouri Compromise. Even when it became evident that Taylor

would not veto a proviso for New Mexico, most of them remained acquiescent, justifying their attitude by declaring that slavery could never exist in New Mexico anyway, and even if it could it would be better for the South not to have any more western competition for slaves and in cotton production. It was not resistance the Whigs wanted, but compromise, and so thoroughly convinced were they of Southern weakness that they were disposed to accept practically any terms the North dictated so long as it was called a compromise. The Whigs prophesied that Southern unity would call forth a Northern unity and thus render impossible that securing of aid from their Northern friends which was the only hope of success for the South. A Southern movement, they declared, was a step toward secession and to secession the Whigs were unalterably opposed.

None of the Whig states of the South sent delegates to the Nashville convention except Tennessee, and in that state the delegates were chosen unofficially in county meetings after the Whig senate had rejected the resolution of the Democratic house that the governor appoint. In Mississippi the delegates were chosen by the legislature, absent-mindedly perhaps, since a set had been named by the October convention. Alabama, South Carolina, Texas, and Georgia elected their delegates by popular vote. The Virginia delegates were chosen by a state convention, and in Florida the governor, by authority of the legislature, appointed. On the whole the mass of Southern people appeared indifferent.<sup>53</sup> The effects of the panic had worn away, and under the stimulation of prosperity people had little patience with constitutional theories or economic abstractions. The elections

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<sup>53</sup> Farrar Newberry, "The Nashville Convention and Southern Sentiment of 1850," in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, vol. XI, 259-273.

for delegates called out a very small vote and many of the delegates chosen did not take the trouble to attend. The death of John C. Calhoun in April removed the most potent advocate of the movement. Responding to the urgings of Webster and others, Northern congressmen were showing symptoms of compromise and the South was disposed to defer meeting its dangers until it could be certain that the dangers existed.

The convention met June 3, 1850, in a Nashville that felt none too flattered by its selection as hostess. There were 179 delegates in attendance of whom 102 were from Tennessee; Virginia sent 6, South Carolina 17, Georgia 12, Mississippi 11, Texas 1, Alabama 21, Arkansas 2, and Florida 6. The average of ability in the convention was, perhaps, not lowered by the enforced absence of the Southern senators and representatives. Governor Matthews and Chief Justice Sharkey headed the Mississippi delegation. Ex-Governor Roane was a delegate from Arkansas, ex-Governor McDonald from Georgia, Governor Henderson from Texas. Beverly Tucker, author of *The Partisan Leader*, was a delegate from Virginia and John A. Campbell, later an associate justice of the supreme court of the United States, was a delegate from Alabama. The most distinguished delegation was from South Carolina, including the venerable Langdon Cheves, ex-Governor Hammond, and Robert Barnwell Rhett. The Carolinians, quite aware of the distrust of their state in the South, kept in the background and took little public part in the deliberations.

The convention organized by electing Chief Justice Sharkey president and Governor McDonald vice-president. After adopting the customary plan for each state to have an equal vote, a committee on resolutions, of two from each state, was selected to which all resolutions

presented in the convention should be referred. While the committee gave its attention to the resolution so referred to it, the convention listened to speeches by the delegates. On the 8th the committee through its chairman, Gordon of Virginia, submitted its report consisting of thirteen resolutions, and an address of which Rhett was supposed to be the author. There was a minority report by four members of the committee. The resolutions of the committee were adopted by a unanimous vote by states and the address slightly amended at the instance of General Pillow of Tennessee. Several members of the convention, including the president, had their names recorded as opposing the address. The resolutions were to the effect that the Wilmot Proviso was unconstitutional and that the states all had equal rights in the territories. The eleventh resolution declared that the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific was the utmost concession the South would make. The address declared that Clay's compromise measures were unacceptable to the South and should be resisted.

The convention adjourned on the 12th after adopting a resolution that it would meet again on the call of Judge Sharkey on the sixth Monday after the adjournment of congress. It had been a dignified gathering and its deliberations much more conservative than had been generally anticipated. Southern Whigs, however, charged that the convention in naming the Missouri Compromise line as its limit of concession was deliberately trying to bring about disunion by making impracticable terms. The adoption of the compromise measure by congress at once forced the South to make its choice, and both Democrats and Whigs prepared for the contest. The result showed that the excitement had been limited to the politicians and that the great mass of Southern peo-

ple had remained unconcerned. Governor Towns of Georgia called the state convention which the legislature had authorized if California were admitted as a free state, but the election resulted in the choice of an overwhelming majority of compromise men. It adopted resolutions accepting the compromise while declaring that it would resist even to secession if slavery were abolished in the District of Columbia, or a slave state denied admission to the Union or any change made in the fugitive slave law or in the status of slavery in Utah and New Mexico.

In Mississippi Governor Quitman called a special session of the legislature in November and sent a message urging secession and the forming of a Southern Confederacy. The legislature called a state convention, but the compromise men controlled it overwhelmingly and adopted resolutions favoring the compromise, condemning the calling of a convention, and denying the right of secession. Senator Foote, one of the originators of the Southern movement but now a convert to the compromise, was elected governor by a bare majority over Jefferson Davis. Davis had taken the place on the Democratic ticket left vacant when Quitman resigned his candidacy on finding his policies repudiated by the state convention.

In Alabama Governor Collier refused to call a special session of the legislature and in the following elections the compromise forces captured both branches of the legislature. The legislature of Virginia passed resolutions acquiescing in the compromise, while the legislature of North Carolina with strict impartiality refused either to approve the compromise or the doctrine of secession. In the Whig states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Louisiana the compromise was so popular that the Dem-

ocrats made no issue of its acceptance. In Florida the compromise advocates controlled the state and showed their control by defeating Senator Yulee for reelection. In Missouri the Whigs elected their first senator in the history of the state, the achievement being due, however, not so much to Whig advocacy of the compromise as to internecine strife in the Democratic party.

In South Carolina there was no prospect of endorsing the compromise; the only choice was between immediate secession and secession in coöperation with the other Southern states. The little handful of Whigs joined hands with the conservative Democrats in promoting the coöperative movement with the result that they secured a majority of the state convention. Since it was impossible to coöperate with states which would not operate, the state convention decided to forego secession while affirming both its right and desire to secede.

Since South Carolina had deferred action as long as possible in hope of a turn of the compromise tide, her state convention was the last of the Southern state conventions to meet. Meanwhile the Nashville convention had reassembled, almost overlooked by the South in its preoccupation with other things. Judge Sharkey did not send out a call for the meeting but the members of the convention dispensed with this formality and made their way to Nashville at the appointed time. The fifteen Whig members and most of the conservative Democrats remained away, contending that the Southern people were satisfied with the compromise and that a further meeting of the convention was unnecessary. Only seven states were represented since the delegations of Arkansas and Texas did not return. The fifty delegates in attendance were chiefly radical secessionists except the fourteen from Tennessee and a few from Mississippi, Ala-

bama, and Florida who attended for the purpose of checking any disunion movement that might materialize. The convention met November 11, 1850, with vice-president McDonald presiding in the absence of Judge Sharkey. The sessions continued for seven days and were largely devoted to the delivery of fiery speeches of which that by Langdon Cheves was the most notable. The convention adjourned on the 18th after adopting resolutions asserting the right of secession and recommending that the Southern states should not take part in the presidential conventions of either political party "until the constitutional rights of the South should be secured." The Tennessee delegation entered a formal protest against this latter resolution and proposed one indorsing the compromise. They countered the rejection of this by holding, in Nashville on the 23rd, a huge mass meeting for the Union.

The Southern movement had for its purpose the promotion of Southern unity in the face of what the South termed Northern aggression. When the movement was originated the Northern program was for free states in California, Utah, and New Mexico, and the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. The Southern movement may be credited with the result of defeating this program, except for California. Utah and New Mexico were organized not as free states but as territories. The ultimate decision as to slavery there would have to come from the supreme court; what the decision would be was revealed later in the Dred Scott case. Texas received restricted boundaries but exacted payment for the territory surrendered. The stricter fugitive slave law was a concession to the South that six months earlier would have been thought impossible. The abolition of slavery in the District was modified to an



abolition of slave trade, and none but the most fanatic Southerner opposed it. Even the loss of the senate through the admission of California was only an apparent loss. California senators would be likely to favor a low tariff which even in 1850 was of greater interest in the South than slavery expansion was.

In the South, as in the North, the excitement over the slavery question was largely an excitement of the politicians; the people were apathetic and passive. Even among the politicians the talk of secession was chiefly rodomontade, a bluff designed to impress the North and to secure concessions. That it accomplished that very thing no one can doubt who reads the correspondence of contemporary leaders, North and South. The action of Senator Foote in originating the Southern movement and then opposing it after the compromise was secured is very enlightening.

It was a Democratic movement which the Whigs exerted themselves first to prevent and later to check. Although they checked the disunion movement following the compromise, the Southern movement was responsible for the concessions in the compromise, and the Whigs found it difficult to meet the Democrat charge that Whigs had shown a disposition to subordinate Southern rights to party unity. The Democrats definitely established their position as the guardians of Southern rights, and Southern people were inclined to give to the Democratic party the credit for the compromise which the leading Democrats opposed. The label of disloyalty to the South that the Democrats succeeded in fastening on the Whigs was to be fatal to that party.

It must be conceded that the Southern movement increased the feeling of a Southern nationalism. Whatever action was proposed was a coöperative action. Not even

South Carolina proposed a separate state action. Secession was openly considered and debated and even in the process of rejecting it, the South became more tolerant of it. Perhaps the most significant result of the Southern movement was, not that it forced concession from the North, but that it promoted unity among Southern people. That was the end for which Calhoun designed it.

## Building the Railroads

The failure of the alarmists in 1850 in their efforts to "fire the Southern heart" was perhaps principally due to the fact that good times had returned and the South was prospering. Both passions and politics had to wait while the Southern people revelled in the all but forgotten delights of making money. Impatient with constitutional theorizing, skeptical of future dangers, openly contemptuous of philosophers and prophets, the South threw its energies into the development of tangible, material things. There was money to be made in agriculture, and in the two handmaidens of agriculture, manufacturing and transportation.

In 1840 the South had about 900 miles of railroads of which the most impressive were the Baltimore and Ohio up the Potomac, the combination of lines from Fredericksburg to Wilmington, and the roads leading from Charleston into upper Georgia. As the shadows of depression lifted the Southern promoters took up anew the railroad ambitions temporarily hamstrung by the panic. Although construction work had not entirely stopped during the hard times, the general revival of hopes and enthusiasm may be dated by the Southwestern convention which met at Memphis, July 4, 1845.<sup>54</sup> Since it was called to promote river improvement as well as railroad building, delegates were present from the Mississippi Valley states of the North as well as of the

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<sup>54</sup> St. George L. Sioussat, "Memphis as a Gateway to the West," in *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, vol. 3, 77.

South. Although the convention considered the Mississippi and adopted resolutions for its improvement, it was railroads that received the greatest attention. John C. Calhoun came as a delegate at large from South Carolina and was chosen president of the convention. The convention after several days of open meetings and group conferences summarized its work in twenty resolutions among which was one calling for the construction of four east-and-west railroads to terminals at New Orleans, Vicksburg, Memphis, and Nashville. Others advocated the improvement of the Mississippi.

The convention by its very recommendations revealed the divergence of interests in the South. New Orleans had no railroads, needed none, and wanted none. Each year 450 steamboats and 4000 flatboats brought to her the commerce of the Mississippi Valley. No effort was required on the part of New Orleans to secure this trade; she needed only to receive it. The only improvement she desired in transportation facilities was improvement in the Mississippi. In 1845 she was the largest city in the South, the second largest exporting city in the United States, and in possession of a trade that was the envy of all other cities, North and South. No other Southern city had a Mississippi to carry commerce to her; every Southern city envied New Orleans and was ambitious to secure some of her trade. From 1845, then, railroad building in the South represents a conscious effort on the part of other cities of the South to divert the Mississippi trade to themselves. Baltimore, Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile lifted their eyes from local trade to the Mississippi and Ohio. They found allies in Memphis and Vicksburg which in the new course of trade would become *entrepôts* instead of mere way-stations to New Orleans.

The desire for the Mississippi trade led to the completion of three main east-and-west lines, all extensions of roads constructed before the panic. The northernmost of these was the Baltimore and Ohio which had been formed for the purpose of diverting the lake trade from the Erie Canal and looked to Pittsburgh as a western terminus. Abandoning both its aim and ambition, after leaving Cumberland it built to Wheeling (1853) lower down on the Ohio in order to secure the river trade. Five years later a more direct branch reached the Ohio near Marietta, and found itself in connection with Cincinnati and St. Louis over lines already completed. This entrance into the trade of the Ohio and the Mississippi brought to Baltimore the prosperity she desired and quickly made her the leading city of the South. In 1850 Baltimore and New Orleans were equal in population; in 1860 Baltimore had 212,418 people while New Orleans had but 168,675.

Much farther south a second line gradually crept westward toward the Mississippi. With the completion of the state-owned Western and Atlantic to Chattanooga in December, 1849, there were continuous roads from Charleston and Savannah to the Tennessee river. In making Chattanooga the terminal of the Western and Atlantic, Georgia was hoping that a considerable part of the upper Mississippi trade would be diverted up the Tennessee and over the Georgia roads to Savannah or Augusta. But in anticipation of disappointment or in hope of increased trade, the Georgia roads and the Charleston-Hamburg encouraged by liberal subscription a road from Chattanooga to Nashville. The completion of this circuitous road in 1854 meant that the Charleston and Savannah bid for trade had carried them to Nashville. But connection with the Mississippi was

not, after all, to be made through Nashville. The Memphis and Charleston, after sinking under the panic, acquired a new charter in 1850, received aid from Tennessee and various cities, bought the Tuscumbia-Decatur road in 1851 and in April, 1857, entered Chattanooga somewhat shamefacedly by utilizing the Nashville road east of Stevenson, Alabama. Charleston at last had her line to the Mississippi as Calhoun had foretold twenty-five years before, but the fact that New Orleans also invested in the road would indicate that the rival cities did not agree on the nature of its utility.

The third east-and-west line, like the first two, was an old hope, long deferred, but finally realized. Savannah had her Memphis connection through Atlanta and Chattanooga, as did Charleston, but desired a line to the Mississippi unshared by her rival. In alliance with Vicksburg in the west and Montgomery in the center she promoted a more direct line which should reach the Mississippi at Vicksburg. As was the case with all the ante-bellum "lines," the Savannah-Vicksburg, when finished in 1860, consisted of several connecting roads. The Southwestern from Macon reached Columbus in 1853 and there joined a branch of the Montgomery and West Point to Montgomery; between Montgomery and Vicksburg the Southern completed its road in 1860 except for sixty miles in western Alabama which remained unbridged until the second year of the War between the States.

Several other east-and-west lines remained suspended in mid-air at the outbreak of the war. In Virginia the Richmond and Ohio was chartered in 1846, started construction in the fifties, and was stopped by the War between the States near Charlottesville whose intellectual atmosphere did not reconcile the railroad promoters

to an entire absence of trade. In North Carolina the road west from Wilmington to Charlotte was designed rather to carry products to the long-isolated people of the mountains than to bring trade to the seacoast. From Savannah and Jacksonville twin roads started westward, presumably for Pensacola, but one remained incomplete in southwestern Georgia and the other, in dire need, stopped near Tallahassee.


In addition to the primary east-and-west lines, the decade of 1850-1860 saw the completion of some half-dozen roads running north and south. Two of these were east of the mountains, one was a valley road, and three were west of the mountains. The Fredericksburg-Wilmington line was extended to the Potomac on the north and through Charleston (1857) to Savannah on the south. The Potomac terminal of this line had only a river connection with Washington whence roads ran to Baltimore and eastern points. Diverging from this seaboard line at Richmond, another line ran through Danville and Charlotte to Columbia where it connected with the South Carolina system. A few miles of this line between Danville and Greensboro remained unfinished until the Confederate government took the task in hand late in the war. The valley road was one of the oldest projects of the South. It originated in 1836 when the east Tennessee people, turning away from the allurements of the prospective Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston, chartered the Hiwassee Railroad to run from Knoxville to the Georgia line where it hoped to meet the Georgia Railroad from Augusta. But with the chartering of the Western and Atlantic the Georgia roads fixed their line terminal far to the west at Chattanooga, far out of the reach of the Hiwassee, which quietly died in disappointment, accentuated by deep

financial stringency. It revived in 1848 under the name of the East Tennessee and Georgia and by July 4, 1855, connected Knoxville with Dalton on the Western and Atlantic. In 1858 the East Tennessee and Virginia connected Knoxville with Bristol from which place the Virginia and East Tennessee had been opened to Lynchburg. From Lynchburg there were diverging roads to Washington and Richmond.

The three north-and-south lines west of the mountains were the Mobile and Ohio, the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern, and the Louisville and Nashville. The first was chartered by Mobile interests in 1847 with the time-honored purpose of diverting the Mississippi trade from New Orleans; the second was sponsored by New Orleans interests in 1852 to checkmate the efforts of their pygmy rival whose impertinent ambitions they regarded with a mixture of wrath and incredulity. The Mobile and Ohio was chartered to build to Columbus, Kentucky, on the Mississippi where it would "connect," by a ferry, with the Illinois Central at Cairo; the New Orleans road was vague about its northern terminal although it favored Nashville. It finally decided on Jackson, Tennessee, as the terminal of its main line, and Memphis as the terminal of a branch road from Grenada. Jackson was of no importance except as a point to which the Mobile and Ohio had built south from Columbus. Since the New Orleans road reached Jackson in January, 1860, and the Mobile and Ohio from the south did not come into town until April, 1861, New Orleans secured railroad connection with Columbus a year before Mobile did – and over the road Mobile herself built!

While Mobile and New Orleans were hurrying their rival roads to the north, the Louisville and Nashville







was staggering southward. It was sponsored by Louisville interests and proposed to make its dividends chiefly on freight carried out of the South through Louisville and over connecting roads to northern ports. Chartered in 1850, eccentricities of management delayed construction until James Guthrie, ex-secretary of treasury, became president. It was opened to Nashville in 1859 and the following year a branch line was completed from Bowling Green to Memphis. When the Louisville road reached Nashville it found the Tennessee and Alabama built south to Decatur. There was a wide gap from Decatur to Montgomery, from which place a road ran to Pensacola and Mobile. That the Louisville and Nashville would sometime gather these roads into a system, bridge the gap, and so have a line from the Ohio to the gulf was inevitable, but the War between the States deferred accomplishment.

At the opening of the war the South had more than 10,000 miles of railroads. In addition to the primary roads there were numerous minor roads connecting with the "trunk" lines or, as in Florida, with nothing at all. The railroads were, as a rule, built economically, the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern being the outstanding example of reckless financing. The Atlantic states relied chiefly on stock subscriptions for their money supply while in the southwest the practice, apparently, was to regard private subscriptions as merely accessories to public funds. Every Southern state aided its railroads either by subscribing to their stock or by a loan of credit by means of bonds. Tennessee was the most liberal, granting each railroad within its limits \$10,000 a mile. Municipalities invested heavily in railroads. State and municipal bonds, as well as mortgage bonds, the roads commonly marketed in England where the

public, except during the period of the Crimean War, displayed a hospitality to Southern investments that was later to cause many heart-burnings. The United States aided some of the roads by land grants. The grants amounted to 3,000,000 acres, practically all in Alabama and Mississippi. The Mobile and Ohio was the chief recipient of federal aid.

The Southern railroads had many defects, most of them common to railroads throughout the United States. To save money many of the roads used wooden rails stripped with iron, and these soon wore out. By 1861, however, the H-type iron rail was in general use. "Connecting" roads rarely connected, freight being transferred from one road to another by wagons. Lack of engineering skill made the contractors wary of tunnels and brought about undue reliance on "inclined planes." The locomotives used wood for fuel; this was cut and piled up along the track at intervals to be loaded on the tender when needed. The roads were rarely direct but ran through the communities which would give the most support. Their direction wavered according to the intensity of subscriptions.

The telegraph followed the railroad into the South; more frequently it marked out the way the railroad was later to follow. The first telegraph line in the United States was a Southern line opened from Baltimore to Washington in 1844. In 1846, Amos Kendall and others incorporated the second line, the Washington and New Orleans, and sent out advance agents to secure the stock subscriptions which, as in the case of railroads, were necessary preliminaries to construction. The telegraph followed the railroad to Raleigh, preceded it to Columbia, followed the Hamburg line to the Savannah and thence went along the old stagecoach line through Ma-

con, Montgomery, and Mobile to New Orleans. The entire line was completed in July, 1848. Meanwhile the People's Telegraph Company had been formed to connect Pittsburgh with New Orleans via Louisville, Nashville, Columbus, and Jackson. It was finished late in 1848 after a spirited legal battle with the Washington and New Orleans. By 1860 the telegraph followed every railroad in the South and brought practically every locality into communication with the outside world. During the War between the States Southern telegraph lines were combined into two main systems.

The chief utility of the Southern railroads, in the scanty time they operated before the war, was to develop the interior; it is doubtful if they would ever have taken the Mississippi trade from New Orleans. Nothing less than the war was required to change this great river trade to a railroad trade. But long before the completion of the Mississippi railroads, Southern people had expanded their commercial ambitions, envisaging an ocean trade with Europe on the east, and a land trade with California on the west.

The agitation for direct trade with Europe, born of discontent in the thirties, was revived in the fifties. In its latter phase it was closely connected with the railroad movement: the Atlantic ports considered shipping connections on the east as desirable extensions of railroad connections on the west. The agitation for direct trade accompanied the agitation for railroads, used the same methods and, but for the war, might have had equal success. Moreover, there was the desire to be free of the "tribute" which Southern industry paid to the North in prosperity even more than in adverse times. The ambition for direct trade found expression in the Southern Commercial Convention which met in Baltimore in

1852 and held adjourned sessions in other Southern cities annually until 1859.<sup>55</sup> Promoting railroads as well as shipping, the convention drew delegates from all the Southern states and sought to direct Southern interest and capital into both fields. As far as direct trade was concerned, results were few. Alabama, South Carolina, and Virginia chartered steamship companies, but the Alabama company apparently exhausted its energies in obtaining a charter while the Charleston company, after building a ship, found that it was unable to get out of the harbor when loaded. Only in Virginia was a beginning actually made and the ships of the Southern Virginia Navigation Company were plying the Atlantic when the war ended their activity.

The commercial convention urged a Pacific railroad as it did direct trade. The project of such a railroad had been agitated in the United States in the forties, but prior to the Mexican War the South had taken little interest in it since our only Pacific possession was Oregon. After the war Southern promoters displayed increasing interest for now there was a southern approach to the Pacific. At once there developed a rivalry among the Mississippi cities for the honor of the eastern terminal. Vicksburg and Memphis claimed it because they were already marked out as terminals for railroads from the Atlantic. St. Louis was a strong claimant because her Missouri Pacific was already chartered to run to the mouth of the Kansas. New Orleans was inclined at first to rely on the Isthmus of Panama road, but after her Opelousas road began to build west, she too joined the list of claimants. In 1849 both Memphis and St. Louis held great railroad conventions to further their plans. Under Pierce, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis

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<sup>55</sup> R. R. Russell, *Economic Aspects*, pt. 1, 123-151.

was authorized to survey the routes, both north and south, for a railroad. His survey showed that a route through Texas was the most feasible. This and the purchase from Mexico of territory south of the Gila river made it seem imminent that the Pacific road would be a southern road and would probably start from New Orleans or Vicksburg, both of which had lines building to the west. But a Pacific road, whether north or south, would have to be built by public funds and this required an appropriation by congress. On the verge of success, the Southern leaders failed to secure this appropriation when all mundane issues in the United States fell before the abolition crusade.





## Cotton is King

The Southern railroads were both evidences and causes of Southern prosperity. By penetrating the hitherto inaccessible regions of the South, they gave an outlet to markets and stimulated not only agriculture but various other industries. Lumber production in the South was more than doubled during the decade, 1850-1860, the chief development being in the pine regions of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. There was, also, a great increase in the production of flour especially in tidewater Virginia and North Carolina where the cultivation of wheat had long since driven out tobacco. In western Maryland and Virginia the coming of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad gave new life to the iron and coal mines, and Cumberland, Wheeling, and Richmond developed factories for the production of railroad iron. In Richmond the Tredegar factory built locomotives for both Southern and Northern roads.

But the great prosperity of the South during the fifties was primarily based on the rise in price of its two great staples, tobacco and cotton. Partly, this was due to the general business recovery in both Europe and America from the economic doldrums of the forties; partly, it was the reflection of currency inflation following the gold discoveries in California. In the case of tobacco, there had been a great decrease in production during the panic years, so that by 1850 supply was running far behind demand. In 1849 the price of tobacco began to mount rapidly, reaching ten cents in 1851, and after a

brief relapse climbing to fifteen cents in 1857. From 1849 to 1859 tobacco production was doubled in the South as a whole, and in North Carolina was tripled. The development of better varieties and the discovery of better methods of curing helped keep up the price. In this decade the greater part of the western tobacco exportation was shifted from New Orleans to Baltimore, as the Baltimore and Ohio penetrated the Ohio Valley and tapped the Mississippi at St. Louis. In seeming contradiction to economic laws tobacco manufacturing expanded as the price of raw tobacco rose. Lynchburg was the leading tobacco manufacturing center of the east, but Richmond and Petersburg were developing rapidly. In the west, Clarksville, Louisville, and St. Louis were the chief centers. In New Orleans there were a few factories employed in the manufacture of the old French Perique tobacco raised on the upper Red river. The tobacco factories in the South made great use of slave labor. For the most part the manufactured products were in the form of pipe tobacco although there was some production of cigars. In 1860 Southern tobacco manufactures were valued at nearly \$20,000,000, which was about one-third the entire tobacco manufacturing output of the United States.

In the case of cotton, the invention of the sewing machine (1846) enormously increased the demand for cotton cloth and, consequently, for raw cotton. The price of cotton began rising in 1844 and with occasional ups and downs averaged about eleven cents for the decade of the fifties. The combination of good prices and bumper crops during the decade had the pleasing effect of increasing the cotton growers' income from \$100,000,000 in 1850 to \$250,000,000 ten years later. In 1859 the production was more than 2,000,000,000 pounds. With the exportation and manufacture of the enormous

crop, the trade and commerce of the world was so inextricably tied up, that to the Southern economists it seemed evident that the South held the key to world prosperity. Their exultation in this fact they expressed in the slogan: "Cotton is King."

Most of the Southern cotton was exported or sent North for manufacture, but the manufacturing movement in the South continued to increase throughout the fifties although beset by many difficulties. The high cotton prices so welcome to the grower receiving them cut down the profits of the manufacturer who paid them. Prosperity in planting also meant that higher wages had to be paid to the mill operatives and that such slave labor as was used in factory work was likely to be withdrawn for work in the cotton field. It happened, too, that there was a fall in the price of cotton goods coincident with the rise in price of raw material; part of the fall may have been due to increased foreign competition under the Walker tariff. Finally, the Southern factories were waging an uphill fight against the competition of established Northern firms who made a practice of "dumping" their goods on the Southern market as a method of crushing the rising manufactures there. As a result of all these things many of the Southern cotton mills failed in the early years of the decade. But there was a revival in 1858, and in 1860 the value of the cotton manufactures in the South was \$11,360,173. This was an increase of only \$2,000,000 in the fifties as compared to one of nearly \$6,000,000 in the forties. Georgia, with 33 mills in 1860, was the leading cotton manufacturing state. Maryland was a close second, and Virginia third. In striking contrast to the lagging cotton manufacturing, the manufacture of woollen cloth increased almost three-fold from 1850 to 1860.

Cotton was king of England. The number of bales

produced in 1860 was 3,837,407; of this 2,344,000 bales were exported to England and 1,069,000 bales to continental Europe, principally France. Normally England depended on the South for about five-sixths of her cotton supply, for her efforts to develop cotton production in India had met with very little success. The manufacture of this cotton from the South, it was estimated, gave employment to over a million laborers; four million people in England were dependent on the industry for their livelihood. Cotton manufactured goods normally made up more than half the total exports of England. Manchester and Liverpool, the leading manufacturing city and the leading port city, owed their prosperity to the cotton industry, and in the six shires around Manchester practically the entire population made its living, directly or indirectly, from cotton.<sup>56</sup>

France consumed only about one-fifth as much cotton as England, but nearly a million people were supported by the cotton manufactures. Cotton manufacture was the most profitable in all France and because of the fineness of the textiles produced the value of the manufactured product was very great. Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, and practically every other European nation possessed cotton factories but they secured an appreciable part of their raw cotton from English reexports.

Cotton was king of the North. Although only one-fourth of the cotton crop of the South was used in the North, the value of cotton manufactures there in 1860 was over \$100,000,000. This represented, however, only a small portion of the money the North made from cotton; cotton formed normally from one-half to two-thirds the total exports of the United States and profits of transportation went chiefly to the North. Cotton kept up

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<sup>56</sup> F. L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy*, chapter 1.

Northern shipping as well as Northern textile manufacturing. In addition to all this was the large item of manufactured goods of all sorts which the South bought from the North and paid for out of the proceeds of the cotton crop. Southern economists estimated Southern purchases from the North at \$150,000,000 annually.

Cotton was king of the West, although here the rule was indirect. The chief product of the West was food crops and for these the only sure market in the world was the far South. It was cotton that caused the planter and farmer to neglect the growing of food crops. It was estimated that Western food products sold in the South amounted to \$30,000,000 annually. This trade between South and West was as old as the West itself and was the basis of that political alliance between the two sections which so long dominated the government of the United States. The South supported the West in her demands for cheap land because it meant cheaper food, and opposed internal improvements because they meant higher food prices due to increased demand. The building of the canals and railroads at the North greatly increased food production in the West but did not shake the position of the South as the largest and steadiest market for Western products.

In 1855 David Christy published his *Cotton Is King* which gave expression to the faith the Southern leaders had come to have in the power of cotton in world affairs. The shibboleth was not new, but the statistics with which Christy interlarded his book gave the idea an increased validity. It became an article of faith accepted and asserted by statesmen, politicians, orators, economists, and even ministers. Its effect was to increase the self-confidence of a people who had always been singularly lacking in meekness and timidity. The Southern leaders

during the fifties were aggressive in action and arrogant in demeanor. Although a minority, by force of assertiveness they dominated all departments of the national government and made use of it to advance their own interests. The political victories of the South, 1850-1860, were even more impressive than its economic development.

In 1850 a union of Whigs and conservative Democrats had secured in every Southern state an acceptance of the compromise as a final settlement of the slavery question. Southern leaders, Whig and Democrat, approved the Georgia resolutions that if any changes were made in the compromise the Southern states would resist. To bring about this acceptance of the compromise the Whigs in some states, notably Georgia and Mississippi, had discarded their party name and united with conservative Democrats under the name of "Union" or "Constitutional Union" party. After the emergency the two wings of the Democratic party reunited, but the Whigs found it difficult to resume their organization. The name Whig had been stigmatized by Democrats, not without success, as symbolizing lukewarmness in defense of Southern rights and it was perhaps not unnatural that the Southern people should distrust Whig ideas while approving Whig action. Moreover, the anti-slave attitude of certain Northern Whig leaders, notably Seward, Greeley, and Governor Johnston of Pennsylvania, had the effect of making the name Whig a term of reproach in the South and of rendering many Southern Whigs reluctant to retain their party affiliations. As the election of 1852 drew near many of the Southern Whigs announced their intention of supporting Pierce, the Democratic nominee, who was a "doughface" and an ardent champion of the compromise; the Georgia

leaders insisted on keeping the Constitutional Union party as a substitute for the Whig; the mass of Southern Whigs retained their party affiliation and directed their efforts toward securing from the Whig national convention a platform affirming the compromise and a candidate who could be trusted to defend it. But although after strenuous efforts they secured resolutions indorsing the compromise, they failed to secure the nomination of Fillmore or of Webster. Scott they distrusted, notwithstanding his assurances, and in the ensuing election a considerable portion of the Whigs either joined the Democrats or refrained from voting. Only Tennessee and Kentucky cast their electoral vote for Scott. Thus there was brought about in the South in support of the compromise that political solidarity which Calhoun had desired as a means of opposing it. It was one of the little ironies of political history that the Southern Whig party, whose efforts secured acceptance of the compromise in the South, committed suicide in its efforts to perpetuate it.

Having secured the presidency, the aggressive Southern leaders acted promptly to make use of it for the promotion of what they considered Southern interests, one of which was the building of a Pacific railroad, and another the securing of more territory on the south. The appointment of Jefferson Davis as secretary of war was probably less a tribute to his undeniable military talents than to a recognition of the fact that only a Southern man could properly direct the department in its survey of the Pacific route. Considering the nature of his mission, no more suitable minister could have been chosen for Mexico than James Gadsden who, as president of the Charleston Railroad, had received the diplomatic training so essential in his new post. The ardor of

Pierre Soulé for the seizure of Cuba offset in the eyes of the administration the fact that he was, to put it with all possible mildness, *persona non grata* to the Spanish court to which he was accredited. John Y. Mason, a Virginian, and James Buchanan, a Pennsylvania dough-face, as ministers to France and England respectively, were selected with special regard for their ability to give him aid and comfort.

That all these preparations were made in vain was due to the fact that Southern planning excelled execution. The arrogance of the Ostend Manifesto was too crude even for a doughface president, and Cuba remained unsecured. The filibustering of William Walker in Nicaragua failed as that of Lopez in Cuba had done; neither failed for lack of Southern prayers for success. Unable to secure from Mexico a territory large enough for a state, Gadsden did purchase land sufficient for a railroad. But the recommendation, by Davis, of a Southern route went unheeded by congress in the wild passions of a new slavery controversy.

The two years following the election of Pierce had been peaceful years for the South preoccupied with prosperity. With the general government firmly under control, the railroads moving toward the Mississippi, and cotton selling at eleven cents, Southern people could ignore *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, mob interference with the fugitive slave law, and even an occasional passage of a personal liberty law by a Northern state. The mass of people, leaders and laymen, were satisfied with the slavery status, and it was, perhaps, in a genial attempt to extend the compromise (1850) principle of government non-interference in the territories that A. C. Dixon, Whig senator from Kentucky, offered as an amendment to the Kansas-Nebraska bill the repeal of the Missouri



Compromise.<sup>57</sup> Apparently Southerners neither realized that the bill would affect the Pacific railroad situation nor that the amendment would again raise the anti-slavery agitation they deplored. Southern congressmen supported the bill, as Douglas no doubt anticipated, because it repealed the Missouri Compromise, and favored the repeal because the Missouri Compromise had been unconstitutional, had never been carried out, and if it were allowed to stand would surround Missouri with free states. The increasing solidarity of the South was shown by the fact that every Southern Whig senator but one joined the Democrats in support of the bill; two-thirds of the Whig representatives voted for the bill.

Southern congressmen in supporting the Kansas-Nebraska bill had refused to see in it any authorization of squatter-sovereignty and had assumed that with the Missouri Compromise repealed and the old Louisiana law unrestored, the status of slavery would be left to the courts as in the case of Utah and New Mexico. Few Southerners were sanguine enough to hope that Kansas or Nebraska would ever become slave states; as has been seen, Southern planters were inclined to oppose the expansion of slave territory. Southern immigration to Kansas was confined almost wholly to Missouri people, whose migrations across the border coincided closely with territorial elections. Apparently the Southern people remained apathetic in regard to Kansas until the missionary efforts of John Brown on Pottawatomie Creek became known. The formation of the Republican party, its rapid progress in the North, and its bold bid for power in the presidential election of 1856 forced the South in self-defense to turn its attention once more to the slavery issue.

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<sup>57</sup> A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party of the South*, 286.

Although the debacle of 1852 had destroyed the Whig party beyond any hope of resurrection, the mass of Whigs were reluctant to assume the Democratic label however much they might be willing to coöperate with Democrats. In 1856 the homeless Whigs found a temporary refuge in the Native American or "Know Nothing" party. The immigration flood that followed the European revolutions of 1848 had sent many foreigners to the South where they were looked upon without favor. This dislike the Whigs tried to capitalize for the undoing of their ancient enemy, the Democratic party. Whig influence in the South added to Know Nothing principles an opposition to slavery agitation and to disunion. The state elections, however, of 1856 showed that the Whigs were unable to do by proxy what they had failed to do in person, for the Democratic candidates were elected everywhere except in Kentucky and Maryland. In the presidential election of 1856 the Buchanan ticket swept every Southern state except Maryland, which voted for Fillmore, the Native American candidate. Even Kentucky went Democratic. It was so plain in this contest that either Buchanan or Fremont would be elected that Whigs joined the Democrats by thousands. Toombs and Stephens of Georgia, Benjamin of Louisiana, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, and many other influential leaders went over to the Democracy and took their personal following with them. The 500,000 Fillmore votes in the South were cast by people who preferred the Union to slavery, since no Southern man could mistake the menace of the Republican party, and the Democrats during the campaign had openly threatened secession if Fremont were elected. The Fillmore vote came from those sections of the South where slavery and plantation predominated and so reveals again the para-

doxical situation that the slave owners were the least disposed to fight for slavery.

The election of Buchanan was not merely a Democratic victory, but a Southern victory as well, for Buchanan was even more of a doughface than Pierce was. The departments of war, treasury, and interior were placed in charge of Southern men. Foreign affairs were directed by a doughface of such proven fidelity that he could be depended on to lend every aid to Southern plans for expansion. Not altogether losing sight of Cuba, the Southern leaders centered their attention on Mexico. To John Forsyth of Alabama who had replaced Gadsden as minister to Mexico in 1856, Cass sent instructions to buy Lower California, Sonora, and Chihuahua, and to secure transit rights across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Forsyth, unable to procure any of these things, was replaced in 1859 by Robert M. McLane of Maryland who in December of that year finally negotiated a treaty with the distracted Juarez government which gave the United States the coveted right of way across the isthmus, right of way for two other railroads across northern Mexico, and gave the United States the right to intervene in Mexico to put down disorder. That the Southern leaders intended to use railroads and intervention as an opening wedge to annexation, there can be little doubt.

Meanwhile at home the Dred Scott decision had given to the Southern people the court action which they had anticipated in accepting the compromise and the Kansas-Nebraska Act. As a matter of fact the Dred Scott decision changed the status of slavery only in Minnesota, Nebraska, Washington, and Oregon, and changed it only theoretically even there. The South accepted the decision as a triumph of its principles, but not even the most fanatical Democrat expected any of the places

ever to become slave states. The cool heads among the Southern leaders realized that a state might be Southern without being slave; it was the support of free states that had given the South its control of the government since 1850, for since the admission of California the South was a minority even in the senate.

In the seven years following the compromise of 1850 the Old South had moved with decision from victory to victory. It had elected presidents, repealed the Missouri Compromise, extended slavery into all territories, secured Mexican land for a Pacific railroad, reduced the tariff. It was enjoying unexampled prosperity and had gone unscathed through the panic of 1857. Its railroads were building rapidly, its factories were developing, it was even getting its hands on its over-seas trade. It was confident in spirit and arrogant with success. Nothing, apparently, could successfully oppose it. Cotton was King.

## Secession

On March 4, 1850, Senator Mason read to the senate of the United States a speech which Calhoun had written but was too ill to deliver. The Union was in danger, he asserted, because of Southern discontent due to the belief of Southern people that they could no longer remain in the Union consistent with honor and safety. The equilibrium between the two sections had broken down as a result of Southern exclusion from the territories, of the federal system of revenue and disbursement, and of the increasing powers of congress. This loss of equilibrium was vital because of the difference of interests in the two sections. Unless some way were devised by which the South could defend its interests against a superior North, secession must inevitably result.

The analysis made by Calhoun was as valid for conditions in 1860 as it had been for those of ten years before. It was quite evident in 1860 that secession was the result of ill-will between North and South which distorted the acts and words of both and made them mutually suspicious. This ill-feeling between the two sections, Calhoun said, had its origin in the struggle over the tariff and was itself a cause of the slavery controversy. There are reasons, however, for thinking that the tariff struggle, like the slavery struggle, was an expression of ill-will rather than its cause. It is possible that indignation over the attempt to exclude slavery from Missouri made the South more ready to detect the injuries result-

ing to her from a tariff beneficial to the North. At any rate, the issue between North and South was joined over the tariff and at no time before 1860 was there a truce between the combatants. There were many people, both North and South, who doubted if either section were so vitally affected by the tariff as its leaders asserted, but there was not a time before 1860 when Northern congressmen would not have raised the tariff if they had been able nor Southern congressmen have lowered it if they had possessed the power.

With interests allegedly conflicting, it was inevitable that each section should try to gain control of the machinery of government in order to promote its own welfare at the expense of its opponent. That the South was successful in this struggle is easily evident. Alexander H. Stephens tried to dissuade Georgians from secession in 1861 by showing that the South had controlled the Union from the beginning.<sup>58</sup> Before 1860 every president had been a Southerner or a doughface, except the two Adams and Van Buren whose combined terms aggregated only twelve years. The South had supplied 18 of the 29 justices of the supreme court (including both chief justices since 1800), 24 out of 35 presidents (pro tem) of the senate, 23 out of 35 speakers of the house, 14 out of 19 attorneys-general, and 86 out of 140 ministers to foreign countries. Most important of all was that the South had controlled congress to such an extent that since the Missouri Compromise no important law had been made which the South disapproved and no important bill which the South favored with any degree of unanimity had failed to become a law. One by one it had killed the tariff, internal improvements, bounties to fishermen, national banks, and other legislation favor-

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<sup>58</sup> J. T. Carpenter, *The South as a Conscious Minority, 1789-1861, 180-181.*

ing the North passed before the South became consciously sectional.

Since the choosing of officials and the passing of laws are done by majorities, some explanation of the technique of the minority South in achieving these things is required. Until the admission of California in 1850 the South could prevent legislation, treaties, and appointments by its equality in the senate. After 1850 it was outnumbered in the senate as it had always been in the house and the electoral college. But equality in the senate does not explain the Southern success in positive legislation before 1850, nor did the loss of equality in 1850 at all diminish the success of the South thereafter in blocking legislation it did not want or in securing legislation that it did.

It is evident that Southern ability at all times to secure presidents it desired, to secure positive legislation before 1850, and both positive and negative after 1850, depended on the assistance given by Northern people themselves. Sometimes this assistance was secured through threats as in the case of the compromise tariff of 1833 and the compromise of 1850. Generally, it was secured through the agency of the political party, and the Democratic party in particular. Both the Whig and the Democratic party, in order to secure from their members the whole-hearted support necessary to success, made concessions to their aggressive Southern elements. The Democratic party was more pro-Southern than the Whig for the reason that the Southern Democratic vote was larger in proportion to the total Democratic vote than the Southern Whig vote was to the Whig total. The South controlled the Democratic party: the Democratic party controlled the government: therefore, the South controlled the government.

The question, of course, arises, why was the Northern Democracy more disposed to favor the South than the Southern Democracy the North. In its ultimate analysis it was because there was no such spirit of Northern nationalism as there was of Southern nationalism. The Northern people did not think of themselves as Northern except in the geographical sense. Not only was there a lack of common sentiment to unite the people, but there was a conflict of interests to divide. The Northeast and the Northwest were more likely to be antagonists than otherwise on such subjects as tariff, public lands, Indian relations, fishing bounties, banking, and even, at times, internal improvements. Northwestern Democrats had much more in common with Southern Democrats than with Northeastern Democrats. The basis of the alliance between the South and the Northwest has been often elaborated in our histories and need not be labored here. It only needs be pointed out that the two sections in coöperation made the program of the Democratic party and through it determined the policy of the government. As the price of coöperation with the South, the Northwest secured certain legislation, but this legislation was not of the character commonly thought of as "Northern." There were divisions of interest between the cotton states and the tobacco states, but the Democrats were mostly in the cotton states and therefore had common interests. An appeal to Southern nationalism could generally quiet any antagonism between upper and lower South.

It was because they realized the utility of a national party in controlling the government that Southern leaders were so violently opposed to Calhoun's attempt to form a strictly Southern party. Such a party would be useless except in the face of a divided North. But, as was often pointed out, the very formation of a Southern



party would tend to unite the North in opposition. From 1850 to 1860 leaders of both parties in the South were constantly appealing to their excited followers to put their trust not in Southern action, but in "our Northern friends." That the South seceded in 1861 was because it had lost faith in the willingness of the Democratic party to fight for Southern interests. In the election of 1860 the Democrats secured control of both senate and house, and the supreme court was not only Democratic but Southern. But the Democratic party in the North, it seemed to the South, was almost as anti-slavery as the Republican, and its congressmen, of course, reflected the opinions of their constituents. The South thought, rightly or wrongly, that Northern people were united against it, and the only safety lay in secession. In Calhoun's words it could no longer remain in the Union consistent with honor and safety.

In all probability the Southern leaders were wrong in their diagnosis. Not that they were wrong in refusing to accept Lincoln's assurance that he would not oppose slavery in the states, but only its extension to the territories.<sup>59</sup> The South estimated Lincoln as a sincere man at any one time but primarily a politician always able to find reasons for changing his convictions as the majority demanded. But in its excitement the South overrated the anti-slavery sentiment at the North. Even the Republican party was far from being anti-slavery. Republicans were primarily anti-Democrat, just as the Whigs had been anti-Democrat. They were a heterogeneous mass of oppositionists, held together only by the hope of plunder. Some hoped to use the party for the promotion of abolition, others for a protective

<sup>59</sup> The menace to slavery of Lincoln's election was debated by A. C. Cole and J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton in *American Historical Review*, vols. XXXVI and XXXVII, July, 1931, and July, 1932, respectively.

tariff, others for low-priced lands. There were the usual number of carrion attracted by the prospect of a corpse. That such a hydra-headed organization could ever have held together for any deliberate program, anti-slavery or otherwise, is not likely. Moreover, like parties in general, it probably would have been more conservative in office than when seeking it.

The act of secession was the ultimate expression of that doctrine of state rights which is commonly regarded as something peculiarly Southern. Yet a study of Southern history is likely to leave one with the impression that the attractions of state rights for the South lay in its utility rather than its principle. As long as the national government was working to Southern advantage, Southern people were nationalists; when it threatened harm, they retreated behind the bulwarks of state rights. A Southern president bought Louisiana and fathered an embargo. Southern leaders originated, and Southern votes passed, acts for the first protective tariff and the second national bank. The South accepted, and even solicited, federal aid for roads, canals, and railroads. No greater invasion of state rights was ever attempted than was the fugitive slave law of 1850. On the other hand, every assertion of state rights by the South was utilitarian; a device for gaining something it wanted. South Carolina was not intent on establishing the principle of nullification, but in lowering the tariff. Georgia was not interested in defying the supreme court but in getting the Indians removed. Kentucky and Virginia put out their famous resolutions not to curb the central government but to bring down the Federalist party.

As a matter of fact, the doctrine of state rights was as popular, and as often asserted, in the North as in the South. It would be difficult to find in the South at any time a more vigorous expression of state rights than in

New England during the embargo and the War of 1812. The Hartford Convention and the Nashville Convention were singularly alike in purpose, spirit, and action. The personal liberty laws of the fifties were as much defiance of the central government as any action in the South. In 1860 there was no state, North or South, which had not at some time through its regularly constituted authorities, practiced nullification and asserted the constitutionality of secession.

Whether secession was constitutional or not is now an academic (that is, a dead) question.<sup>60</sup> Whether states could or could not leave the Union, we may at least be sure of two things. The original thirteen states went into the Union thinking they could leave when they desired, and the belief in secession was almost universally held in 1860 both North and South. In the final analysis, a state could constitutionally leave the Union if it retained under the constitution the "sovereignty, freedom, and independence" it undoubtedly possessed under the Confederation. No state, North or South, up to 1860 had failed to claim repeatedly the possession of these three virtues.

The secession movement in the South was of ancient ancestry and slow growth. It was recognized as the *ultima ratio* of the nullification movement in South Carolina. Following that episode there was ever present in the South a group of leaders who were known as secessionists *per se* in that they advocated secession as a better course for the South irrespective of Northern attitude and action. Robert Barnwell Rhett and W. H. Hammond were the most prominent of this group. Later they were joined by Governor Quitman of Mississippi,

<sup>60</sup> The Southern view of secession as a constitutional measure is elaborately presented in the first volume of Alexander H. Stephens, *The War Between the States*.

Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, Edmund Ruffin of Virginia, W. L. Yancey of Alabama, and others. Until late in the fifties the secessionists *per se* were discredited in the South as fanatics in much the same way that Garrison was in the North. As long as the South controlled the government of the United States, Southern people had little inclination to "calculate the value of the Union." But most Southern people believed in secession if events justified it, and in the three years preceding the election of 1860 an increasing number became convinced that the justification had arrived.

The first event, perhaps, that played directly into the hands of the secessionists was the refusal of congress to admit Kansas as a slave state in 1858 on the ostensible ground that her constitution had not been submitted to a vote of the people. The Southern leaders looked upon this as a mere subterfuge since all the states before 1817, and five since, had been admitted without submitting their constitutions to a popular vote. This action of congress gave the South its first check since the compromise and it is possible that the sting of unaccustomed defeat intensified the Southern indignation. It was quite in vain that cool men like Howell Cobb pointed out that if Kansas were admitted as a slave state against the wishes of her people she would be useless to the South.<sup>61</sup> From this time the writings and speeches of Southern leaders are filled with bitterness and indignation, and there is a growing disposition to leave a Union now become intolerable.

The capture of the house by the Republicans and Free Soilers in 1858 also had the effect of increasing the strength of the secession movement in the South,

<sup>61</sup> U. B. Phillips, editor, *Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb*, in *American Historical Association Annual Report*, 1911, vol. II, 424.

since it indicated that the legislative department of the government was passing into the hands of the avowed enemies of slavery. The Freeport Doctrine announced by Douglas this same year in his successful effort to return to the senate was another thing that stirred the Southern people, making the Dred Scott decision and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise take on the semblance of barren victories. Nothing, however, so strengthened the hands of the secessionists as did the John Brown raid. Southern people could not endure the menace of a servile insurrection. The Southern states began purchasing arms and preparing for eventualities, and a proposed conference of the Southern states at Atlanta was defeated only by the refusal of Virginia to take part. The organization of the house in 1859 with the election of a Republican speaker and the subsequent appointment of committees dominated by anti-slavery men increased Southern unrest and strengthened the secession movement.

There were other things. Within the ten years after the compromise every Northern state east of the Mississippi, except Ohio and Illinois, passed personal liberty bills which to all intents and purposes nullified the fugitive slave law. Some of the penalties against a Southerner trying to reclaim his property were as follows: <sup>62</sup>

STATE	FINE	IMPRISONMENT
Maine .....	\$1,000	5 years
Vermont .....	2,000	15 years
Massachusetts .....	5,000	5 years
Connecticut .....	5,000	5 years
Pennsylvania .....	1,000	3 months
Indiana .....	5,000	14 years
Michigan .....	1,000	10 years
Wisconsin .....	1,000	2 years
Iowa .....	1,000	5 years

The number of fugitive slaves was not large in proportion to the slave population, and the loss fell mostly on the border states, but neither of these facts lessened the indignation of the cotton South. The personal liberty bills were judged at the South by their purposes and not by their effects.

The refusal of admission to Kansas had shown how the will of a state on slavery might be blocked by congress; the Freeport Doctrine pointed out how even a supreme court decision might be obviated by a territory. To the South both ideas were equally vicious. The John Brown raid of 1859 indicated, by the countenance given it in high places in the North, that slavery was not even to remain unmolested in the old established slave states. Throughout the South public opinion crystallized into the conviction that the Republican party must be destroyed or that the South must secede in self-defense. Extreme state rights leaders declared that not even the destruction of the Republican party would assure the safety of the South, for Northern Democrats were often as rabidly anti-slavery as Republicans were.

Against this rising tide of discontent the dwindling remnants of the old Whigs fought valorously and vainly. They tried to distract Southern thoughts from political and sectional issues to economic ones. They urged on the building of railroads, the promotion of manufactures, the establishment of shipping lines, and the exploitation of the Amazon Valley. They even at times advocated the taxing of Northern imports and shipping, the deportation of Northern firms doing business in the South, and the boycotting of Northern industry. But by 1860 the secessionists had gained control of the local Democratic organizations in the cotton states and were prepared to force ultra-Southern views on the national

Democracy or abandon it. Since either course would bring about that Republican success which the secessionists insisted would be the signal for disunion, it is evident that they preferred Southern independence to a Union controlled by the South.

The election of 1860 showed clearly how a devotion to shibboleths and slogans can blind men to the realities of a situation. When certain of the cotton states instructed their delegates to the Charleston convention to withdraw if the convention rejected the Dred Scott decision as the party platform, they were demanding something of the Northern delegates that would have meant the loss of every Northern state to the Democracy had it been conceded. The decision was the law of the land whether endorsed or not, and however much Douglas may have believed in squatter sovereignty he could not as president have substituted it for the decision. There are scant grounds for believing that Douglas's adherence to squatter sovereignty was more than an election expedient which had served him well in 1858, might serve again in 1860, and could be reconciled with the decision once he were elected. When the Southern delegations withdrew from the convention and disrupted it, their course was disapproved throughout the South, except in South Carolina, and even the regular party organizations in the withdrawing states displayed a tendency to compromise. Every state, except South Carolina, reaccredited to Baltimore the delegations which had withdrawn from Charleston; the Baltimore delegates were also accredited to Richmond with the understanding that that convention should take no action if harmony could be established at Baltimore. Enthusiasm for suicide was not altogether confined to the secessionists as was shown by the action of Douglas men in sending

contesting delegations from Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Georgia, and of the Baltimore convention in seating them. The regularly accredited delegates of the cotton states, the full delegations of California and Oregon, a majority of the delegates of Massachusetts, and a minority of the Pennsylvania and Minnesota delegates withdrew from the Baltimore convention, nominated Breckenridge and Lane on a Dred Scott decision platform, and had their action confirmed by the reassembled Richmond convention. Newspaper reporters, commenting on the proceedings of this wild medley of conventions, declared that the Southern insistence on the Dred Scott decision was primarily for the purpose of eliminating Douglas. As a matter of fact, twice during the convention Douglas authorized his managers to withdraw his name, but in both cases his telegrams were suppressed.<sup>63</sup>

The Constitutional Unionists, under which name the Whigs made their last attempt to escape incorporation in the Democracy, were as hide-bound as were the Democrats themselves. They were Southern nationalists quite as much as the Breckenridge men were, quite as devoted to the Dred Scott decision, and quite as ardently hated the Republicans and all their ways. They abhorred secession, but by retaining their separate organization they did their utmost to bring secession to pass. An Epimetheus of today might be pardoned for thinking that the only people in the South who preferred the Union to their shibboleths were the men who cast their votes for Douglas.

From the time of the Richmond and Baltimore nominations, all but the most sanguine followers of the re-

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<sup>63</sup> M. Halstead, *A History of the National Political Conventions of the Current Presidential Campaign* is a lucid description by "an eye-witness of them all."



spective candidates conceded the election of Lincoln and directed their chief energies toward fixing upon their Southern opponents the responsibility for the event. Scattered hopes that the election might go to the house disappeared after the fall elections in Northern states.<sup>64</sup> The Breckenridge men in the cotton states welcomed the election of Lincoln assuming that it meant disunion; in Charleston the news of his election was received with enthusiastic cheering.<sup>65</sup> In the upper South the state legislatures were controlled by Bell and Douglas men and remained inactive; in the lower South the Breckenridge faction was in control and took prompt steps for secession.

No dispassionate analysis of the popular vote in the North in 1860 can interpret it as an anti-slavery vote. Congress remained Democratic and the most that could be feared from it was a refusal to admit further slave states. But Southern realists in 1860 knew that slavery had reached the natural limits of its expansion in the United States as then constituted, and that, with the possible exception of Kansas, further slave states were impossible, irrespective of congressional action.<sup>66</sup> It is not likely that any attempt would have been made to overthrow the Dred Scott decision since climate and soil had robbed it of all practical significance in the then territories. The South was doomed to be a minority; yet it had always been a minority and, notwithstanding, had been able to rule. Southern realists knew that a state admitted without slavery was not necessarily a state opposed to slavery in the South. It is difficult to escape the

<sup>64</sup> U. B. Phillips, *Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb*, 500-501.

<sup>65</sup> D. L. Dumond, editor, *Southern Editorials on Secession*, 226.

<sup>66</sup> C. R. Ramsdell, "The Natural Limits of Slavery Expansion," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. XVI, 151.

conclusion that the secessionists in the South were using the anti-slavery menace as a bogie man to frighten Southern people into an adherence to their pre-arranged program. How little fear of anti-slavery action there was on the part of the great slave owners is shown by their opposition to secession.

The secessionists were, or thought themselves to be, Southern nationalists working for the independence of the South as a method of protecting Southern rights; no one pretended that he was moved merely by devotion to his own state alone. But since the South as a section had no constitutional standing, its independence could be gained only through the secession of the separate states of which it was composed inasmuch as each state had rights under the constitution including, presumably, that of secession. Since secession was unprecedented there was no established method of seceding. In the absence of an approved technique, South Carolina left the Union as she had entered it, through a convention called by her legislature. By February 1, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas followed South Carolina into secession and adopted her technique. Mississippi and Texas had submitted to the people the question of entering the Union; Texas submitted to them the question of leaving it.

Having secured independence through state rights, the seceding states at once gave expression to their Southern nationalism by forming a Southern Confederacy. The invitation extended to *all* the Southern states by Alabama in her Ordinance of Secession to send delegates to a convention at Montgomery, February 4, was accepted only by the seceding states and the delegates of one of these, Texas, did not arrive in Montgomery in time to take part in the proceedings. The other six states in forming

the Confederacy adopted a constitution so near that of the United States as to justify their contention that they had left the Union but not its constitution. The choice for vice-president of Alexander H. Stephens who had supported Douglas, was a personal friend of Lincoln, and had opposed the secession of Georgia, was an open attempt to enlist the support of the Southern conservatives. Jefferson Davis was made president probably in recognition of his freedom from local attachments and of his devotion to Southern nationalism.<sup>67</sup> In the spring of 1861 the constitution of the Confederate States was ratified by conventions in the seven seceded states, the only opposition appearing in South Carolina where extreme state rights men charged that the Confederate government was too centralized.

The Montgomery convention invited the other Southern states to join the Confederacy, but for the time being the invitation went unaccepted. The legislatures of the tobacco states, controlled by Douglas and Bell men, did not judge the election of Lincoln a just cause for secession and refused to call conventions to consider the question except in Tennessee, where the convention when called was controlled by Unionists and in North Carolina where it was rejected by popular vote. Instead they worked diligently for compromise and conciliation. Senator Crittenden of Kentucky introduced compromise resolutions in the senate which all the tobacco states supported. When this effort failed, Kentucky memorialized congress for the calling of a national convention, and Virginia called a peace conference which met at Washington under the presidency of John Tyler the same day the Montgomery convention met under the

<sup>67</sup> N. W. Stephenson, "A Theory of Jefferson Davis," in *American Historical Review*, vol. **XXI**, 73-90.

presidency of Howell Cobb. All the Southern states were present except those which had seceded; all the Northern states except six. During the month of its deliberations the United States and the Confederacy refrained from acts of hostility in accordance with the appeal of Virginia. The Crittenden resolutions never came to a vote, the recommendations of the peace conference were rejected with practical unanimity and congress, having refused to call a national convention, adjourned March 4 leaving the country divided into a resolute North, a resolute Confederacy, and a group of eight slave states between them undecided as to their course. The call to arms following the bombardment of Ft. Sumter furnished them a cause, or excuse, for secession. Virginia was the first to secede (April 17), following her secession with entrance, by treaty, into the Confederacy. Arkansas and North Carolina followed in May. Tennessee did not secede until June 24, but her legislature early in May passed a declaration of independence and made a military alliance with the Confederacy; the declaration was ratified by the people June 8. All these states submitted their acts of disunion to popular ratification. In Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee the ancient spirit of sectionalism showed itself in the opposition of the highlanders to the act of the lowland majorities. In Virginia sectionalism seized its opportunity to bring about the state division which it had long desired. In none of the states is there any evidence that the opposition to secession was due to love of the Union. Maryland and Missouri were overwhelmed by United States forces before the legislatures could act. The decision of Kentucky to remain in the Union but be neutral in the war, although in all probability a ruse of the Union men to prevent secession, undoubtedly reflected the spirit

of Kentuckians of which the principle ingredient is a dislike of unknown things.

By July 20 the Confederacy included all the seceded states, eleven in number. The spirit of Southern nationalism had originated in the attacks on Missouri, forty years before. It had increased in intensity year by year, until by 1860 it was strong enough to enlist all the Southern states, except Kentucky, in a movement for separation in fact from the Northern states. Separation in sentiment there had long been. The Southern states had long been a nation in all but name, bound to each other chiefly by cords of sentiment. In 1861 this common sentiment triumphed over conflicting interests in trade, agriculture, social systems, and many other things, and was sufficient to hold them united. In the war they faced they had little to fear from the North: their chief enemy was their own doctrine of state rights. There was little question of the ability of the Southern Confederacy to defend itself against the United States: the chief question was whether the spirit of nationalism was strong enough to overcome the spirit of state rights and to bring about a community of effort necessary for success.



## The Culture of the Old South





## The Social System

The quantity of the Old South increased tremendously from 1789 to 1860 but its quality remained much the same through the seventy years. Slavery, the plantation system, and the production of staple crops were characteristic of it in 1860 as they were in 1789. Slavery indeed had fastened and increased its hold on the South in a way that completely reversed the prospects of 1789. At the time of the eighth census the people of the South were as much a rural people and as much given to agriculture as they were when the first census was taken. Cities were still small and few. There were but three cities in the South that had a population of over a hundred thousand, and one of these, Baltimore, was as much Northern almost as it was Southern, while St. Louis, the most rapidly growing of the Southern cities, could with much better grace be called a Western city than a Southern. New Orleans, ranking next to Baltimore in population, was certainly a Southern city, and Louisville with about a third as much population ranked fourth. The total population of all the other Southern cities combined did not run much over a hundred thousand. Charleston which had been the leading city in 1790 now ranked barely fifth and was losing population in the last decade before the War between the States.

In 1860 the fifteen slaveholding states had a population of 12,240,000 of which nearly 4,000,000 were slaves and 250,000 free negroes. The eight million whites were distributed somewhat unevenly over the South.

Virginia was the most populous state, Missouri second, and Kentucky third. The South Atlantic states were growing very slowly because their people were continually being drawn off to the West and the Western states were growing very rapidly because they were receiving them. In 1790 the population of the South had been almost exactly equal to that of the North; in 1860 the North outnumbered it almost two to one. This disparity of numbers is to be accounted for neither by a difference in the birth rate nor in the rate of mortality. For the most part it was due to the fact that the Old South during that period had received very little immigration from abroad and that the expansion of the Southern people had carried a great many of them into Northern territory.

One of the most striking features of the Old South was the homogeneity of its people. The census of 1860 gave the number of foreign born people in the South as 536,692, a number that would have to be considerably increased in order to get the number of those of foreign descent. This was only a little over one-eighth of the total foreign born population of the United States and even those who did come to the South were not widely distributed. Missouri contained nearly a third of the foreigners of the South, while Louisiana had about half as many, and Maryland was a very close third. Kentucky was fourth. With the exception of Louisiana, the lower South had very few foreigners: Florida and North Carolina were practically without them and Mississippi and South Carolina had only a handful each. Statistics showed that most of the foreigners in the South went to the cities. Nearly two-thirds of those in Missouri lived in St. Louis, while Baltimore and New Orleans had an equal proportion of those living in Maryland

and Louisiana. Practically all those in South Carolina lived in Charleston, and Mobile absorbed two-thirds of those in Alabama. There were more Germans than any other nationality, with the Irish coming second. The former were in the majority in the border states and Texas; the Irish in Virginia and the lower South.

It has always been a mooted question why the foreigners did not go to the South. Certainly it was not because there was any antipathy to them on the part of the Southern people, for there is abundant evidence that the South welcomed them. This was particularly true of the Irish who were generally day laborers and were in great demand in the South for all the dangerous tasks in which the farmer or planter did not wish to risk the life of a slave. If an Irishman died it merely increased the Kingdom of Heaven; if a slave were killed there was \$1,500 gone. The South never had as great a labor supply as it needed and for this reason foreign labor was greatly in demand. Nor could the failure of the foreigners to go South have been due in any great measure to any repugnance felt by them to slavery or to negroes or to a reluctance to put themselves into competition with slave labor. We have no reason to suppose that the foreign immigrants to the United States were abolitionists from conviction or that they were well-informed about labor conditions at the South. It was as easy to secure land in the Southwest as it was in the Northwest and the prospects of profits were quite as good. The great mass of Southern people were not slave owners but worked their farms with their own labor. Certainly it would have been possible for the foreigners to have done the same. One could live in the South without coming into contact with the slave and without competing with him in any way. Probably the chief reason

why the immigrants stayed out of the South is to be found in the fact that the steamship lines all ran into Northern ports. The immigrant landed in the North because his ship took him there; he either stayed there from the force of inertia or if he went West he had a tendency to follow the parallels. This rather than climate or slavery seems to have been the reason so few of them reached the South.<sup>68</sup>

The census of 1860 showed that there were 355,811 people of Northern birth living in the South and that this was an increase of seventy-five per cent in ten years. These Northern born were, of course, to be found in the greatest numbers in the border states and very few found their way into the lower South. South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia had practically none at all. There was no evident feeling against these ex-Northerners in the Old South and as a matter of fact they rarely retained their Northern qualities for any length of time. They were quickly assimilated in the bulk of the Southern population and completely lost their identity. Northern immigrants to the South entered into all the careers open to Southern people and there are many instances of Southern leaders of Northern birth held in high esteem. A most notable instance of this was Sargent Prentiss of Mississippi. It is little more than romance to picture these Northern born people as a conservative force in the time of secession or as an Union element during the War between the States. The South sent many more immigrants to the North than it received from that section. In 1860 there were 655,496 Southern born people in the population of the North but the increase of the last decade was slight.

The Old South was the subject of many popular mis-

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<sup>68</sup> T. P. Kettel, *Southern Wealth and Northern Profits*, 101.

conceptions during its life, and has been the subject of a great many more since it disappeared. It was common, for example, to speak of it as a "land of cotton" whereas in reality less than half its area was in the cotton area and less than half its people engaged in cotton production. Cotton was as much an object of curiosity in Maryland as in Maine. But the worst misconception was the idea, perpetuated into the present, that the South was a land of plantations where every man owned great droves of slaves whose labor supported him in idleness.

Only a small per cent of the Southern people ever owned slaves. In 1860 there were some 383,000 slave owners in the South out of a total white population of over 8,000,000. A liberal estimate would give to the slave owning families a membership of about 1,600,000, or about one-fifth of the total white population of the South. So far were the Southern people from being slave supported that three out of every four of them had to live, if they lived at all, by the labor of their own hands. As a matter of fact the proportion was much higher than this, since the owner of merely a few slaves could not possibly be supported by their labor. It is only an apparent paradox that the greatest number of slave owners were to be found in Virginia and Kentucky where plantations were least numerous and slavery least profitable, for slavery was first established in Virginia while the two states ranked first and third in population. In all the border states the average number of slaves to an estate was so small, and was so steadily decreasing, that in 1861 there was considerable feeling in the cotton states against inviting them into the Confederacy since they seemed certain of soon becoming free soil and consequently abolitionist.

The four million slaves at the South in 1860 were

about evenly divided between the older states (including Georgia) and the new. The slaves of the Atlantic and border states were practically all natives of the states where they were owned, while in the newer cotton states one-third to one-half the slave population had been brought in from other states or from Africa. It has been estimated that 270,000 slaves were smuggled into the United States after 1808, but the census of 1870 counted only about 2,000 negroes who admitted their African birth. Practically all these were in the gulf states and South Carolina. With the exception of the smuggled articles, the non-native slaves of the Southwest had been brought in by their immigrating owners or had reached their destination through the agency of the domestic slave trade. The domestic slave trade began about 1820 and by 1860 had resulted in the transfer of some 300,000 slaves from the tobacco states where slavery was less profitable to the cotton states where there was an insatiable demand. Virginia was the chief source of supply for the slave trade; in 1870 there were 160,000 Virginia born negroes living in the other Southern states. The constant exodus of slaves from Virginia without any apparent decrease in her slave population gave rise to the abolition taunt, indignantly denied by the Virginians, that slave breeding had supplanted agriculture in the plantation economy of the old dominion.<sup>69</sup> Slavery had practically disappeared in Delaware by 1860, while in South Carolina and Mississippi slaves outnumbered the white people and almost equalled them in number in Louisiana. The 250,000 free negroes in the South in 1860 were mostly in the tobacco states and for the most part were descendants of slaves set free before 1820,

<sup>69</sup> Frederic Bancroft, *Slave-trading in the Old South*, 67-87. For a refutation see U. B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery*, 361-362.

since the Southern states in general denied state residence for more than a year to emancipated slaves.

The slaves of the South were divided almost equally between farm and plantation, a farmer being defined as a man who lived by the sweat of his brow, and a planter one who lived by the sweat of slave brows. The classification of slaveholders in 1850 indicates that there were about 100,000 plantation owners in the South and since it was the custom to employ not more than sixty slaves on a plantation, the number of plantations was considerably in excess of the number of planters. On both farm and plantation the slaves were of two kinds, house servants and field hands. The former were the slave aristocracy, in constant contact with their owners, imitating their speech and demeanor, trusted with authority and freedom of movement, and commonly repaying the trust in them with loyalty and devotion. It is the house servant that has become the stock type of fiction. Novels, the stage, and innumerable ballads have immortalized the black mammy, the cook, the pompous coachman, and the devoted body-servant. In their own parlance the house servants "belonged" to the family in much the same way as the white members of the household. They took great pride in their privileged conditions and affected equal disdain for the field hands and the po' white trash. The field hands far outnumbered the house servants and in striking contrast to them their lives were strictly regimented. They lived in quarters, had their food dealt out to them in weekly rations, worked in gangs in the fields under the supervision of an overseer on the plantation and of their owner on the farm. On the large plantations they rarely came in contact with any white person other than the overseer, and they were forbidden to leave the plantation without a pass. Any

loyalty on the part of the field hands to their owners was the loyalty of inertia and dread of change. The field hand rarely figures in fiction, although he has a certain standing in ballad literature.

On the plantation the character of slave life and the profits of his labor largely depended on the overseer. Planters chose their overseers with the same care that manufacturers used in selecting managers for their factories. The two things required of the overseer were that he should be able to get along with the slaves and that he should be a practical agriculturist. Elaborate regulations governed his management of the slaves, specifying the amount of their food, the quality of their punishments, the amount of labor to be exacted from them, and many similar things. Equally elaborate regulations specified the amount of cotton, corn, and other crops to be raised. The fact that the plantation was generally profitable may indicate that the overseer was normally efficient, but there can be little doubt that he was universally detested by the slaves.

The plantation was profitable because slave labor was profitable. Slave labor was slow, clumsy, and inefficient, but all these defects were more than offset by its steadiness. It was not subject to strikes or labor disturbances; it was not interrupted by drunkenness or merrymaking or wage disputes. As long as the slave was contented, his labor would result in a profit to his owner. Every Southern slave owner realized the necessity of keeping his slaves in a good humor, for there was no way of dealing with a sullen slave without impairing his usefulness as a laborer. Fortunately, the task of keeping slaves contented was not a difficult one for an owner who understood them. A plentiful supply of food, a reasonable amount of rest, occasional gifts and holidays were nor-



mally all that was required. That the slave of the South was reasonably contented may well be believed, although the testimony is almost exclusively that of his owners. From the physical side his working hours were long but not strenuous; from the psychological side, since he had never known freedom, he looked upon slavery not as a degradation but as a routine. He took no thought of the future nor needed to. In sickness and in health, in his childhood and his old age he was assured of an income proportioned to his necessities and not to his productiveness. From the moment he was born he became the recipient of an annuity that continued until his death. In the security of bondage he probably gave little thought to the unknown attractions of freedom.

The plantation owners constituted the aristocracy of the South. They were, as has been indicated, few in numbers and more numerous in the cotton states than in the tobacco states. Contemporary fiction and abolition propaganda made every Southerner an aristocrat and the owner of a plantation. The planters were the most articulate class of the Old South and modesty was not one of their besetting weaknesses. They saw no reason to refrain from publishing their virtues and merits to their contemporaries, and since the passing of the Old South many a book of reminiscence has pictured them in the lenient light of distant memory. The planter was generally a wealthy man, but since his wealth was invested principally in land and slaves he was often in need of ready money. Fiction represents the planters as improvident and impractical, but the mass of them were certainly successful business men whose net income was derived from the steadiness of slave labor and large-scale production. The planter regarded his plantation primarily as a business enterprise, and only secondarily

as a home. Southern plantations, then, were likely to appear unkempt to people accustomed to the carefully tended homes of the North or of the upper South. A soil prolific in weeds, bushes, and briars, but chary of grass contributed to the ragged appearance of farm and plantation. The planter built his house in 1860 as he did in 1700. The Southern mansion had, and has, a widespread reputation for beauty and comfort, but travellers reported it as being more often undistinguished in architecture and lacking in convenience compared to Northern houses. Doubtless there were as many varieties of plantation houses as there were of plantation owners, although in both cases convention tended to produce uniformity. Some of the planters were Chevalier Bayards and a surprisingly large number of them, if we can believe the reports of travellers perhaps not unbiased, were veritable Squire Westerns. As a rule a planter's culture and refinement would depend on how long he had been a planter and on where he lived. For the planter class was constantly being recruited from the farmers, and in the Western states plantation life lacked many of the graces and punctilios characteristic of the East. His hospitality was abundant but by no means indiscriminating and there is plentiful evidence that he treated with scant courtesy visitors who presented themselves without proper credentials.

There was considerable justification for the Northern complaint that Southern planters were arrogant and overbearing. They were never afraid to look upon the wine when it was red, but drunkenness was hardly the exclusive attribute of any class or section in the United States of ante-bellum times. The planter conventions permitted a considerable liberality in personal morals, demanded an attitude of reverence for women, and took

for granted a devotion to that sum of principles which is called honor. To take some part in politics was almost a canon of his class.

While the overseer managed the plantation and the slaves did the manual labor, the planter lived a life of ease. He entertained his neighbors and entertained them royally. In the summer he made the rounds of the summer resorts, in the pine woods of the Carolinas, at White Sulphur Springs in Virginia, or even at Saratoga. He owned his stable of horses and his kennel of dogs and he was present at all the fox hunts in the neighborhood. He ordered his clothes, with many maledictions, from Northern tailors, and in the interstices of outdoor life read the *Charleston Mercury* or the *Richmond Enquirer* or the *Louisville Journal* so that he might be able to discuss the intricacies of politics with his friends. He was commonly a justice of the peace and dealt out the high, low, and middle justice. He was often a member of his state legislature or of the national congress. His place in society was secure and so was that of his family. To the Southern planter nothing was more evident than that the Lord had looked down upon him as the choicest work of His hands and had pronounced him good.

By far the most numerous class of the South was that of the farmers. They constituted about five-sixths of the total white population of the South. One-fifth of them were slave owners, but whether the farmer owned slaves or not he was forced to labor in the field in order to make a living. It is evident, then, that the great mass of white people in the South were working people, ignorant of the supposed fact that white people could not endure the Southern sun and equally oblivious of any hypothetical stigma on manual labor. It is also evident that the white people of the South had no aversion to laboring in com-

pany with the slave. Statistics of slavery and population indicate that the majority of the planters lived in the cotton states, due to the fact that cotton was more adapted to slave labor than was tobacco. The evidence is overwhelming that the farmers of the cotton states were enthusiastic advocates of slavery, whether they owned slaves or not. For it was through slavery that they saw their only opportunity to increase their wealth and to improve their social standing.<sup>70</sup> Almost invariably the cotton farmer began his life in poverty, making his living by unremitting toil; if his health did not break nor cotton fall too low in price, he might soon begin buying slaves and land, and in the course of time his farm would grow into a plantation and its owner become a planter. It was, of course, not to be expected that he should condemn either the labor system that gave him his chance to rise or the social class into which he hoped to enter. The farmers of the South formed the bulwark of the Democratic party which made itself the protector of slavery interests, and brought about secession, ostensibly, in its defense.

The crops of the farm were the crops of the plantation, except that the farmer did not venture into the production of rice and sugar since these required a capital that he could not command. Life on the farm was hard and monotonous, perhaps harder and more monotonous than in any other section of the United States. Able to gain a competence only by dint of continual application, the farmer lacked the leisure to appreciate, as he lacked the means to procure, the better things of life. From the testimony of travellers it can be gathered that the farmer of the cotton states was most often uneducated although by no means lacking in intelligence, that he was given

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<sup>70</sup> J. D. B. DeBow, *Interest in Slavery of the Southern Non-Slaveholder*.

to hard drinking and even harder swearing, that he read little beyond the almanac if he read at all, and that he was inclined to be boorish but not inhospitable, having about him few of the comforts and conveniences of life and affecting to despise their appearance. In his haste to acquire wealth he was content to live in unbelievable squalor, and his home and farm had such an unkempt appearance that travellers were commonly deceived thereby into thinking him improvident and his farm a losing business. It seems probable that the farmers of the tobacco states lived an easier and less rude life than did those of the cotton states. Their chief selling crop was tobacco, but their agriculture was diversified. There is evidence that farm agriculture throughout the South was more diversified than plantation agriculture.

The lowliest of the lowly in the Old South were the poor white trash. By that slave-bestowed name they were known throughout the South although they had special names in different localities. "Crackers" they were called in Georgia, "sandhillers" in South Carolina, "rag-tag and bob-tail" in Virginia, "squatters" in Alabama and Mississippi, "people of the barrens" in Tennessee. They, as their name indicates, were the paupers of the South, but in reality it was not poverty so much as shiftlessness that set them apart from Southern people. They lived in the pine barrens and on the worn-out land of the South everywhere, and there were perhaps a million of them all told. They were absolutely without energy, initiative, or ambition. They lived in miserable huts and sheds which were generally without any other floors than the earth, and which possessed roofs in name only. Between inadequate roof and non-existent floor their houses consisted rarely of more than one room, and the furniture in them was of the most makeshift

# Slaveholders, 1860

Slaveholders	1 slave	2 slaves	3 slaves	4 slaves	5 slaves	6 slaves	7 slaves	8 slaves	9 slaves
Alabama	5,607	3,663	2,805	2,329	1,986	1,729	1,411	1,227	1,036
Arkansas	281	173	117	88	69	70	50	52	41
Delaware	237	114	74	51	34	19	15	10	8
Florida	863	568	437	365	285	270	225	186	169
Georgia	6,713	4,355	3,482	2,984	2,543	2,213	1,839	1,647	1,415
Kansas	2								
Kentucky	9,306	5,430	4,009	3,281	2,694	2,293	1,951	1,582	1,273
Louisiana	4,092	2,573	2,034	1,536	1,310	1,103	858	771	609
Maryland	4,119	1,952	1,279	1,023	815	666	523	446	380
Mississippi	4,856	3,201	2,503	2,129	1,809	1,585	1,303	1,149	1,024
Missouri	6,893	3,754	2,773	2,243	1,686	1,384	1,130	877	640
North Carolina	6,440	4,017	3,068	2,546	2,245	1,887	1,619	1,470	1,228
South Carolina	3,763	2,533	1,990	1,731	1,541	1,366	1,207	1,095	973
Tennessee	7,820	4,738	3,609	3,012	2,536	2,066	1,783	1,565	1,260
Texas	4,593	2,874	2,093	1,782	1,439	1,125	928	791	667
Virginia	11,085	5,989	4,474	3,807	3,233	2,824	2,393	1,984	1,788
Total in States	76,670	45,934	34,747	28,907	24,225	20,600	17,235	14,852	12,511
Dist. of Col.	654	225	112	72	53	31	24	12	11
Nebraska	1	4				1			
Utah	8	2					1		
Total in Territories	663	231	112	72	53	32	25	12	11
Total in States and Territories	77,333	46,165	34,859	28,979	24,278	20,632	17,260	14,864	12,522

# Slaveholders, 1860

10-15 slaves	15-20 slaves	20-30 slaves	30-40 slaves	40-50 slaves	50-70 slaves	70-100 slaves	100-200 slaves	200-300 slaves	300-500 slaves	500-1000 slaves	1000 and over slaves	Aggregate holders of slaves	Total number of slaves
3,742	2,164	2,323	1,253	768	791	550	312	24	10			33,730	435,080
99	43	35	13	8	6	4						1,149	111,115
17	8											587	1,798
627	349	333	171	99	116	42	45	2				5,152	61,745
4,707	2,823	2,910	1,400	739	729	373	181	23	7	1		41,084	462,198
												2	2
3,691	1,580	1,093	296	96	51	12	6	1				38,645	225,483
2,065	1,157	1,241	695	413	560	469	460	63	20	4		22,033	331,726
1,173	545	487	179	81	75	24	15		1			13,783	87,189
3,432	2,057	2,322	1,143	755	814	545	279	28	8	1		30,943	436,631
1,734	666	349	120	33	26	8	4					24,320	114,931
4,044	2,029	1,977	870	474	423	188	118	11	4			34,658	331,059
3,334	1,876	1,984	1,083	579	710	487	363	56	22	7	1	26,701	402,406
3,779	1,744	1,623	643	284	219	116	40	6	1			36,844	275,719
2,237	1,186	1,095	491	241	194	88	52	2				21,878	182,566
5,686	3,088	3,017	1,291	609	503	243	105	8	1			52,128	490,865
40,367	21,315	20,789	9,648	5,179	5,217	3,149	1,980	224	74	13	1	383,637	3,950,513
20	7	7			1							1,229	3,185
												6	15
1												12	29
21	7	7			1							1,247	3,229
40,388	21,322	20,796	9,648	5,179	5,218	3,149	1,980	224	74	13	1	384,884	3,953,742

quality. The families of these people were most often large, but large or small they all lived together in the one room. They cooked in it, ate in it, slept in it, were born in it, and died in it. There was generally one large home-made bed that did service for the whole family, there was a rough home-made table, and one or two home-made stools. The family was lucky if it possessed an inherited frying pan, and the possession of knives and forks would have been frowned upon as a sycophantic attempt to ape the gentry. The possession of chinaware would have been looked upon as a symptom of effeminacy.

As a class the poor white trash had an unconquerable aversion to work in any form, and only direst necessity could induce them to indulge in it. Each family had a little truck-patch near its cabin and commonly a few acres of corn overrun by weeds. In the spring the families planted their gardens and their corn patches conscientiously, but after that intrusted them to the care of Divine Providence. Yet the members of this class managed not only to multiply but even to prosper. There were no beggars among them. The forests of the South were wide and game was abundant. However poor the rag-tag and bob-tail was, he always possessed a rifle and was an expert in using it. A few hours spent in the forests with old "silver heels" would provide him with meat for a week, and leave a residue to be traded in at the country store for whisky or other necessities. For the poor white trash were notoriously given to drunkenness and, always irresponsible, they became even more so when intoxicated. Occasionally they worked for the farmer or the planter, but the work was always by the day, with the worker apt to quit his job any time he got a dollar or so in his pockets or whenever an unusual



feeling of inertia took possession of him. As a laborer he was considered inferior to the slave, not so much on account of his laziness (the slaves themselves furnished vigorous competition in this respect) as on account of his lack of dependability. Farmer and planter alike disliked him and distrusted him because he set such a bad example for the negro and particularly because he was so singularly inappreciative of the difference between *meum* and *tuum*. Consequently both made it their business to buy him out whenever possible and get him away from the neighborhood. In fact the desire to remove this undesirable class from the community was a by no means inconsiderable cause of the increasing size of farm and plantation.

In appearance the poor white trash were likely – men and women – to be long, lank, and lean. As a class they had a yellowish or greenish color which seems to have been due partly to their habit of habitually eating clay. They were totally ignorant, were generally intelligent, and were hospitable to a fault. They voted the Democratic ticket automatically without hope of reward or fear of punishment. They were generally hard-shell Baptists in religion, if it be proper to speak of their superstitions as religion. They were strong advocates of slavery, their hatred of the slave being due to the proximity of his social status to their own. They looked up to the planting class without envy and without emulation. In the War between the States they threw off the inertia that so hampered them in peace and became very effective fighters in defense of state rights of which they had never heard and of the slaves which they did not own.

Ingenious explanations have been given by various writers of the origin of these peculiar people. Many have professed a belief that they were descendants of

the convict and debtor classes of colonial days. Both their number and their distribution argue against such an explanation, and it is improbable that any one explanation will account for them all. As the Mississippi name indicates, many of them were originally squatters, settling on government land ahead of sale, and moving on when dispossessed. Daniel Boone came dangerously near sinking into this class for this reason. Probably great numbers of them came from the farming class, failing on account of bad management, bad crops, ill-health, or other reason and being hopelessly submerged. For although it was an easy task to sink into this class, it was practically impossible to get out – *Facilis descensus Averno, sed revertare gradum superasque evadere ad auras, hoc opus, hic labor est.*

The progress of modern science has suggested that the inertia and shiftlessness of the poor white trash was a disease rather than a fault.<sup>71</sup> The children – and many of the adults – of the poorer classes in the South went bare-foot practically all the year round, and the hookworm has been found to flourish most in those regions where the poor white trash lived. Certainly in recent years the members of this class when treated for the hookworm have thrown off their inertia and have become as active as other men. We might say in the case of the poor white trash it was not so much that they were inferior as that their talents were latent. They at least were always energetic when they were drunk, and in the War between the States proved themselves brave, enduring, and resourceful soldiers.

The social system of the South may be likened to a three-story white structure on a mudsill of black.

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<sup>71</sup> Paul H. Buck, "The Poor Whites of the Ante-bellum South," in *American Historical Review*, vol. XXXI, 41.

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Planters, farmers, poor white trash, and slaves made up a social order in which only the last named was permanent and incapable of rising. The three white classes were not sharply differentiated and people were constantly shifting from one class to another. There was little friction among them for the superiority of the planter was conceded as freely as it was claimed.



## Education

When the English people came to the South they brought with them as a part of their inheritance the English conception of education. Education was primarily a training for leadership. Since by dint of property qualifications for office holding and even for voting, leadership in the early South was limited to people of means, it followed that education was thought of as a thing reserved for people who could afford to pay for it. It was no part of the business of society to furnish educational facilities free of charge or even to furnish them at all. Of the original six states of the South, only two, North Carolina and Georgia, mentioned education in their constitutions and the mention was brief. "The arts and sciences shall be promoted in one or more seminaries of learning," said the Georgia constitution of 1798, and an injunction was laid upon the legislature to make donations to seminaries.

It was perhaps inevitable, since education was a training for leadership, that education in the Old South should grow more vigorously at the top than at the bottom. Colleges and academies flourished, or at least existed, in the South long before there was any thought of establishing elementary schools. The academy was the distinctive school of the South. It was a school having a corporate existence, operating under a state charter, and governed by a board of trustees which was generally self-perpetuating. Sometimes the academies had endowments from private subscriptions, infrequently they re-

ceived aid from the state, often they enjoyed denominational support, and always they depended chiefly on tuition fees for the necessary replenishment of the exchequer. Their curricula occasionally reached up into college work and more often down into the elementary levels. They were both preparatory schools for the colleges and finishing schools standing alone. They all taught Latin and Greek in response to the firm conviction of the Southern people that these two languages were the foundation of all education. Mathematics was always included in the educational bill of fare, but it was mathematics quite commonly limited to arithmetic and geometry. History was practically an unknown subject and what little attention it received was given to ancient history. The English that was taught was almost entirely grammar (for which, perhaps, something might be said), and the philosophy was chiefly metaphysical with little application to things of this world. Occasionally the academies penetrated into the sciences and into the modern languages, but these were more in the nature of raids than of permanent invasions.

In 1850 there were three thousand of these private academies in the South and they had a student enrollment of over two hundred thousand. Kentucky had the greatest number, but this was probably not so much due to a passion for knowledge in that state as to the fact that many of the academies received state aid. Kentucky adopted the policy of establishing an academy in each county seat and of giving six thousand acres of land to it as an endowment. This policy was certainly not an illiberal one, but it failed of its purpose. The school lands were mostly assigned in the western part of Kentucky where settlement was very slow in penetrating and where land, consequently, had only a nominal value. The Ken-

tucky academies in their need for money for buildings and other purposes sold their land early and at a very low price. Sometimes they invested the proceeds of the sale and almost invariably lost it all. Georgia, like Kentucky, adopted the policy of establishing county academies and of supporting them by land grants. In Louisiana state support of academies began in 1811 and continued increasingly until at the beginning of the public school system in 1847 approximately a million dollars had been expended. In the other Southern states assistance to the academies from the state was negligible and in the case of Arkansas, Florida, and North Carolina, non-existent.

All the academies of the South were private institutions and were privately managed whether they received state aid or not. Some of them, it may be most of them, were secular in character and existed for no more altruistic reasons than similar institutions do of the present day. Many of the academies, however, were denominational institutions, both supported and controlled by the different churches. The Presbyterians, the Methodists, and the Baptists seem to have been the most active in bringing to the wavering structure of education the powerful support of religion. Only in Louisiana did the Catholics extend their activities to education. Very often the strong religious inclination of the founder or manager of an academy gave a decided atmosphere of sectarianism to an academy unsupported and uncontrolled by a denomination. It does not appear that the curriculum or standard of teaching in the denominational academy differed in any material respect from those of the other academies.

As a rule the academies were inclined to be most numerous in the Southern Piedmont, shunning the moun-

tains because of their poverty and the coastal plain for its wealth. Everywhere they were numerous enough to be accessible to all who really wanted an education. Their courses of study and their teachers were sufficient to furnish a well-balanced grammar school education to those who applied. The buildings were commonly rude, the methods antiquated, and the equipment scanty: how much the course of education was hindered by these things is doubtful. Some of the academies had, and deserved, reputations that were nation-wide. Perhaps the most noted was Waddell's, at Willington, South Carolina, where John C. Calhoun, A. B. Longstreet, W. H. Crawford, George McDuffie, H. S. Legaré, James L. Petigru, Howell Cobb, and many other leaders of the Old South were trained. Sunbury Academy in Georgia was a leading secondary school of the South for forty years, and Liberty Hall in Virginia was equally famous. Many of the academies in time grew into institutions of higher learning, as Davidson into the University of Nashville, Prince Edward into Hampden-Sidney, Liberty Hall into Washington, Albemarle into the University of Virginia, and Transylvania into the university of the same name.

It has long been a matter of dispute whether the first state university in the South was established by the sovereign state of North Carolina or the equally sovereign state of Georgia. The former, however, seems to have made a beginning of sorts in 1795 and to have been followed by Georgia and South Carolina six years later. With these the movement for state universities came to a close until the University of Virginia opened its doors in 1826. Alabama and Tennessee established their universities in 1831 and 1832 respectively, while Mississippi and Louisiana delayed for fifteen years longer.



Kentucky had no state university, but Transylvania, for a period, was subject to state regulation and partially supported by state funds. Of these state-supported universities, Virginia was by all odds the most famous. It owed its existence to the dying efforts of Thomas Jefferson, and throughout its entire organization reflected the ideals and ideas of that great reformer.<sup>72</sup> The surpassing beauty of its architecture distinguished it then as it does now. The high attainments of its faculty drawn from the best scholars of Europe and America, the liberality and freedom of its studies, its increasing traditions of liberty of thought and expression, were all matters of pride throughout the South. It exerted a profound influence on the history of the Old South and the roll-call of its alumni is almost a roll-call of Southern leadership. South Carolina College, at Columbia, owed both its existence and its location to the determination of the tide-water planters to unify the state, and to its teachings and influence was due in considerable measure the political unanimity of the South Carolinians. Thomas Cooper was its president for a number of years and brought to its administration the pugnacity and devotion to personal liberty that had previously distinguished him in Northern politics.<sup>73</sup> Francis Lieber was once a member of its faculty. Transylvania, the first institution of higher learning west of the mountains, was during its most flourishing period under the administration of the famous Doctor Holley and had a number of famous men on its faculty, including the learned and eccentric Rafinesque.

The Southern states exercised great self-control in supporting their universities. North Carolina supported

<sup>72</sup> R. J. Honeywell, *The Educational Work of Thomas Jefferson*, 67-134.

<sup>73</sup> Dumas Malone, *The Public Life of Thomas Cooper, 1783-1839*, 251-281.

its university by land script and escheats. South Carolina College received six thousand dollars annually from the state. Georgia gave her university an endowment of eighty thousand acres of land and six thousand dollars annually for its support. The University of Virginia was given an annual grant of fifteen thousand dollars by its proud and hesitant legislature. The public land states of the newer South were given land grants by the United States, but these were as badly mismanaged in the South as similar ones were in the North. In every case the universities had to rely chiefly on tuition fees to keep the wolf from the door. The wonder is that with such small resources the universities were able even to stay in existence; that they did and in addition performed their allotted tasks of training the Southern leaders shows that the spirit of sacrifice was abroad in the South as elsewhere.

In addition to the state universities there was an unusually large number of denominational institutions in the South designed to further the cause of higher education. Tennessee and Kentucky ranked first in the number of colleges of this kind; Texas and Arkansas struggled for the last place. The colleges of Virginia were probably the strongest in the South. William and Mary represented Episcopal control; Emory and Henry, and Randolph-Macon, Methodist; Richmond, Baptist; and Roanoke, Lutheran. In North Carolina, Wake Forest, Davidson, and Trinity represented Baptist, Presbyterian, and Methodist respectively. In South Carolina, the Methodists had Wolford, the Baptists, Furman, and the Lutherans, Newberry. In Georgia Oglethorpe was a Presbyterian school, Mercer, Baptist, and Emory, Methodist. In Kentucky, Transylvania was at different times controlled by Presbyterians and Methodists, and

when the latter became dominant the Presbyterians established Centre. It is a matter of debate whether education is a benefit to religion; there is no doubt that religion has often been the best ally of education.

The Southern ante-bellum colleges were not coeducational, although a small per cent of the academies were. Women, as a matter of fact, were not provided for in the Southern educational philosophy since the South had no disposition at all to encourage feminine leadership. For women the South considered education more in the light of a social adjunct than anything else. Consequently the "female academies" of the South were more in the nature of finishing schools than of institutions of learning. Their chief aim was the imparting of social graces and the adding of such knowledge as was useful for social success. They were probably not any worse in the South than in other parts of the United States. The most noted of them were the Ursuline Convent in Louisiana, La Grange Female College in Georgia, Science Hill in Kentucky, Mary Baldwin and Hollins in Virginia, and Warrenton Female College in North Carolina.

As for statistics, the South had in 1860 two hundred and sixty colleges and universities, with fifteen hundred teachers, and over twenty-five thousand students. This was more than half the colleges of the United States, and practically half the teachers and students. Throughout the South the enrollment in colleges and universities was very small, very few institutions going over five hundred students and most of them hovering around a hundred. The course of study was very limited, although not more so, perhaps, than in other sections of the United States. Practically all the Southern leaders in national affairs were college graduates and so were the most

prominent of those in state politics. A college degree in the Old South carried with it a considerable amount of social prestige and was a decided assistance on the road to political prominence.

The obligation of the state to provide free elementary education was an idea that developed very late in the history of the South. Idealists like Jefferson had preached and had fought for it, but they had died disappointed men. It was the problem of their indigent but ambitious children that finally forced the Southern people to embark on the policy of establishing free schools. Some of the Southern states had attempted to provide for their indigents by appropriating money to pay their tuition fees in the academies, but this arrangement had the effect of dividing the students into classes, and of stigmatizing one class as pauper. For this reason only a comparatively few of the indigent children were allowed by their families to take advantage of state aid. There was obviously but one way out of the dilemma and the South took it, but took it belatedly and with evident reluctance. It provided free schools for all children, thereby avoiding all distinctions of rich and poor. In the South Atlantic states the free school movement gained impetus as a result of the constitutional reforms of the thirties; in the Southwest the movement was furthered, perhaps, by the rising of Jacksonian democracy.

Of the Southern states South Carolina stands out conspicuously for its early establishment of free schools, for the support it gave them, and for its methods of management. An act of the legislature in 1811 established in each district as many free schools as the district had representatives in the state legislature; each school was to receive three hundred dollars annually for its schools for each representative it had. The schools were

free to all, but if they became over-crowded preference was to be given to the poor. This last provision had the result in some measure of classing the schools as charitable institutions and for this reason there developed a certain reluctance on the part of the wealthy in making use of them. Also, it may be noted that since representatives in South Carolina were apportioned on a mixed basis of taxes and population, the act had the effect of making schools most numerous in that part of the state which needed them the least and made use of them most infrequently. It would be easy to point out other defects in the system, such as the sums appropriated for the support of the schools. But at any rate aristocratic South Carolina did have a democratic school policy and did support the schools with regularity. It also kept the school administration in the hands of the state officials and did not make the schools themselves dependent on local option. After the action of South Carolina the free school movement in the South seemed to be in a state of complete paralysis for nearly thirty years, but in the roaring forties most of the other states took action beginning (somewhat inopportunistly) with Kentucky in 1838 and ending with Alabama and Texas in 1854.

The Southern states provided for the support of their free schools in various ways. The public land states received a section of each township for the schools but these were so mismanaged and dissipated that they were of little benefit. Several of the states had what they called "literary funds" derived from the proceeds of escheated lands, stock in internal improvements, etc.; Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia were outstanding examples of this. When the surplus was distributed in 1837 the Southern states quite generally set aside their shares, wholly or in part, for the public schools. The very fact that the schools were supported

by special funds and grants shows that they were exotic and in the nature of hot-house plants. In most of the Southern states these special funds were sadly mismanaged, lost in dubious investments, and drawn on for current expenses when the state treasury ran low. Mississippi probably had the worst record in the South, although the historians of Kentucky would probably claim the honor for their own state.

South Carolina was the only state to make the establishment of schools mandatory; the other states made it optional with the county or the township. The county generally had control of the schools. To this permissive character of the educational system of the Old South is largely due the lack of schools in the poorer sections of the states. In no Southern state was there any state action looking toward compulsory attendance. The South stretched its philosophy to the breaking point in making education free; compulsory education would have scandalized it.

As to actual results, there were in 1860 over eighteen thousand schools and nearly six hundred thousand pupils enrolled. This was only one-sixth of the schools of the United States and about one-seventh of the students. The free school movement received its greatest support in the border states of the South. Of illiterate whites the South had in 1860 about half of the United States total of something over a million. Of course, practically the entire slave population was illiterate, and if slaves were counted it would give the South about four times as many illiterates as the remainder of the United States. It is quite evident that the Old South was not enthusiastic in the pursuit of knowledge – at least of such knowledge as could be imparted in its free schools.

As to the character of the free schools at the South,

not much can be said that is definite. The Southerners complained that the great mass of teachers both in the free schools and the academies were Northern and that they both taught Northern ideas and in return for it sent North great sums of Southern money. All this must be taken with more than the usual allowance of salt. The schools were almost entirely one room affairs and we have every reason to believe that the teaching was bad whether it was done by Northern teachers or by Southern. It may safely be conjectured that the free schools of the South, like the colleges and academies, were inferior to those of the Northeast, but it is not likely that they could have been worse than those of the Northwest. The question of efficiency in education, however, is one that it is quite vain to discuss until the world makes up its mind as to the purpose of education and its nature.





## Literature

It is more than probable that in the field of literature the people of the Old South deserved to be ranked as consumers rather than producers. It was not that they neglected to cultivate the literary field; they did, with diligence and fine determination. But the net result of the labor which they took under the sun was a literary output in whose huge quantity only an occasional flash of quality made itself visible. Nor did Southern literature differ materially from that of the North: throughout the United States in the ante-bellum period writing was much less a matter of inspiration than of manual labor. Most of it seemed to be produced by main force and the reading of it, if it were read at all, was confined to those who united strong will power with a stern sense of duty. It can at least be said of the literature of the Old South that it was no worse than that of the North.

There can be little doubt that the most influential type of literature in the Old South was the newspaper. The Old South was well served in this field and the Southern newspapers compare favorably with those of other sections. In the South in 1784 there were but fifteen newspapers; in 1850 there were, excluding Delaware, 67 dailies, 59 tri-weeklies, and 475 weeklies. Quite evidently the weekly was the favorite form of the newspaper in the South, as it was in the North. The greatest number of all sorts was to be found in Virginia. That state had fifteen dailies; Louisiana had eleven, Kentucky nine, Tennessee eight, and South Carolina seven.

If quantity production were a criterion of culture, it would be easy to locate the intelligent people of the Old South.

The best known paper in the Old South was probably the Richmond *Enquirer*. It owed both its fame and its notoriety to the genius of its editor, Thomas Ritchie. Ritchie became its editor in 1804 and remained editor for forty years until he resigned it to his two sons. Ritchie was a strong state rights man who was able on occasion to harmonize his doctrines with the nationalizing tendencies of his Northern brethren. Under his direction the *Enquirer* came to be called the "Democratic Bible," and probably had the largest circulation of the Southern newspapers. It covered the entire South, and Ritchie's influence on the political development of the South can hardly be overestimated. Ritchie believed very firmly in the educational power of vituperation, and his *Enquirer* probably had a higher average in malediction than other newspapers of the time. He had many enemies as was to be expected, and some of these were quite his equal in the gentle art of abuse. Andrew Jackson called him the greatest scoundrel in America, the mildness of this dictum probably being due to the fact that the two men belonged to the same party. Horace Greeley referred to him as the Talleyrand of the press, and his manner of saying it left no doubt in the mind of anyone as to his opinion of Talleyrand. Hezekiah Niles said he was the prince and high priest of weathercocks. The most biting indictment came from John Randolph of Roanoke when he said that Ritchie was a man of seven principles – five loaves and two fishes. A man must have possessed elements of greatness to call forth such encomiums as these.

Still the *Enquirer* was not without competition even

in its own home. There was a Richmond *Whig* as well as a Richmond *Enquirer*, and its editor, John Hampden Pleasants, was a man quite as determined as Ritchie and only a little less able. He was the editor of the *Whig* from 1824 until his death in 1846 and he made it a medium of personal expression quite as completely as Ritchie did the *Enquirer*. The two editors of different political faith fought each other for twenty years with every verbal weapon they could command. The war remained verbal, however, until the elder Ritchie retired to Washington to become the editor of the *Union*. The younger Ritchie, lacking his father's subtleness in abuse, called down upon himself a challenge from the editor of the *Whig*. In the fight that followed Pleasants was so badly wounded that he died in a few days.

Charleston had its Democratic newspaper and its Whig newspaper just as Richmond had. The Charleston *Mercury* was the organ of Robert Barnwell Rhett and was the leading state rights paper in the South. It was a fire-eating, nullification paper whose chief purpose was to "fire the Southern heart" and to nerve Southerners to rid themselves of their "subserviency to the North." It was one of the leading and earliest advocates of secession in the South and can almost be looked upon as the official organ of this group in the South as the *Liberator* was of the abolitionists in the North. In all this it was opposed by the Charleston *Courier* which was edited by Richard Yeadon. The *Courier* was Whig and as such was bound to be conservative and moderate.

Ranking with the Richmond and Charleston papers were the Louisville three – the *Journal*, the *Courier*, and the *Democrat*. The *Journal*, indeed, was one of the outstanding papers of the United States. Its editor was George D. Prentice, a Connecticut man, who came to

Kentucky originally for the express purpose of writing a biography of Henry Clay, and who after writing it stayed on as an editor. Prentice was certainly the most influential Whig editor of the South and his editorials made the *Journal* just as Ritchie's did the *Enquirer*. Prentice specialized in ridicule and his most effective weapon was the short, pungent paragraph, generally of but one or two sentences but with each word biting and vitriolic. He was a staunch Union man and in the war his paper was perhaps the most effective force in preventing the secession of Kentucky. The *Courier* was the persistent rival and opponent of the *Journal*. It was ably edited by W. B. Haldeman and was one of the most outspoken and vindictive of secessionist organs. Prentice and Haldeman fought each other at every turn and the contest was not an unequal one except for the fact that Prentice wrote for a much wider audience than did his rival, inasmuch as the great mass of Louisville people were Unionists in their sympathies. In the early days of the war the *Courier* was suppressed but Haldeman continued to publish it from various places in the South, the particular place at any time being determined by the juxtaposition of the Northern armies. It is one of the little ironies of history that after the War between the States the papers were combined and still live under the name of the *Courier-Journal*. The *Democrat* under the editorship of William Harney was the organ of the Union Democrats as the *Courier* was of the state rights wing. During the war it opposed secession but grew more and more restless as the Lincoln policies disclosed themselves until, near the close, it was almost a Southern paper again.

In Tennessee the best known papers were probably the Memphis *Appeal* and the Knoxville *Whig*. The

latter was edited by the notorious "Parson" Brownlow, who, in addition to his editorial cares, was a Methodist minister. The *Whig* was an extremely colorful sheet. It was both nationalistic and anti-slavery and its editor lived a life of continual excitement in the midst of his exasperated neighbors. The Union sympathies of the eastern Tennessee people caused the Confederate government a great deal of anxiety in the War between the States and there can be little doubt that Brownlow's attitude was very influential in determining their course.

There were a number of other newspapers in the South less brilliantly edited than these which have been named, but still having more than a local reputation. Among these was the Baltimore *Sun* which was regarded in Baltimore as an institution. In New Orleans the *Picayune* had much the same place in the heart of the people as the Baltimore *Sun* had in Baltimore. It had an able rival in the *Commercial Bulletin*. In Mobile the *Advertiser* divided the field with the *Register*. The latter was edited by John Forsyth.

Of these papers the Richmond *Enquirer* had the widest circulation. Virginians were dispersed all over the South and they always carried the *Enquirer* with them to their new homes. Few of the others had any considerable circulation outside of their own cities except, perhaps, the Louisville *Journal* which was widely read throughout Kentucky. The readers of these newspapers read them less for the news than for the editorials. None of them deserved the name newspaper, for they carried very little news and what they did carry was not often new. In common with all papers of the United States at that time they ignored local news almost entirely, apparently considering it beneath the dignity of cold print. Reporters were unknown and correspond-

ence was dragged and uncertain. Their out of town news was commonly copied from their exchanges and the news from Europe was often months old. The extension of the telegraph to the South was quickly utilized by the papers and telegraphic news began to make its appearance about 1845. It was generally all put together in one column headed "telegraphic news" and the reader could determine its content only by personal exploration. The Southern papers were very chary of headlines, and the few they did use usually gave little specific clue to what followed. "A Remarkable Occurrence" might head the notice of a two-headed calf, a Kansas cyclone, or the charge of the Light Brigade.

Evidently news was the least thing these newspapers were concerned about. They published a vast amount of poetry sometimes culled from the anthologies but more contributed by some of the sweet singers among the home talent. They printed short stories – and some that were not so short – both from the pen of the local geniuses and also from the works of celebrated authors. They always included columns and columns of moral and ethical discourses whose authors ranged all the way from Confucius to the editor himself. The only part of the papers more lugubrious than the essay portion was the section devoted to home-talent poetry.

In mechanical make-up all ante-bellum newspapers North and South were very much alike. The size was generally limited to four pages. The first page was generally given over solidly to box advertisements. Display advertising was unknown in the Old South and the advertiser generally contented himself with a small notice which he left unchanged from year to year. It is not likely that the advertisements had many readers or were expected to have; they were inserted as a pa-

triotic duty to assist the financial side of the paper and thus enable the editor to go about his business of discharging political broadsides at his adversaries.

The real business of the newspaper was not to print the news but to print editorials. They were read in direct proportion to the ability of their editorial writers. These editorials were almost always concerned with politics and they were designed as strong meat for men. The Southern editor took his politics in undiluted form. He expressed himself vigorously, striving to do his full duty by his readers without any fine regard for the feelings of those who opposed him. Every Southern political editorial contained the ingredients of a duel; many of them were potential invitations to homicide. The Southern editor lived an exciting life, ably assisted by his readers. For every Southern newspaper made a specialty of inviting letters from its readers and of printing them at great length. Consequently, "Vox Populi," "Gracchus," "Poplicola," "Friend of the People," and many others filled up the papers with their views of the political situation. Through its editorial page the Southern newspaper exerted a great influence over the people; through its correspondence it afforded the people a means of expression.

The Old South was a fertile field for newspapers but it was a graveyard for magazines. Something over a hundred were born there between 1790 and 1850 and by the latter date all were dead but nine. Nowhere else in the United States was the mortality rate of periodicals so high as in the South, and one reason was that nowhere else in the United States was the birth rate so high. Few were the towns in the Old South which could not boast at some time of its magazine and almost equally few were those which could not boast of burying one. From

the record one might easily infer that there was a great demand for magazines in the Old South but very little patronage for them.

No city of the Old South was so fiercely determined to be cultured as was Charleston. Between 1790 and 1860 no less than thirty-four magazines began life there and all but two of them terminated it there. The reason for this state of affairs is to be found in the fact that Charleston possessed a little group of men whose ambitions far outran their means and frequently outdistanced their talents. Chief among these were Robert Y. Hayne, James L. Petigru, Hugh Swinton Legaré, and William Gilmore Simms. Some of these men were interested in all the Charleston ventures, and Simms in almost all. They planned magazines, issued prospectuses, wrote numerous and lengthy articles, and began publication. Each new enterprise was hailed with acclaim by the Charleston people, but subscribers remained coy and distant and the magazines after brief existence usually perished from financial inanition.

The most pretentious and the most ambitious of the early Charleston periodicals was the *Southern Review* which began its existence in 1828 and departed this life in a little less than five years afterward. It was modelled after the *North American Review* and was highly charged with scholarship and metaphysics. It made a desperate effort to achieve immortality but failed, largely on account of a lack of subscribers. In the same year that the *Review* was launched the *Southern Literary Gazette* was born but it only lasted a year before it went the way of all flesh. In 1844 the two-year-old *Southern Quarterly Review* was removed from New Orleans to Charleston and began at once to sink into senile decrepitude. When in 1849 it had reached "a condition of worth-



lessness not even to be conceived," Simms became its editor and by Herculean efforts kept it in existence until 1855. It was probably the best of the Charleston magazines and had a circulation and a reputation that was not confined to the South. Its merits were largely due to Simms himself who contributed the greater number of the articles it contained. After laying the *Southern Quarterly Review* to rest, Simms was associated with Paul Hamilton Hayne in the publication of *Russell's Magazine* which lasted from 1857 until 1860. Except for the *Southern Quarterly Review* an account of the Charleston magazines is little more than exercise in epitaphs.

The best of all Southern magazines in the ante-bellum period was undoubtedly the *Southern Literary Messenger*. It was founded at Richmond in 1834 and continued there its entire existence of thirty years. In its pages appeared the contributions of the leading writers, both prose and poetry, of the South and it deserves to be considered as the leader of the periodicals in that section. Its lists of contributors would be a roll-call of Southern writers, and the greatest name in Southern letters was for two years associated with its editorship. Edgar Allan Poe from 1835 to 1837 made it by sheer force of genius the best magazine in the United States. His poems and short stories appeared in it but it was his literary criticism that made it famous. After Poe it had a number of able editors including B. B. Minor and John R. Thompson. It continued to hold its contributors and its subscribers even after secession.

Of a quite different type from either the *Southern Quarterly Review* or the *Southern Literary Messenger* was the *Commercial Review* begun in New Orleans by J. D. B. DeBow in January, 1846. DeBow had

already served his apprenticeship on the Charleston magazines and possessed considerable ability as a writer. He was a Charleston man but was led to start his periodical at New Orleans because of his experiences at Memphis when he attended the great railroad convention there in 1845 and fell into the hands of the New Orleans boosters. His magazine, commonly referred to as *DeBow's Review*, was a trade journal pure and simple, but the devotion of its editor raised it far above the ordinary level of such publications. He filled each number with articles dealing with the economic life of the Old South and wrote many of them himself. Today the old numbers of the *Review* are highly esteemed by scholars for the light they throw on the conditions prevailing in the South at the time. For all his industry and merit, DeBow had a difficult time making both ends meet and his enterprise probably would have met an early death had it not been for the financial assistance he received from public spirited philanthropists in New Orleans. As it was, the magazine lived until New Orleans fell in the War between the States.

The three leading periodicals of the Old South, then, had their homes in Richmond, Charleston, and New Orleans. *Niles' Register* begun in Baltimore in 1811 is too well known to need description and was too little Southern to merit it in this place. As to the hundred and one others in the Old South, not even their names can be given and they would be quite meaningless if they should be. They were of all kinds and descriptions having nothing in common except a transient, troubled life and an early, impecunious death. There were magazines for the women, such as the *Floral Wreath* and *Ladies Bower* that burst into bloom at Charleston in 1846 and the *Magnolia* of the same place three years

before. In this class, too, belongs the *Ladies' Book* of New Orleans and perhaps the *Southern Parlor Magazine* of Mobile. Nashville had its magazine for boys in the *Youths' Monthly Magazine* and Charleston had one for girls in *The Southern Rose*. There were a number of farm magazines but the South was too agricultural to appreciate them.

The distinctive quality of the Southern magazines was sobriety. One gets the impression from reading them that they considered sprightliness a deadly sin and looked upon frivolity with horror. Their articles were so heavy as to be imponderable. They were monuments of erudition and dullness generally without a single relieving flash of humor or of wit. Compared to them the *Congressional Globe* made easy reading and the moral essays of Seneca were full of mirth. To the contributors to the Southern magazines life was real and desperately earnest, and their mission on earth was to instruct and elevate if it cost the life of the last subscriber. The wonder is not that the Southern magazines died so readily but that they lived so long; the gentle reader of the Old South must have been very gentle indeed. As anaesthetics or as remedies for insomnia the Southern magazines must have ranked high, but as literature they must have been sorely discouraging to everyone, including their publishers.

Yet it must be said for them that they were no worse than the average magazine in the North and West. The entire United States was one vast Sahara as far as magazine merit was concerned. It is doubtful if any periodical could be found in the country whose articles had a lightness of touch any more pronounced than those that appeared in the Southern magazines. The faults of the Southern writers were the faults of the times rather

than of their section. Nowhere in the United States was there a magazine which a normal human being would read for pleasure. And the same thing might be said of the books.

As one works his way through the literature of the Old South it becomes more and more evident to him that the best writers were the newspaper editors. They had two of the prime qualifications for writing: they had something to say and they were professionals in the art of saying it. It is quite beside the point that the great mass of what they said had far better been left unsaid: the same thing could be said of the great majority of human utterances, verbal and written, since the world began. Sometimes they had inspiration and when they lacked that they found an adequate substitute in earnestness. Nor is it to be counted as a defect of their technique that their manner of writing led often to the duel and the early grave. They had something to say and they said it well. Their writings were not lacking in content or in form.

On the poets of the Old South no such favorable judgment can be passed. They were amateurs, not professionals, and they wrote not for a purpose but as a diversion. As one discriminating writer has said, the Southern poets regarded their poetry "as merely one of the ornaments of their culture." Ornamental poetry in all ages has had a habit of revenging itself on its creators by slipping off into oblivion and staying there. This is what most of the poetry of the Old South did and what more of it should have done. It had little substance to it and precious little shadow; it was not representative of Southern life in any way; it was altogether divorced from nature. The Southern people were rough, robust, practical, and wholly human. Southern

poetry was meticulously delicate and refined; it was polished to the point of debility, and expressed itself in images that were altogether foreign to the life of the Southern people and commonly to their comprehension. It was too artificial to be art.

Whatever theory of poetry the Southern poets had was probably an *ex post facto* one. One generalization, at least, can be made. They all aimed at beauty as the final purpose of the poem. There was no didactic or instructive poetry written in the Old South; when the Southern people wanted instruction they could find it readily enough in prose. Nor were any narrative stories told in poetic form by the Southern poets; that again was the province of prose. They looked upon poetry as they did upon music, as a pleasure-giving art, and they thought the poem fulfilled its mission in the world when it achieved beauty.

After the literary pruning-hook has been conscientiously applied to the poetic output of the Old South hardly more than three names remain as the basis of a Southern anthology. First, of course, is the mighty name of Edgar Allan Poe, one of the half-dozen great poets of the English race. In discussing his standing as a Southern poet the only possible question is, not his rank as a poet, but his rank as a Southerner. A Southerner he certainly thought himself, at least, as anyone can find out by reading his later contributions to the *Messenger*. It is idle to debate the quality of his talent, as if talent could be catalogued and classified by parallels and meridians. His poems, other than the mere exercises in rhythm like "The Bells" and "The Raven," have all the characteristics of Southern poetry and none of the Northern. They are beauty raised to its highest power. If all his poems were lost but the incomparable "To

Helen," it alone from sheer beauty of expression and imagery would render his fame secure.

Sermons may be found in stones, and lessons in running brooks, but it is certainly a most unusual thing to find poetry in a congressman. Yet that this improbable thing may sometimes come to pass is shown in the case of Richard Henry Wilde. His reputation rests on a single poem, but it rests in peace. "My Life is Like a Summer Rose" is only a short poem but it is sufficient to raise its author to the poetic Olympus and to keep him there. There is no mark of the amateur visible on this poem; it is the work of a man who had mastered his trade even if he did not often practice it. Its art is as perfect as that of "To Helen," only the words are less closely attuned to the thought. There could be only one method of barring Wilde from the poetic isles of the blest: to make entrance into them depend on mass production.

Theodore O'Hara was a Kentuckian as Wilde was a Georgian. His poems are not the equals of Poe's and Wilde's in finish, but are perhaps more substantial in content. His "Bivouac of the Dead" was written as a memorial to the Kentucky dead who fell in an unworthy war against Mexico. But it quickly shed all limitations of time and place and became, like Gray's "Elegy," the common property of the race. There was a sombreness in the poetry of Poe which has often been noted and this same note of melancholy made itself felt in Wilde. It pervades the poetry of O'Hara. Perhaps there can be no great poetry without sadness; perhaps there can be no great beauty apart from grief.

In the final analysis the cause of the Old South in the field of poetry must depend on O'Hara, Wilde, and Poe. The overwhelming work of Lanier had not begun be-

for the war; he had not yet written his "Sunrise" or "The Marshes of Glynn" or the tender "Ballad of the Trees and My Master" which were to mark him as probably the greatest poet of his race. There are, to be sure, a great many other names among the Southern poets but they are not so much poets as poetasters. They were the makers of pretty, graceful verses and they were nothing more than that. Timrod and Hayne, Legaré and Meek, Thompson and Hope were the best of these but they do not belong to the same category with the three which have been named. To class them with Lanier would be to make a mockery of poetry itself. Neither can Simms and Prentice be placed with the poets, although the latter almost scaled the heights with "The Closing Year" and the former delivered a tremendous frontal attack in fifteen volumes.

If the chief defect of Southern poetry was that it was too artificial, the chief defect of its humorous prose was that it was too natural. There was certainly nothing subtle or refined about it; there were no half-tones; the humor was as coarse as Southern life itself. The great part of it is absolutely unreadable today but it was thoroughly enjoyed at the time it was produced and it still holds a certain degree of standing because of the traditional delight it gave to people in the past. The rudest part of America would not tolerate it for a day in the present times. Yet crude and coarse as it was, it was typical of life in the South; it fairly represented the life of the people while it caricatured it.

The premier of Southern humorists was Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, brother of the Longstreet of war fame. He was a Georgian, as many of the Southern humorists have been, and was educated at Waddell's Academy, in South Carolina, and at Yale. Neither of

these places were calculated to develop a sense of humor nor was the practice of law which he began in Georgia. It may be that newspaper life has a certain tendency to excite the risibilities, for it is certain that Longstreet's began to show itself when he became the editor of the *Augusta Sentinel*. To this paper he contributed his "Georgia Scenes," the work upon which his fame rests – more and more uneasily with the passing of time. The "Scenes," which were later brought out in book form, depicted or travestied the life of the poor people of the South, and each sketch describes some incident which the people of the time thought to be uproariously funny. If they thought it so, of course it was, but tastes change and the "Georgia Scenes" would hardly be admitted to the Sunday comic supplements today. After writing this book, it is interesting to know, Longstreet grew into a serious-minded man, became a Methodist minister and a university president, and in both capacities was seriously handicapped by the reputation for frivolity which he had made when young.

No author was more of a favorite with the common people of the Old South than was W. T. Thompson. He was born in Ohio, but after experiencing almost as many vicissitudes as Aeneas himself, he finally drifted into Georgia and became associated with Longstreet in bringing out the *Sentinel*. In 1840 he was engaged in editing the *Madison Miscellany* and with the apparent intention of justifying its name he published certain sketches in it that he called "Major Jones' Courtship." These were received by his contemporaries with wild glee, but to modern readers they seem forced in their humor and without interest of any kind. Like the "Georgia Scenes" they make very dull reading and Major Jones has not fulfilled his promise of immortality.



That the business of being an editor is a mirth-provoking affair seems to be indicated by the fact that J. J. Hooper, like Longstreet and Thompson, had charge of a newspaper. It was while he was editing the Chambers (Alabama) *Tribune* that he brought out his book entitled *The Adventures of Captain Simon Suggs*. This work was accustomed to arouse great mirth in its readers of the Old South, and there are still people who insist on classifying it as a work of humor. It is inferior in every respect to the work of Longstreet and of Thompson and only the most unsophisticated reader could glean any amusement from its pages.

The fourth of the Southern humorists was a man who showed much more talent in his work than did any of the three mentioned. J. G. Baldwin was a Virginian who removed to Mississippi and thence to Alabama where he practiced law for many years. In 1853 he published his *Flush Times of Alabama and Mississippi*. The book was a favorite one in what little was left of the ante-bellum period and it still holds an interest for its readers. Its humor is less wild and forced than that of Longstreet, Thompson, or Hooper, and it has considerable value to the historian attempting to reconstruct the life of the times.

It may be noticed that Southern humorists, such as they were, flourished chiefly in the Southwest. As such their literature was more along Western lines than Southern. Certainly it is a far cry from William Byrd (*The Dividing Line*) to Hooper and Thompson and Longstreet. The driest speeches of old John Randolph of Roanoke contain more real wit than all the productions that have been noticed. There were other humorists in the South but their output did not raise the average. Davy Crockett had his *Autobiography* and George

D. Prentice had his *Prenticeana*, the latter being nothing more than extracts from his editorials. As literature the humorous writings of the Old South have no standing at all, but they served to make the people laugh and in doing that they perhaps justified their existence. We can only wonder, however, what kind of people these really were who found the Southern humorous writers amusing.

Descending to the very lowest depths of Southern literature, we come at last to Southern fiction. A great deal of praise can be given to the editors of the South; some few poets can be found who were not merely verse-makers; we can feel kindly to the humorists for their purpose, at least; but for the fiction writers nothing can be done but to offer an apology. It is the most dismal field in the whole area of Southern literature. All the ills that literature is heir to are to be found in it.

Happily the great mass of novels written in the Old South has been dragged by its own weight so far down into oblivion that no memory of it remains to vex the history of literature. The host of novelists is more terrible than an army with banners, but only three of them wrote things of merit and two of these three are very insecure in their place. It is very probable that the only real novelist of the Old South was John Pendleton Kennedy of Maryland. Two of his books long ago lost their appeal for adult readers, but will probably always remain favorites with the youth of the land inasmuch as they are tales of adventure. One of these is *Horse-Shoe Robinson* and the other is *Rob of the Bowl*. Both are historical novels and their attraction lies entirely in the exciting plots. They have the same merits and demerits as Cooper's novels at the North and, like Cooper's novels, they will always be read by people whose lack

of sophistication enables them to demand of a novel nothing beyond a plot. *Swallow Barn* is an entirely different sort of a book. It is a cross-section of life in the Old Dominion and is written in the easy, placid style of Sir Roger de Coverley. The characterization runs frequently into piquant satire, and the humor of it is quiet and often subtle. It runs leisurely along as unhurried as the planter life it depicts. It resembles the "Sleepy Hollow" tales of Washington Irving and is as far removed from the forced wit and would-be humor of Longstreet and Hooper and Thompson as if it came from another world. It will probably live as the one real novel produced at the South before the Civil War.

It is doubtful if N. B. Tucker's *The Partisan Leader* should be classed with the novels at all. It is less of a novel than a prophecy, and perhaps more of a piece of propaganda than either. Written long before the Civil War, it portrays a future war between North and South and the portrayal bears a startling resemblance to what really occurred. As a piece of imaginative work it must take high rank, but it belongs in the same class with *Erewhon* and *Looking Backward*. It may be mentioned that Tucker brought the Southern cause through in triumph in his imaginary war and in so doing illustrated the perils of prophecy.

If there is any doubt about placing the works of Tucker in the list of Southern novels, there can, at least, be none about those of William Gilmore Simms. It would be improper to place them in the list of Southern novels because it would be improper to place them among novels at all. Simms was one of the first of a goodly company of Americans to apply factory methods to literature and to devote his literary talents to mass production. He began his career as a writer when he

was nineteen and continued to write without ceasing until he died, aged sixty-three. Fifteen volumes of poetry and more than sixty volumes of prose issued forth from his literary workshop for the edification of an increasingly bewildered public. He, too, seemed to "specialize in omniscience," producing poems, plays, criticisms, biographies, histories, and novels with equal facility. In his leisure hours he edited a half-dozen magazines, served in the legislature, travelled extensively, and played Maecenas to two generations of struggling *literati*. No American before or since has ever directed such a literary bombardment against the gates of immortality. In his day he was the pride of Charleston and one of the wonders of America. Whatever posterity may think of him, if it think of him at all, his contemporaries had no doubt that he was the greatest literary genius of his age.

Simms wrote his own epitaph in these words: "Here lies one who, after a reasonably long life, distinguished chiefly by unceasing labors, has left all his better works undone." Looking over the vast mass of his productions one is tempted to think that the word "better" might well be changed to "good." Few of Simms's works rise above the level of mediocrity. His besetting vice as a novelist is the artificiality of his dialogue. No human beings ever talked to each other in the lofty strain that the characters of Simms habitually employ in their conversation. Like most novelists of his time, Simms fell an easy victim to the insidious disease of "fine writing," and his entire output is vitiated by it. His plots are not without interest; at least, they are up to the standard of novels in general. But the disgust of the reader with the strained and artificial dialogue is generally so intense as to render him incapable of appreciating any other

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feature of a book by Simms. His best novel – or his least bad – is generally considered to be *Yemassee*, but an improving taste in literature has consigned it to oblivion along with the others.

A handful of editors whose work was good but necessarily ephemeral, one great poet and two of fair ability, an array of humorists whose very existence was an indictment of the public which appreciated them, and one novelist. This is the record of the Old South which contained in its gentry class the most cultured people of the United States. It is a record that needs explanation and two possible explanations occur. One is that the cultured people of the South were finding an outlet for their energies in other ways – in politics, perhaps. Politics, at least, is a form of life; literature at its best is only a mirror. The Southern people, perhaps, were too busy with life itself to be interested in making a representation of it. The other explanation is not so much an explanation as an apology. Bad as the Southern record is, it is probably not below the average for the United States as a whole. It is certainly much better than that of the West in the same period. To the modern taste the literary achievements of the United States before the War between the States seem very meager in quality. It seems to us immeasurably inferior to the writings of today. The judgment of one age in regard to a preceding one, however, can never be taken as an impartial judgment inasmuch as the judgment is rendered by one of the parties to the dispute and the other party is prevented from replying by the fact that it no longer exists.

The Old South as a producer can be weighed in the balance, but there is no possible way of ascertaining its achievement as a consumer. How much did the Southerners read? We can count the books in the libraries of

the South but that does not solve the problem for to have a book in a library is one thing and to read it is entirely a different thing. The census statistics show that the South had in its libraries more books than any other section if Pennsylvania and New York be excluded; it was certainly far in the lead of the West. The tradition is that the gentry class was a reading class and that its libraries were filled with the classics. How much truth there is in the tradition can only be conjectured, but even the fact of the tradition has a certain significance. Southern statesmen were accustomed to interlard their speeches with passages from the Latin authors, and even Benton had a Greek phrase for emergencies. Much of this probably only indicated a superficial acquaintance with books of quotations such as were very much in evidence throughout the country in the ante-bellum period. The tradition is that the private libraries of the South were more likely to contain books by English authors than they were to contain American productions. If this be true it must be accounted unto them for righteousness. The gentry of the Old South has been characterized as a class which "belonged to the Episcopal church, voted the Whig ticket, and read Sir Walter Scott without hope of reward or fear of punishment." Certainly they might have done much worse; probably a great many of them did.

## **The Struggle for Independence**





## The Struggle for Independence

The War between the States followed a secession brought about on the issue of slavery and justified by the doctrine of state rights. Yet both the secession and the war drew their chief support from people who did not own slaves and had little interest in constitutional theories. Cause and justification alike were scarcely more than rationalizations; the inspiration of the war, so far as the responsibility lay with the Southern people, was a love for the South so intense that it may be called patriotism. It was as strong in one part of the South as another. It was common to the Atlantic states and to the newer states, the border states and the gulf states, the highlands and the coastal plain. It permeated the planter and the farmer, the slave owner and the non-slave owner; it was even to be found among the slaves. It transcended, and still transcends, all differences of geography, all conflicts of interests, all distinctions of politics, religion, and society.

Yet the South did not take its full strength into the war. Force alone prevented Maryland and Missouri from joining the Confederacy, while the course of Kentucky was determined by a love of inertia more powerful among its people than even their love for the South. The eleven states of the Confederacy had a population of approximately nine millions, of whom five and one-half million were white and three and one-half million were slave. The slaves supported the war unanimously (albeit somewhat involuntarily) ; the white people were

by no means so unanimous. There can be no doubt that among the mountain whites there was widespread indifference, and even hostility, to the war. Nothing could be more grotesque than to ascribe this mountain sentiment to a spirit of nationalism and devotion to the Union. No people in the United States were more devoted to state rights and local self-government than were the mountain people; nowhere in the South could be found a people more Southern in sentiment or more contemptuous of the "Yankees." Their hostility to the Confederacy was merely a continuation of that sectional feeling which had manifested itself throughout the entire history of the South. They opposed both secession and the war because they looked upon both as lowland movements. When in Virginia the mountain people used the opportunity of war to form themselves into the state of West Virginia, they were merely bringing to a successful conclusion a separatist movement which had been fifty years in the making. Among the mountain people in general, inertia and an inherent dread of new things were powerful allies of sectionalism in determining opposition to the Confederacy. The attitude of the mountain people caused little embarrassment to the Confederacy for the mountain region was remote from the seat of war and the people were generally content with a passive disapproval, occasionally stirred to activity by the ministration of conscription and impressment officials.

For the Southern people the War between the States was a war which they had not anticipated and for which they were unprepared. Following the John Brown raid the Southern states purchased some 350,000 stands of small arms and added them to the state arsenals. Approximately 200,000 more were added by the seizure

of United States arsenals at the outbreak of the war.<sup>74</sup> The South had few plants for the manufacture of arms and expected to make up its deficiency by importation from abroad. The chief deficiency was in artillery, but the war was expected to be chiefly an infantry war – as, in fact, it was. Importation was counted on, also, for keeping up the supply of manufactured goods necessary for the army. The leaders of the South foresaw an attempt at blockade, but knowing the length of the Southern coast line and the impotence of the United States navy, they did not think it could be made effective.

The South entered the war with man power and supplies assured sufficient for winning its independence. The enthusiasm of the people was unadulterated by doubt. Their confidence was due partly to their provincialism, partly to their inherited spirit of aggressiveness, partly to their expectation of foreign aid. Because they controlled the Mississippi, they expected the passive, if not the open, support of the states of the Northwest for whose trade the Mississippi was, or at the least had been, the traditional highway. It was as a measure of conciliation that Confederate policy at the beginning of the war gave to the nominally hostile Northwest the free navigation of this river through the heart of the South. The South also expected sympathy and aid from that considerable portion of the western population which was of Southern descent. In this it was not disappointed, and it is probable that Northern “copperheads” gave the South more aid and comfort in the war than the Southern mountaineers did the North. Southern expectation of aid, however, was chiefly directed toward England. The belief that England must, at all hazards, have Southern cotton was almost an article of religion with

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<sup>74</sup> F. L. Owsley, *State Rights in the Confederacy*, 7-9.

the Southern people. Firm in this belief the Southerners withheld their cotton at the beginning of the war in what was practically an unofficial embargo. No one doubted that such a measure would cause such suffering in England that public opinion would force the government to intervene on the side of the South.

The confidence and aggressiveness of the Southern people inclined them to an offensive war, but the Confederate authorities, relying more on geography than temperament, decided to make the war a defensive one. Southern geography was ideally adapted to defense. Both Southern flanks were secure; the Atlantic because the United States had no navy, and the western because of difficulties of transportation. The attack had to be a frontal attack and to this the South seemed invulnerable. The Ozarks screened the trans-Mississippi, the neutrality of Kentucky was a barrier to any land invasion of the Mississippi Valley, and the mountains of Kentucky and western Virginia were impenetrable by invading armies. The Valley of Virginia could be easily defended against any enemy depending on the Shenandoah or an unfinished railroad for its supplies. Apparently the only routes of invasion lay east of the Blue Ridge where two railroads led south from the Potomac. The eastern line, the Richmond, Frederick and Potomac, lay across lateral rivers and ran through a section so wild it was called the "wilderness." The western road, the Orange and Alexandria, was the most obvious route for the invader and Southern armies in the spring of 1861 were concentrated for its protection. The point chosen for defense was Manassas where the Manassas Gap Railroad made possible the rapid shifting of reinforcements from the valley in case of need. The strength of this strategic position was evidenced in the two battles of Bull Run.

The abandonment of neutrality of Kentucky in the fall of 1861 laid the South open to invasion down the Mississippi Valley. From Columbus, Paducah, and Louisville railroad lines ran down the valley and were paralleled by the Cumberland and Tennessee, both of which were navigable. Anticipating the decision of Kentucky, the Confederacy rushed troops to Columbus and Paducah, threw an army across the Louisville and Nashville to take post behind the Green river, and strongly garrisoned Forts Henry and Donelson on the rivers at the state line. Albert Sidney Johnston, reputedly the ablest general of the South, was in command with his headquarters on the Louisville and Nashville. The railroads could not be forced; the Federal attack followed the rivers and met its initial success in the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. But its significance was that Johnston felt constrained to withdraw the Confederate armies, leaving the Louisville and Nashville and the Mobile and Ohio in the hands of the enemy.

With these two roads constantly bringing down supplies and reënforcements from the North, the remaining task of the Federal armies was to follow the Southern railroads and paralyze the transportation system of the South; the task of the Southern armies was to protect the roads. To this end Johnston stood at bay at Shiloh and his defeat there gave the Federals control of Corinth where the Mobile and Ohio crossed the Memphis and Charleston. For several months after Corinth fell the railroads secured a respite while Grant followed the will-o'-the-wisp of opening the Mississippi. The Mississippi was of negligible military value to the Union, and of no commercial value to a Northwest whose trade for several years had been rapidly shifting to the Atlantic ports over the Northern railroads. Its loss could

bring no great damage to the South, since the lack of trans-Mississippi railroads made it impracticable for the South to draw supplies from that region in any case. The siege of Vicksburg was in the nature of a last salute to the dead glory of Mississippi commerce. The folly of the Federals in besieging it was only exceeded by the folly of the Confederates in defending it. The days of grace allowed to the Confederacy by Grant's obsession with the Mississippi went so unutilized that following the fall of Vicksburg the western armies of the Confederacy apparently reduced their military science to the single element of retreat. The immediate result of this policy of retreat was the loss of Chattanooga, a two-fold disaster inasmuch as it gave the Federal forces access to the valley railroad both for cutting off Southern supplies and for a quick drive on Richmond from the South. The latter movement did not take place because Sherman allowed himself to be seduced into following Johnston into Georgia and so turned his back on the seat of war. With the capture of Atlanta he again had an opportunity of moving on Richmond via the Georgia road. Instead, to the relief of the Confederacy, he chose to march to the sea thus removing himself still further from the scene of conflict and giving the Confederacy time to concentrate its forces. Sherman's "marching through Georgia" had practically the effect of demobilizing his army while Grant finished the war.

Why did the Southern defense collapse so readily in the west and stand so firm in the east? The eastern army fought its first battles and won them when enthusiasm and confidence were at high tide. It established a reputation for invincibility which went far toward making it invincible. Whatever else was needed for success it received from Lee. In the west the first attack fell on a

Confederate army which had already lost its enthusiasm and perhaps its confidence. In football parlance, Grant's move up the Tennessee and the Cumberland (February, 1862) was a delayed buck which took place almost a year after the ball was snapped. By that time the fervor of the South had spent itself; by April, 1862, the lack of volunteers brought about the passing of the first conscription act. Other and more stringent acts followed with the result that 300,000 men were drafted in the South before the war was over — amounting to practically one-half the total of Southern soldiers. Even more indicative of Southern apathy was the claiming of exemption by practically fifty per cent of the drafted men and the hiring of substitutes by more than 50,000 of them.<sup>75</sup> The exempted occupations, such as that of mail carrier, railroad and river employees, telegraph operators, miners, teachers, ministers, druggists, and physicians, reached a height of popularity in the South such as they had never before enjoyed.<sup>76</sup> Desertion from the Confederate armies became so frequent as to present the appearance of a major industry; the number of desertions during the war has been estimated at more than 100,000.<sup>77</sup> Drafting, exemption, substitution, and desertion reached even higher proportions in the North than in the South. There is reason to believe that if the decision had been left to the people North and South, both sections would have voted to end the war in 1862 regardless of the attainment of its objectives.

The waning of Southern enthusiasm was due to the prolongation of the war beyond all anticipation, to its defensive character for which the people were tempera-

<sup>75</sup> A. B. Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy*, chapter iii.

<sup>76</sup> *Idem*, chapter iv.

<sup>77</sup> Ella Lonn, *Desertion during the Civil War*, 226.

mentally unfitted, and to the refusal of England either to aid the Confederacy in winning independence or to recognize it as already won. The Southern expectation of speedily winning the war was perhaps not unreasonable. At the beginning the Southern troops had the spirit of crusaders and although the troops themselves were undisciplined they had a multitude of leaders trained in the regular army. Outnumbered, under supplied, without reserves, the best chance of the South for winning lay in the speed and fury of its onset. The decision of the Confederacy to stand on the defensive was perhaps the most fatal step of the war. No other government in modern times has equalled the success of the Confederacy in cooling the ardor of its soldiers by inaction or dissipating their enthusiasm by restraint from attack. No other government has wanted to.

The cotton embargo failed to move England notwithstanding the fact its success was repeatedly demonstrated by unanswerable logic and irrefutable arguments. It was only as the hope of intervention was repeatedly deferred that the South realized how much its confidence had depended on its expectation of English aid. But it was quite in vain that the South sent out its diplomats, organized English public opinion and doggedly withheld its cotton; England was to be moved neither by persuasion nor pressure. The profits of neutrality were so great as to make its ethical appeal irresistible. For although there was great distress among the operatives in England when the smaller cotton mills closed, the high prices of cotton cloth brought huge fortunes to the larger mills, and English shipping benefited enormously by the destruction of the United States merchantmen at the hand of the Confederate raiders.<sup>78</sup> An

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<sup>78</sup> F. L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy*, 565.



English government dominated by these interests could hardly be expected to aid in abbreviating a war which so liberally contributed to their prosperity.

It is fairly evident that the reason the Confederate armies were so uniformly inferior in number to their enemies was not that the South lacked men but that it lacked soldiers. Yet even in numbers the armies were perhaps strong enough to win independence had they been well led and well supplied. One of the greatest hardships of the South in the war was the multitude of generals it inherited from the United States army. They were as a rule jealous of each other, incapable of coöperation, too full of their own importance to carry out the plans of their superiors, rarely securing or deserving the confidence of their subordinates. The storm petrel of the war was Joseph E. Johnston.<sup>79</sup> His vainglory and jealous insistence on his dignity spread discord through the eastern armies until a providential wound removed him from command. Upon his recovery he was sent west where, resentful of the terms of his command, he failed to coöperate with Pemberton and as a spectator witnessed the fall of the Mississippi Valley.<sup>80</sup> Later in his retreat toward Atlanta his refusal to communicate his plans to Davis or to his own generals brought about his removal.<sup>81</sup> Davis himself was a general and in his military capacity made notable contributions to the downfall of the Confederacy. His distrust of Johnston and constant interference in his plans was largely responsible for the conduct of that gentleman. His selec-

<sup>79</sup> A. P. James, "General Joseph Eggleston Johnston, Storm Center of the Confederacy," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. XIV, 342.

<sup>80</sup> T. R. Hay, "Confederate Leadership at Vicksburg," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. XI, 543.

<sup>81</sup> T. R. Hay, "The Davis-Hood-Johnston Controversy of 1864," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. XI, 54.

tion of Pemberton to oppose Grant at Vicksburg and of Hood to supersede Johnston before Atlanta were acts of misjudgment so profound as to approach sublimity. Davis throughout the war had great confidence in Bragg and kept him in positions of responsibility although Bragg's operations in Kentucky and Tennessee were of such a character as to make one wonder whether they were designed to assist the Confederacy or the Union. Yet Davis must be credited with the promotion and un-deviating support of Lee. Lee was so preëminent as to escape most of the bickerings and jealousies that beset Johnston. Yet a contributing cause to the loss of Gettysburg was Longstreet's lack of coöperation. Except for Lee, the successful leaders of the South were not its professional officers, but its amateurs such as Bedford Forrest, John Morgan, and Stonewall Jackson.

But the most fatal handicap of the South in its struggle for independence was neither the waning of enthusiasm nor the ineptitude of the leaders; it was the resurgence of the doctrine of state rights. There was a valid basis for the assertion of state rights against the Union, because the Southern states had interests antagonistic to those of the United States; there was no logic in asserting state rights against the Confederacy because all the states which composed the Confederacy had identical interests. But the South in self-interest had for so long opposed centralization of government, that it had come to believe centralization an evil in itself. The doctrine of state rights had so long been asserted as a means to an end that it finally came to be viewed as an end in itself. The jealousy of the states toward the Confederate government showed itself at the very beginning of the war and grew to such an extent as practically to prevent all community of action.

It first showed itself in the refusal of the states to turn over to the Confederacy the state arms purchased after the John Brown raid and seized from the Federal forts and arsenals. The immediate result of this maneuver was that the Confederacy had to reject some 200,000 volunteers for lack of arms.<sup>82</sup> Throughout the war the Southern states persisted in maintaining troops for local defenses. These state militias were legally exempt from Confederate control until the Conscription Act of 1864 and were actually exempt throughout the war since the states defied the law. Over 100,000 men were thus kept out of the Confederate armies;<sup>83</sup> for the most part they were also kept out of the war. For the state militias were notoriously the haven of those whose valor was liberally diluted with discretion. They were in effect state quarantines for sufferers from war-phobia.

Not only did the states refuse arms and men to the Confederacy but they insisted on their right to appoint the officers for the troops raised within their limits for the Confederacy. Such officers were commonly distinguished more for their political acumen than for their knowledge of war. But nothing so outraged the feeling of the state rights devotees as did the Confederate laws for conscription, martial law, and impressment of property. The passing of the first conscription act brought down on the head of Davis a greater storm of obloquy than had ever assailed Lincoln. The states hampered the operation of the act in various ways, by building up their militias, by insisting that the conscription agents should be state officials, and (in North Carolina) by court decisions against its constitutionality.<sup>84</sup> The suspension of

<sup>82</sup> F. L. Owsley, *State Rights*, 22.

<sup>83</sup> *Idem*, 273.

<sup>84</sup> A. B. Moore, *Conscription and Conflict*, 207-305.

the writ of *habeas corpus* (February, 1862) raised such a furor in the South as practically to nullify the law (actually so in North Carolina and Georgia) and to force its repeal the next year. The Confederacy took courage sufficiently to suspend the writ again in February, 1864, but in the interim Vicksburg had fallen and Gettysburg had been lost. Throughout the war, state judges used the writ of *habeas corpus* to protect deserters from the Confederate armies. The law for the impressment of property, March, 1863, was the necessary result of the refusal of the Southern farmers and planters to sell supplies to the Confederate armies for Confederate money. The Southern states made a nullity of the law as far as they were able by insisting that property so seized should be valued by local appraisers.<sup>85</sup> At times the state militias were called out to prevent the seizure of property for the Confederacy. North Carolina and the Confederacy almost came to blows when Davis attempted to impress slaves for building a railroad from Greensboro to Danville. South Carolina would not allow her slaves to be carried out of the state and Florida refused to allow her slaves to be impressed by any other authority than the state itself. Injunctions from the state courts in many instances prevented the Confederacy from removing branch line railroads for the repair of the main lines.

The most flagrant exhibition of state rights was given by the states in their control of textile mills.<sup>86</sup> The textile mills of the South expanded greatly to meet the war needs. There were 122 mills in the South in 1864, mostly located in North Carolina (40), Georgia (36), and Virginia (26). The output of 54 of the 122 mills was

<sup>85</sup> F. L. Owsley, *State Rights*, 219-271.

<sup>86</sup> *Idem*, 110-149.

monopolized by the states for their own uses and refused to the Confederate government. North Carolina would not permit any of her textile products to be sold to the Confederacy. Each state insisted that such clothing as it furnished the Confederate armies be limited to its own troops. The result was that the North Carolina and Georgia troops were generally well clothed while the soldiers from the other states were often clad in rags. At the close of the war the North Carolina soldiers in the Confederate armies were comfortably clothed and equipped and North Carolina had over 90,000 uniforms in reserve. The states not only deprived the Confederacy of a great part of the domestic supply of clothing, but competed successfully for the control of importations. The seaboard states owned their own blockade runners and managed by various devices to secure the cargoes of private runners as well. In 1863 the Confederate congress legislated to the effect that one-third the cargoes of private ships must be reserved for the Confederacy, but the chief result was that the states chartered the private ships. The law of 1864 giving the Confederacy authority over private shipping resulted in a wholesale transferal of such shipping to the states. State-fomented strikes of Confederate blockade runners were not unknown. In all the conflicts between the states and the Confederacy, North Carolina under Governor Vance and Georgia under Governor Brown were the most vigorous advocates of state rights. There were many times when these two states seemed to consider Davis a greater enemy than Lincoln, and to prefer the United States to the Confederacy. Vance and Brown were ably assisted in opposition by Vice-president Stephens, Rhett of South Carolina, Foote of Tennessee, and Yancey of Alabama. Florida under Governor

Milton had, perhaps, the best record for supporting the Confederacy. The South did not lose because it was outnumbered; it had sufficient man power to gain its independence, but neither by force nor persuasion could the Confederacy keep its armies filled. Neither did it lose because of the blockade.<sup>87</sup> The United States even in 1865 had but 600 steamers to guard the long coast line of the South and it has been estimated that the blockade runners completed successfully approximately 10,000 trips. Only one-sixth of them were caught. It may be doubted if the South failed to secure anything from abroad that she needed. Neither did the South fail because of lack of food and supplies. During the war the South gave up almost completely the raising of cotton and devoted itself to the cultivation of food crops. There was no time during the war when the South lacked food although there were times a-plenty when the soldiers went hungry. The sections of the South occupied or devastated by hostile armies were few; for the most part Southern agriculture escaped unscathed and there were vast quantities of food supplies at the end of the war. Clothing was not so plentiful as food, but even of clothing there was sufficient, either the product of Southern mills or of English. The South never lacked clothing although there were many times when the soldiers were barefoot and clad only in rags.

The paradox of Southern plenty and Confederate need has two explanations. One explanation was the breakdown of the Southern transportation system. The war began and ended on a railroad; the first battle and the first surrender took place on a railroad. It was a railroad war in which the Federal armies by successive steps isolated section after section of the South from

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<sup>87</sup> F. L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy*, chapter viii.

the defending armies by capturing the railroads. But the railroads themselves were non-combatants. They fell because they were not defended. The Confederate armies failed in their defense because they were outnumbered, because they were badly led, because they were ill-supplied. For these conditions no one was to blame except the Southern people themselves.

The war both gave and took away. The direst catastrophe it visited upon the Southern people was to rob them of their confidence in themselves. The burned towns would be rebuilt, the railroads would once more be laid down, the devastated fields would sometime yield again. Even the grief for the heroic dead would in time become a memory that did not burn. But the spirit of the South was broken, perhaps beyond repair; its faith in itself destroyed, it may be beyond all hope of resurrection. Yet the war brought its gift to the South. The antagonisms of the war were soon forgotten; the remembrance of suffering and high endeavor endured as a heritage. In this memory the South was united, its people became more Southern. The spirit of Southern nationalism was increased by the war it brought to pass, grew immeasurably from the war which denied it.





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## Index



# Index

- ABOLITION MOVEMENT: 143-144, 195-196, 250
- Academies: 281-284
- Adams, J. I: 171
- "Address to the People of the Southern States": 205
- Adventures of Captain Simon Suggs*: 309
- Agriculture: colonial, 77-80; reform, 197
- Alabama: territory, 125; statehood, 125; sectionalism, 157; land sales, 1820-1830, 166; Jacksonian migration, 172; river improvement, 180; Compromise of 1850, 211; secession, 254
- Albemarle: 63
- Algonquian Indians: 38-39
- Alien and Sedition Acts: 159
- American Revolution: 107
- Andrews, Bishop: 196
- Annapolis: 83, 154
- Appalachian mountains: 17, 18
- Appalachian Valley: 28-29
- Appeal* (Memphis): 296
- Arator*: 198
- Architecture: 70-72
- Arkansas: territory, 136; statehood, 164, 173; secession, 256
- Arkansas Post: 129
- Arkansas river: exploration, 131
- Athens (Georgia): 157, 182
- Atlanta: 173, 322
- Austin, S. F: 201
- BACON'S REBELLION: 154
- Baldwin, J. G: 309
- Baltimore: founded, 83; growth, 217
- Baltimore and Ohio Railroad: 180-181, 217
- Baltimore Convention (1860): 251-2
- Banks: in Mississippi Territory, 122; panic of 1837, 187-189
- Baptist church: 196
- Batesville (Arkansas): 137
- Bayou Spadrie: 132, 133
- Bellefontaine: 132, 133
- Berrien, J. M: 205
- Biloxi Indians: 38
- Birney, J. G: 143, 195
- "Bivouac of the Dead": 306
- Black Warrior river: 123
- Blockade: 329, 330
- Blount, William: land speculations, 100-103; territorial governor and Indian superintendent, 104; senator, 105; Houston county, 111
- Bluffton movement: 197
- Boone, Daniel: 95
- Boonesborough: 95, 98
- Boonville (Missouri): 135
- Bourbon county: 111, 115
- Bradford, John: 106
- Bragg, Braxton: 326
- Brown, John: 237, 249, 250
- Brown, Joseph E: 329
- Buchanan, James: 236, 238
- Burr, Aaron: 131
- CADDO INDIANS: 130, 133
- Cahaba (Alabama): 122, 125
- Calhoun, John C: nullification, 147; secretary of war, 171; "Southern Address," 205; Southern convention, 206, 214; Southwestern convention, 216; Southern discontent, 241; education, 284
- California: 204
- Campbell, J. A: 208
- Canals: 178-180

- Canton (Mississippi): 123  
 Cape Fear river: 179  
 Cape Girardeau: 129, 135  
 Carroll, Charles: 181  
 Cartersville: 173  
 Caswell, Richard: 101, 102, 111  
 Catawba Indians: 37  
 Charleston: 155, 180  
 Charleston and Hamburg Railroad: 181  
 Charleston convention (1860): 251  
 Charlottesville: 218  
 Chattanooga: 173, 322  
 Cherokee Indians: description, 39-42; in revolution, 98; civilization in 1830's, 168; and Georgia, 168; removal, 171  
*Cherokee Phoenix*: 168  
 Chesapeake and Ohio Canal: 178  
 Chestertown (Maryland): 154  
 Cheves, Langdon: 208, 212  
 Chickasaw Bluffs: 115  
 Chickasaw Indians: description, 46-47; and French, 87; removal, 171  
 Chisholm vs. Georgia decision: 159  
 Chiswell mines: 92  
 Choctaw Indians: description, 45-46; land cessions, 116; removal, 171  
 Christy, David: 233  
 Claiborne, W. C. C.: 115  
 Clarke, G. R.: 96, 101  
 Clay, Henry: 202, 209  
 Coastal Plain: 19-25  
 Cobb, Howell: 248, 300  
 Colerain (Georgia): 112  
 Columbia: 155, 181  
 Columbus (Georgia): 173  
 Columbus (Mississippi): 123, 124, 172  
 Commercial conventions: 197, 225-6  
*Commercial Bulletin*: 297  
*Commercial Review*: 301-302  
 Compromise of 1850: 210-211, 212  
 Conecuh (Alabama): 122  
 Confederacy: formed, 255; England, 324  
 Conscription: 323, 327  
 Constitutional reform: 161-164  
 Constitutional Union party: 234, 252  
 Cooper, Thomas: 285  
 Corinth: 172, 321  
 Cotton: beginning, 109; fall in prices, 189; in fifties, 229  
 Cotton gin: 108  
 Cotton Gin Port: 117, 155  
*Cotton is King*: 233  
 Crawford, W. H.: 284  
 Creek Indians: description, 42-45; War of 1812, 119-120; removal, 171  
 Cumberland Gap: 91, 116  
 Cumberland Road: 166  
  
 DANVILLE (Kentucky): 103  
 Davidson College: 286  
 Davis, Jefferson: candidate for governor, 210; and Pacific Railroad, 226, 235; president of Confederacy, 255, 325  
 DeBow, J. D. B.: 301  
 Debts: of Southern states, 188  
 Decatur: 123  
 Delaware: 107  
 Democratic party: sectional basis of, 159-161; attitude to California, 204; effect of Compromise of 1850 on, 234; Southern control, 244  
 Demopolis (Alabama): 123, 124  
 Denominational colleges: 286  
 Desertion: in Confederate armies, 323  
 Dinsmore, Silas: 119, 121  
 Direct trade with Europe: 197, 225  
 Dismal Swamp Canal: 154  
 Dixon, A. C.: 236  
 Donelson, John: 111  
 Douglas, S. A.: 251, 252  
 Dred Scott decision: 239, 251, 253  
  
 EAST TENNESSEE and Georgia Railroad: 220  
 East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad: 220  
 Elections: (1852), 235; (1856), 238; (1860), 251-254  
 Emory and Henry College: 286



England and Confederacy: 324  
*Enquirer* (Richmond): 294  
*Essay on Calcareous Manures*: 198  
*Essays on Domestic Industry*: 197  
 Europe: direct trade with, 197, 225

FALL LINE: 20, 23  
 Farmers: 271-273  
*Farmers' Register*: 198  
 Federal Road: 116, 117, 122, 166  
 Florence: 116, 124  
 Florida: geology, 23; Spanish, 60-61;  
     purchase, 126, 127; statehood, 203;  
     secession, 254  
*Flush Times of Alabama and Mis-*  
*issippi*: 309  
 Foote, H. S.: 205, 211, 212, 329  
 Foreigners: in South, 262-263  
 Forests: 69-71  
 Forrest, Bedford: 326  
 Forsyth, John: 239  
 Fort Adams: 112  
 Fort Clark: 133  
 Fort Dearborn: 115  
 Fort Donelson: 321  
 Fort Henry: 321  
 Fort Pickering: 112  
 Fort San Luis: 60, 85  
 Fort Smith: 134  
 Fort Stanwix: treaty, 93  
 Fort Stoddard: 116  
 Fort Tombeche: 87  
 Fort Toulouse: 86  
 Fort Wilkinson: 112  
 Frankfort: 106  
 Franklin: state of, 101, 111  
 Free negroes: 266  
 Freeport Doctrine: 249, 250  
 Free Soilers: 248  
 French Broad: 98, 100, 105  
 French Lick: 87, 96  
 Fugitive slaves: 212, 249, 250  
 Furman College: 286

GADSDEN, James: 235-236  
 Gaines, George S.: 119  
 Gaines's Trace: 123

Garrison, William Lloyd: 144, 195  
 Georgia: settlement, 86-87; revolu-  
     tion, 107; slave trade, 108; western  
     land, 109-110; land system, 110,  
     118; speculation, 110-111; cession  
     of western land, 112; sectionalism,  
     157-158; reform, 163; river im-  
     provement, 179; Wilmot Proviso,  
     204; Compromise of 1850, 210; se-  
     cession, 254  
 Georgia Central Railroad: 183  
 Georgia Compact: 112, 125  
 Georgia Railroad: 183  
 Georgia Road: 116, 122  
*Georgia Scenes*: 308  
 Gist, Christopher: 92  
 Grand Gulf Ridge: 30  
 Grant, U. S.: 322, 323  
 Great Migration: 120  
 Gregg, William: 197  
 Guntersville: 172  
 Guthrie, James: 223

HALDEMAND, W. B.: 296  
 Hammond, James Henry: 199, 208, 247  
 Hampden-Sidney College: 284  
 Hard Labor, Treaty of: 93  
 Harrison, William Henry: 146  
 Harrodstown: 94  
 Hawkins, Benjamin: 112, 115, 119,  
     121  
 Hayne, P. H.: 301  
 Hayne, R. Y.: 182, 300  
 Henderson, Richard: 95, 97, 98, 100,  
     102, 103  
 Henderson (Kentucky): 103  
 Henry, Patrick: 111  
 Highland Rim: 25  
 Hollins College: 287  
 Holly Springs: 172  
 Holley, Horace: 285  
 Hooper, J. J.: 309  
 Hopewell, Treaty of: 102, 105  
 Horseshoe Bend: 120  
*Horse-Shoe Robinson*: 310-311  
 Houston, Sam: 202  
 Houston county: 111

Huguenots: 64-65  
 Hunter, R. M. T.: 205  
 Huntsville: 116, 121, 122, 123, 125

ILLINOIS: attitude to Missouri controversy, 146  
 Illinois county: 101  
 Illinois Central Railroad: 220  
 Immigration: 197, 262-263  
 Indentured servants: 65-68, 80  
 Indiana: attitude to Missouri controversy, 146  
 Indiana Territory: 131  
 Indians: description, 37-57; conditions in 1830, 166-177; removal, 171-172; *see* particular tribes  
 Irish: 263  
 Iroquoian tribes: 39

JACKSON, Andrew: 105, 120, 126, 188  
 Jackson, "Stonewall": 326  
 Jackson (Mississippi): 124  
 Jackson Purchase: 121  
 James river and Kanawha Canal: 178, 179  
 Jefferson, Thomas: 144, 153  
 Johnson, Reverdy: 238  
 Johnson, Samuel: 102  
 Johnston, A. S.: 321  
 Johnston, J. E.: 322, 325, 326

KANAWHA RIVER: 31  
 Kansas: admission to Union, 258  
 Kansas-Nebraska Bill: 236-237  
 Kennedy, J. P.: 310-311  
 Kentucke county: 96  
 Kentucky: settlement, 95; in revolution, 98-99; separatist movement, 101, 102; statehood, 103; sectionalism, 156; roads, 177; river improvement, 180; Compromise of 1850, 210; neutrality, 317, 321  
*Kentucky Gazette*: 106  
 Kingdom of Accomac: 83  
 King's mountain: 99  
 Know Nothing party: 238  
 Knoxville: 105

LA GRANGE FEMALE COLLEGE: 287  
 Land cessions: Cherokee, 104, 116, 118, 171; Chickasaw, 123, 171; Choctaw, 116, 120, 171; Creek, 110, 118, 120, 165, 171; Osage, 133  
 Land officers: Mississippi Territory, 115, 116, 121; Orleans Territory, 132; Louisiana Territory, 132; Missouri Territory, 135; Arkansas, 137; Louisiana, 137  
 Land systems: Virginia, 97; Kentucky, 103; Georgia, 110, 118; Tennessee, 117  
 Lanier, Sidney: 306-307  
 Lee, R. E.: 322, 326  
 Legaré, H. S.: 284, 300  
 Lewis and Clark expedition: 131, 145  
 Lexington: 100  
 Lexington and Ohio Railroad: 184  
*Liberator*: 195  
 Liberty Hall: 284  
 Licking river: 100  
 Lieber, Francis: 285  
 Lignitic Ridge: 30, 32  
*Life and Labor in the Old South*: 34  
 Lincoln, Abraham: 245  
 Little Rock: 136  
 Lochaber, Treaty: 93  
 Longstreet, A. B.: 284, 307  
 Longstreet, J. B.: 326  
 Louisiana: state, 133-134; parties, 161; Compromise of 1850, 210; secession, 254  
 Louisiana Purchase: 129; exploration, 131; division, 130  
 Louisville: 100  
 Louisville and Nashville Railroad: 220-221, 321  
 Louisville and Portland Canal: 179  
 Louisville, Charleston and Cincinnati Railroad: 181  
*Louisville Courier*: 295  
*Louisville Democrat*: 295  
*Louisville Journal*: 296  
 Loyal Land Company: 92, 93  
 Lundy, Benjamin: 143, 195

- MACADAMIZED ROADS: 177  
 McClary's Path: 115  
 McDonald, C. J: 208, 212  
 McDuffie, George: 284  
 McKee, John: 119, 121  
 McLane, R. M: 239  
 Macon (Georgia): 124, 182, 183, 218  
 Macon, Nathaniel: 162  
 Madison county: 116  
 Magazines: 299-301  
 Mail routes: Kentucky and Tennessee, 106; Mississippi Territory, 124  
 Manassas Gap Railroad: 320  
 "Major Jones' Courtship": 308  
 Manufacturing: 197, 231, 328-329  
 Maryland: settlement, 62-63; sectionalism, 151-155; "revolution of 1837," 163  
 Mason, J. Y: 236  
 Mason and Dixon line: 62; of Indians, 38  
 Mayslick: 100  
 Maysville: 100  
 Maysville and Lexington Turnpike: 177  
 Meigs, R. J: 119, 121, 133  
 Memphis: 124  
 Memphis and Charleston Railroad: 218, 321  
*Mercury* (Charleston): 295  
 Meridian: 123  
 Methodist church: 196  
 Mexican War: 203  
 Military Road: 123  
 Milledgeville: 118, 121, 124, 158  
 Milton, John: 329-330  
*Mirror, The*: 106  
 Mississippi: territory, 112-125; statehood, 125; sectionalism, 156; banks, 189; Southern movement, 206; secession, 254  
 Mississippi and Atlantic Railroad: 184  
 Missouri: settled, 135; territory, 134; statehood, 136; reform, 163  
 Missouri Compromise: 143-145, 237  
 Missouri Pacific Railroad: 226  
 Mobile and Ohio Railroad: 220, 321  
 Montgomery: 122  
 Montgomery and West Point Railroad: 218  
 Morgan, John: 326  
 Morganton-Watauga Trail: 105  
 Muscle Shoals Canal: 179  
 "My Life is like a Summer Rose": 306  
 NASHVILLE: founded, 98; land office, 116; Southern convention, 208; railroads, 217, 233; capture, 321  
 Nashville Basin: 25  
 Natchez: 111, 115, 116, 184  
 Natchez Trace: 116, 124, 166  
 National Bank: 187  
 Natchitoches: 129, 132  
 Negroes: free, 266  
 Neutrality: of Kentucky, 256  
 Newberry College: 286  
 New Madrid: 129  
 New Orleans: prosperity, 216  
 New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad: 220  
 Newspapers: 293-299  
 North Carolina: settlement, 63-64; revolution, 107; land speculation, 100-101; sectionalism, 151-155; constitution of 1835, 162; political parties, 159; river improvement, 179; Compromise of 1850, 210; secession, 256  
 Northern-born in South: 264  
 Northwest: Southern population, 141  
 Nullification: 147-149; attitude of Southern states, 148  
 Novelists: 310-313  
 OCCONEECHI PATH: 54, 76  
 Oconee: 110  
 Ogeechee: 110  
 Ogeechee Canal: 179  
 O'Hara, Theodore: 306  
 Ohio: attitude to Missouri controversy, 146.  
 Ohio Company: 92, 94  
 Opelika: 172

- Opelousas: 132, 137  
 Oregon: 203  
 Orleans Territory: created, 130; land offices, 132; population in 1810, 133  
 Osage Indians: description, 129-130; land cession, 133  
 Ostend Manifesto: 236  
 Overseers: 268  
 Ouachita: 137  
 Ozarks: 18, 135
- PACIFIC RAILROAD: 226, 235, 236  
*Palladium*: 106  
 Palmyra: 173  
 Panic of 1837: 173, 187  
 Paris (Kentucky): 100, 106  
*Partisan Leader, The*: 208  
 Peace Conference (1861): 255  
 Pemberton, J. C.: 326  
 Personal Liberty Bills: 249  
 Petigru, J. L.: 300  
 Phillips, U. B.: 34  
*Picayune* (New Orleans): 297  
 Pierce, Franklin: 235  
 Pike, Z. M.: 131  
 Pillow, G. J.: 209  
 Pine Barren Speculations: 110  
 Plantations: origin, 79; life on, 268-269  
 Planters: characterization, 269-270  
 Pleasants, J. H.: 295  
 Poets: 304-307  
 Political parties: Federalist, 158-159; Republican, 159; Whig, 159-161  
 Polk, J. K.: 202  
 Poor white trash: 273, 276-278  
 Potomac river: 91  
 Prentice, George D.: 295, 296, 307  
 Proclamation of 1763: 93  
 Public schools: 288-291  
 Purchase of arms: 249, 319, 327  
 Pushmataha: 119
- QUAPAW INDIANS: 130, 133  
 Quebec Act: 96, 101  
 Quitman, John A.: 199, 247
- RAFINESQUE: 285  
 Railroads: and western trade, 180, 181, 182, 216-217; in War between the States, 320, 321, 330; *see* individual roads  
 Randolph-Macon College: 286  
*Register* (Mobile): 297  
 Regulators' War: 154  
 Red river: "raft," 33-34; exploration, 131-132  
 Republican party: 245  
 Repudiation: 189  
 Revolution: 107  
 Rhett, R. B.: 199, 208, 209, 247, 295, 329  
 Richmond and Ohio Railroad: 218  
 Richmond College: 286  
 Richmond Convention (1860): 251-252  
*Richmond Enquirer*: 294  
 Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad: 182  
*Rights of Man*: 106  
 Ritchie, Thomas: 294  
 Rivers and Harbors Bill: 203  
 Roads: Wilderness, 94, 98, 99, 106; Cumberland, 104, 105, 116; Natchez Trace, 116, 117, 123, 124; Federal, 116, 117, 122, 124; Georgia, 116, 122; Gaines's Trace, 123; Military, 123-124; Zane's Trace, 124; *see* macadamized roads  
 Roanoke College: 286  
 Roanoke Island: 61  
 Roanoke river: improvements, 179  
*Rob of the Bowl*: 310  
 Robertson, James: 95, 97, 104, 121  
 Rogersville (Tennessee): 106  
 Rome (Georgia): 173  
 Ross, John: 168  
 Ruffin, Edmund: 198, 248  
*Russell's Magazine*: 301
- SAC AND FOX CESSION: 133  
 St. Asaph: 95  
 St. Augustine: 60  
 St. John's College: 154

- St. Louis: 129, 131, 134  
 St. Marks: 185  
 St. Stephens: 115, 122, 125  
 Ste. Genevieve: 129  
 San Lorenzo: 112  
 Santa Fe trade: 135  
 Santee Canal: 179  
 Santee Indians: 38  
 Scotch-Irish: 64-65, 84-85  
 Selma: 122  
 Seminole Indians: 171  
 Separation of churches: 195-196  
 Sequoya: 168  
 Sevier, John: 101, 102, 104, 105, 111  
 Sharkey, W. L.: 206, 208, 209  
 Shawnee Indians: 47-48, 120  
 Shenandoah river: 32  
 Sherman, W. T.: 322  
 Shiloh: 321  
 Shipping: colonial, 82  
 Simms, W. G.: 300-301, 307, 311, 313  
 Slaveholders: 265, 274-275  
 Slavery: origin, 80; sentiment against, 108; in Mississippi Territory, 115, 116; slave population in 1860, 261, 266; slave life, 267-269  
 Slave trade: domestic, 191, 266; in Georgia, 108; in South Carolina, 108  
 Smithland (Kentucky): 103  
 Soulé, Pierre: 236  
 South Carolina: settlement, 63-64; revolution, 107; slave trade, 108; cession of western land, 109, 115; sectionalism, 155-156; constitution of 1790, 155; nullification, 147; Compromise of 1850, 211; secession, 254; public schools, 288-289  
 South Carolina College: 156, 285  
 Southern control of government: 242-243  
 Southern convention: 204-212  
*Southern Literary Gazette*: 300  
*Southern Literary Messenger*: 300  
*Southern Quarterly Review*: 300  
 Southern Railroad: 218  
*Southern Review*: 300  
 Southwestern convention (1845): 215  
 Southwestern Railroad: 218  
 Southwest Point: 104, 105  
 Spanish Treaty, 1819: 136, 145  
 Speculation: colonial, 91-94; Kentucky, 95, 96, 100; Tennessee, 100, 101, 102; Georgia, 110, 111; Mississippi Territory, 122  
 Springfield: 173  
 State rights: 246-247, 326-329  
 Staunton river: 81  
 Steamboats: 124, 135  
 Stephens, A. H.: 238, 242, 255, 329  
 Stuart, John: 93, 98  
*Sun* (Baltimore): 297  
 Sunbury Academy: 284  
*Swallow Barn*: 311  
 Sycamore Shoals, Treaty: 95  
 TAHLONTUSKEE: 133  
 Talladega: 172  
 Tallmadge amendment: 143  
 Tariff: (1816), 146; (1824), 147; (1828), 147; (1842, 1846), 198  
 Taylor, John: 198  
 Taylor, Zachary: 204  
 Telegraph: 224-225  
 Tellico Block House: 104, 105, 112  
 Tennessee: statehood, 105; sectionalism, 157; constitution of 1835, 163; Compromise of 1850, 210; secession, 256  
 Tennessee river: 31  
 Territories: South of River Ohio, 105; Mississippi, 112; Alabama, 125; Orleans, 130; Louisiana, 131; Missouri, 134; Arkansas, 136  
 Texas: settlement, 201; slavery, 202; annexation, 202; admission, 203; secession, 254  
 Thompson, W. T.: 308  
 "To Helen": 305  
 Tobacco: colonial, 81; after revolution, 189-191; in fifties, 229  
 Tobacco manufactures: 190  
 Toombs, Robert: 238  
 Trade: direct with Europe, 197, 225

- Trading posts: Cherokee, 105, 112;  
Creek, 112; Choctaw, 115; Chickasaw, 115; trans-Mississippi, 132-133
- Transylvania Colony: 95, 96, 97
- Transylvania Company: 95
- Transylvania Seminary: 106, 284-285, 286
- Transylvania College: 286
- "Tribute" to North: 192-194
- Trinity College: 286
- Tucker, N. B.: 208, 311
- Tukabahchee: 44
- Turner's Rebellion: 195
- Tuscaloosa: 123
- Tuscumbia: 123
- Tuscumbia and Decatur Railroad: 184
- Tuskegee: 172
- Tyler, John: 255
- UNCLE TOM'S CABIN: 236
- Underground Railway: 195
- University of Virginia: 284-285
- VALLEY, the Appalachian: 28-29
- Vandalia: 94, 96
- Vance, Z. B.: 329
- Vicksburg: 322
- Virginia: settlement, 61-62; revolution, 107; cession of western land, 101; social reform, 108; sectionalism, 151-155; constitution of 1830, 161-162; Wilmot Proviso, 204; Compromise of 1850, 210; secession, 256
- WADDELL'S ACADEMY: 284, 307
- Wake Forest College: 286
- Walker, Dr. Thomas: 92, 94
- Walker, William: 236
- Walker Tariff: 203
- War of 1812: 118-119
- Warehousing system: 199
- Warriors' Trace: 41, 54, 57, 92, 95
- Washington (Kentucky): 100
- Washington College: 154
- Watauga: 95
- West and South: 233, 244
- West Florida: 118, 119, 130
- West Virginia: 318
- Western and Atlantic Railroad: 183
- Whig (Knoxville): 296-297
- Whig (Richmond): 295
- Whig party: origin, 159-160; annexation of Texas, 202; election of 1844, 202; Mexican War, 203; "Southern Address," 205; and Southern convention, 206; effect of Compromise of 1850, 234-235; election of 1852, 235; Know Nothing movement, 238; election of 1856, 238; secession, 250-251; election of 1860, 252
- White river: Cherokee reservation, 133; settlement, 135, 166
- Wilde, R. H.: 306
- Wilderness Road: 96, 99, 105
- Wilkinson, James: 102, 119, 131
- William and Mary's College: 286
- Willington, S. C.: 284
- Wilmot Proviso: 203, 204
- Wolford College: 286
- YANCEY, W. L.: 199, 248, 329
- Yazoo Companies: 111, 122
- Yeadon, Richard: 295
- Yemassee: 313
- Yemassee War: 86
- ZANE'S TRACE: 124













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